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| A Suggested Roadmap to Freedom for the Cambodian People "I would sooner have you hate me for telling you the truth than adore me for telling you lies." (Those are the words of satirist and serial complainer Pietro Aretino, who annoyed the great and not so good of the 16th Century with a flurry of public correspondence to the editors of his age.) ---------------------------------------------------------------------
"Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe."
H. G. Wells
The Outline of History
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"I am only one, but I am still one; I cannot do everything, but still I can do something; and because I cannot do everything, I will not refuse to do the something that I can do."
Edward Everett Hale
Ten Times One is Ten
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"Better to light one candle than to curse the darkness."
Attributed to a Chinese proverb
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"Aides-toi, et le Ciel t'aidera" An old French Proverb meanaing, "Help yourself and Haven will help you." Because nobody can help the Cambodian people to get out of this deadly situation; only the Cambodian people can help themselves. Stop asking for help from other peoples, especially the Vietnamese. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. December 2007
This is an appeal to all decent Cambodian people to think and to make all efforts in order to defend their country of birth, Cambodia, and to give it a better chance to survive the unrelenting Vietnamese pursuit of genocide policy, which had been previously and successfully used against Champa, and now being used against the rest of the once great country of Cambodia especially in Kampuchea Krom. This strategy used by the Vietnamese since they moved dwon from the Red River Delta in the tenth century, known as the "leopard Skin," strategy, which consists of moving into the newly occupied land belonging to the Chams and now the Khmers, first by small groups of Vietnamese consisting of former prisoners and war vetarans, to occupy Khmer land, as in the case of Kampuchea Krom. The most baffling aspect of this 'Leopard Skin' strategy used by Vietnam, is the fact that the Cambodian kings never put up any resistance, let alone any wars, against the Vietnamese 'silent invasion.' Only when the Vietnamese had become too harsh in their treatment of the Cambodian people in that part of lower Cambodia, did they start to revolt against the Vietnamese occupants/invaders. The Khmer kings, not only did not make any move against the Vietnamese aggression, they surrendered to the Vietnamese conquerers, by either marrying a Vietnamese princess and by giving the right to the Vietnamese to use Prey Nokor (now Saigon/Ho chi Minh City) as custom house, as Chey Chhetha II did in the 17th century, or simply surrendering to Vietnamese aggression, as Sihanouk is doing. Of course, that attitude by the Cambodians leaders had led to the conquest of the whole Kampuchea Krom, and now of Cambodia, by Vietnam. Since its birth from a country named Funan, in the early century of the Christian era, then became an empire in the 9th century as a result of the merging of two principalities, Water and land Zenla, Cambodia is now dwindling in a downward sprial without any any limit in sight, due to its god-king dynasties who kept the Cambodian people under their thumb wiothout any identity until today. It is the only country in the world that have not changed since the Angkor time. to have a long history of the rise and fall of the Khmer Empire please, take alook at the sequence of map since the state of Funan in the second century B. until today. It disappeared once in the mid 1800's, and was absorbed by both Siam and Vietnam. Thanks to the people of Cambodia under the leadership of the Okhnas, (one of whom was Mr. Soan Sann's great grandfater Mr.Sun Kuy) the Cambodian people were able to get back their freedom, very briefly, and to be again enslaved under the co-suzereignty of the both Saim and Vietnam, until 1863. Then King Norodom naively invited French Emperor napoleon III to come and 'protect' Cambodia, against Siam and Vietnam's aggression . Of course, the French did not come to protect, but to exploit Cambodia as a colonial possession. Please. take a very careful look at the sequence of those maps showing how Cambodia, after having reached the apex of its power in the 13th century A.D, has since been slowly but steadily disintegrating, mainly due to internal weaknesses. Narnahkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 11, 2008
World order according to Confucius | ON WORLD ORDER: | "To put the world in order, we must first put the nation in order; To put the nation in order, we must put the family in order; To put the family in order, we must cultivate our personal life; And to cultivate our personal life, we must first set our hearts right."
Confucius (551 - 479 B.C.) |
A Suggestion on the Roadmap to Freedom for the Cambodian People (Diagnostics, a Suggested Roadmap for the Survival of Cambodia, and Conclusion) Diagnostics: Despite recent high growth rate of GDP, the finding & conclusion on why Cambodia is a failed state remains unchanged, and can be summarized as follows. The contributing internal and external factors to this failure are: I. Internal problems (For more details on the internal problem under the dictatorship of hun Sen and his CPP, please, see a recent report (February 2008) by Mr. Yash Ghai, the special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General in Human Rights in Cambodia, (posted just below). Judging from its current state of affairs in Cambodia, namely: a. Systemic and prevasive corruption, An anti corruption law is not in existance , today in Cambodia b. Uncontrollable illegal Vietnamese immigration. No result from a recent population census was allowed by the CPP to be published on the number of Vietnamese living legally or illegally in Cambodia c. Abject poverty, extreme imbalance in income distribution. Cambodian economy is controlled by Hun Sen and his extended family as reported by 'Global Witness;' according to a legal analysis (Due Dilligence) done by an American legal firm on SOKIMEX, it was revealed that it has the monopoly of all he most important industrial and trade activities in Cambodia, it also was revealed that SOKIMEX is controlling more than 80 percent of all manufacturing and services business in Cambodia, is 60 percent owned and managed by Sok Kong, a Vietnamese national and a close friend of Hun Sen d. Systemic destruction of the environment e. Epidemic spread of AIDS and other deadly diseases f. Human traffic especially women and child prostitution and trade g. Concentration of wealth and land ownership due to insatiable appetite for wealth accumulation by members of the CPP and Funcinpec, and the eviction and the taking over of the land from poors h.. Gross pervasive abuse of human rights and other civil rights i. Extremely weak legal framework and the politicization of the Judicial system, especially the use of the courts of justice to oppress ansd suppress members of the opposition parties j. The sale of diplomas and degrees at the high school and university levels has jeopardized the future of Cambodia by diluting the quality of manpower, thus economically disadvantages Cambodia vis-à-vis other countries in this very competitive world. Conclusion: Cambodia is a failed state. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- II. External problems a. Until very recently, Cambodia was facing aggression from both; Siam and Dai-Viet. However since the early 1990s, because of the changes in the political system in Thailand, this country has become much less of a problem for Cambodia. By contrast, Vietnam, because of the autocratic and totalitarian nature of its political system remains extremely dangerous for the survival of Cambodia, and still praticing genocide against the Khmer Krom (Please, watch Rebecca Sommer videos titled "Eliminated Without Bleeding" posted below in this page). b. In dealing with Vietnam naked aggression, Cambodia must start reforming from within. The main obstacles are the strong grip of power in Cambodia by the Hun Sen and his CPP with Sihanouk’s support. Therefore, isolating Sihanouk by fully protecting and implementing the content of the constitution is the first step. The next step is to use non-violent means and philosophy or AHIMSA to democratically and non-violently remove Hun Sen and his CPP from power. It will not be easy, but it can be done. c. There is no question in my mind that, Cambodia can learn a great deal from the experiences of Thailand and Vietnam in fighting and overcoming their own respective foreign aggressions. Their experiences clearly show, that only by fundamentally reforming their society, and by embracing new honest and capable leaders, could they recover from national disaster caused by foreign aggressions. Nobdy can save Cambodia but the Cambodian people themselves III. Roadmap and Conclusion The main causes for these economic, institutional, legal, political, and social problems in Cambodia rest mainly on the legacy from the past, especially the institution of the monarchy. The Cambodian people’s blindness and irrational trust and belief in the institution of the monarchy incarnated and perpetuated until today, by the concept of the god-king, since the Angkorian era, and exploited by former King Sihanouk for his personal ego and his family’s benefit, also contributes to the practically downfall of the Cambodian society and nation. Below are suggested recommendendations on the details on how to address the problems in each sector of the society: The pervasive and crushing role of the monarchy combined with the conservative nature of the Cambodian society, such as the belief in prophesies and the rigidity in social organization and behavior contribute to the inertia and the inability to allow new ideas and and capable leadership, and entrepreneurial spirit to emerge. This, in turn, leads to the inability to organize the people to defend and to resist foreign aggressions, especially today naked and unrelenting aggression from Vietnam, and to keep Cambodia perpetually underdeveloped. keep the moarchy within the constraints of the constitutional framework. Only by a progressive and systemic overhaul of the Cambodian society can these problems be gradually being improved, thus allowing the Cambodian people to survive and to prosper. Cambodian Diaspora can and must play a positive role in this challenging and difficult endeavor, by taking full advantage of their freedom and accessibility to education and management and skill formation for the pursuit of material and spiritual well-being, and last but not least, by exercising their constitutional rights to participate fully in the democratic process in those Western democratic countries to influence and to bring about international support to Cambodia. However, the main effort remains in the hands of the Cambodian people themselves to rise up and defend their land and culture (See our letter to senators and President Obama to intervene on behalf of the Khmer Krom, and also see a page in this web site entitled Why I support barack Obama; Reasons why I support Barack Obama). The protection of the rights of the Khmer people should be extended to include those Cambodians who are now living in the Southern part of Vietnam, the Khmer Krom. Their right, Security, and dignity as a minority must be accepted and respected by Vietnam as Cambodia has already accepted this principle regarding the Vietnamese living in Cambodia. The right to return to Cambodia (as Israel grants to all Jews living in the world) must also be granted to all those Khmer Krom who choose to come and live in Cambodia. This can only be done, if and only if, there is a genuine and representative government in Cambodia that can and want to protect all Cambodians against foreign aggressions. On the eocnomic and social front, the first corrective measure is to deal with extreme income inequality. Although significant real growth rates have been recorded in the last few years, due mainly to large inflow of foregn investment (mainly from South korea and China, and other South East Asian countries), because of the concentration of wealth ownership in the hands of the few (Hun Sen and his exended family, and foreigner, especially the Vietnamese-owned SOKIMEX), all income been accumulated by the few politically-powerful families and their friends.
. Recent flare in inflation caused by the spike in the prices of oil and gas, and the prices of primary commodities, especially rice and other goods and services, has exacerbated the level of poverty of the majority of the Cambodian people whose income is derived from the agricultural sector. Normally, the increase in the prices of primary commodities should favor those who make their living in the agriculural sector, ie. the peasants.
However, this is not the case, as the intermediaries who collect the primary products from the peasants, do not pass on the benefit of these price increases to the peasants. the remedy is to have an non-profit and autonomous organization whose role is to facilitate the transfert of price increase to the primary commodities growers, and not to the intermediaries.
Finally, the adoption of an anti-corruption law is a necessary, though not sufficient condition to set the stage for a better and more equitable income distribution and the alleviation of of the abject poverty of the majority of the Cambodian people who depend for their livelihood on the agricultural sector.
Last but not least, is to make sure that the rich and the pwoerful pay due tax on their income and wealth acculumated illegally. This can be done only if there is a law to make sure that Hun Sen and members of his extended family make public the extent and the amount of the enormous wealth they own, and on which would pay due wealth and income tax, in oder to render less vulnerable the economy of Cambodia (See an artilce and a link entitled 'One big happy family in Cambodia' pasted below in this page).
A program of economic structural diversification must be put in place, backed up by an encompassing reform in the quality and level of education in order to increase the level of productivity thus competitiveness, and the income of the workers in all sectors in the Cambodian economy, and also to attract more foreign investment.
Finally, the Hun Sen and his CPP gevernment should use the forthcoming income from oil and gas to develop further the phisical and intellectual infrastructure in the form of building roads, bridges, roads, airport, sea ports, schools, and technological schools and higher learning institutions.
On the legal front, the rule of law must be fairly but strictly implemented, especially the anti-corruption law, without which there is no hope for change in Cambodia in the political, economic, and social fronts.instituted. Only with an independent and non-politicized judicial sytem can this encompassing program be implemented. In order to carry out all these required objectives and reform, an honest, capable, and responsible government must be instituted. That kind of government does not exist, at the moment, in Cambodia.
The United Nations and NGOs can play a crucial role in this case. It would not be an easy process in view of the current and dismal state of affairs in Cambodia. Intractable, yes; impossible, no!
Non-Violence is the only strategic option for the liberation of Cambodia and why What strategy should Cambodians adopt to give Cambodia a better chance to remain free from Vietnamese genocide is as important what behavioral and social changes should Cambodia choose. The strategy to fight for our freedom is already contained in the previous suggestion of a roadmap to freedom for Cambodia. In view of its inherent political, military, , economic, and social weaknesses, there is no other choice but to chjoose that strategy based on the philosophy of non-violence or 'Ahimsa.' Below is the philosophy of Ahimsa which was created by Jainism, in the fifth century B.C. Why should Cambodians espouse the philosophy of Ahimsa? Because, Vietnam had succeeeded in painting itself, - despite its overwhelmingly military strength and power, - as the victim of great powers ' aggressions; while Cambodia was demonized by the Vietnamese, their froeign supporters, and by their Cambodian allies, Hun Sen and Sihanuk, to be the worst demon in the world. In turn, this Vietnamese propaganda had put Cambodia in the worst position to use forces to defend itself, while to invalidate the Vietnamese choice of using military means to 'defend' itself. However, Ahimsa requires a more intelligent, capable, unselfish, and courageous leaders to successfully implement it. Unfortunately, Cambodia, at present and prevailing condition, cannot produce any such high-quality leaders. (Please, for more detailed information on the practice, conceptualization and organization of Ahimsa, see an article posted below.) Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC January 30, 2008. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MEANING OF AHIMSA Ahimsa or non-injury, of course, implies non-killing. But, non-injury is not merely non-killing. In its comprehensive meaning, Ahimsa or non-injury means entire abstinence from causing any pain or harm whatsoever to any living creature, either by thought, word, or deed. Non-injury requires a harmless mind, mouth, and hand. Ahimsa is not mere negative non-injury. It is positive, cosmic love. It is the development of a mental attitude in which hatred is replaced by love. Ahimsa is true sacrifice. Ahimsa is forgiveness. Ahimsa is Sakti (power). Ahimsa is true strength. SUBTLE FORMS OF HIMSA Only the ordinary people think that Ahimsa is not to hurt any living being physically. This is but the gross form of Ahimsa. The vow of Ahimsa is broken even by showing contempt towards another man, by entertaining unreasonable dislike for or prejudice towards anybody, by frowning at another man, by hating another man, by abusing another man, by speaking ill of others, by backbiting or vilifying, by harbouring thoughts of hatred, by uttering lies, or by ruining another man in any way whatsoever. All harsh and rude speech is Himsa (violence or injury). Using harsh words to beggars, servants or inferiors is Himsa. Wounding the feelings of others by gesture, expression, tone of voice and unkind words is also Himsa. Slighting or showing deliberate discourtesy to a person before others is wanton Himsa. To approve of another's harsh actions is indirect Himsa. To fail to relieve another's pain, or even to neglect to go to the person in distress is a sort of Himsa. It is the sin of omission. Avoid strictly all forms of harshness, direct or indirect, positive or negative, immediate or delayed. Practice Ahimsa in its purest form and become divine. Ahimsa and Divinity are one. AHIMSA, A QUALITY OF THE STRONG If you practice Ahimsa, you should put up with insults, rebukes, criticisms and assaults also. You should never retaliate nor wish to offend anybody even under extreme provocation. You should not entertain any evil thought against anybody. You should not harbour anger. You should not curse. You should be prepared to lose joyfully even your life in the cause of Truth. The Ultimate Truth can be attained only through Ahimsa. Ahimsa is the acme of bravery. Ahimsa is not possible without fearlessness. Non-violence cannot be practiced by weak persons. Ahimsa cannot be practiced by a man who is terribly afraid of death and has no power of resistance and endurance. It is a shield, not of the effeminate, but of the potent. Ahimsa is a quality of the strong. It is a weapon of the strong. When a man beats you with a stick, you should not entertain any thought of retaliation or any unkind feeling towards the tormentor. Ahimsa is the perfection of forgiveness. Remember the noble actions of great sages of yore. Jayadeva, the author of Gita-Govinda, gave large and rich present to his enemies who cut off his hands, and obtained Mukti (liberation) for them through his sincere prayers. He said: "O my lord! Thou hast given Mukti to Thy enemies, Ravana and Kamsa. Why canst Thou not give Mukti to my enemies now ?" A saint or a sage possesses a magnanimous heart. Pavahari Baba carried the bag of vessels and followed the thief saying: "O Thief Narayana! I never knew that You visited my cottage. Pray accept these things." The thief was quite astonished. He left off his evil habit from that very second and became a disciple of Pavahari Baba. Remember the noble actions of saints like Jayadeva and Pavahari Baba, you will have to follow their principles and ideals. GRADATIONAL PRACTICE OF AHIMSA When thoughts of revenge and hatred arise in the mind, try to control the physical body and speech first. Do not utter evil and harsh words. Do not censure. Do not try to injure others. If you succeed in this by practice for some months, the negative thoughts of revenge, having no scope for manifesting outside, will die by themselves. It is extremely difficult to control such thoughts from the very beginning without having recourse to control of the body and speech first. First control your physical body. When a man beats you, keep quiet. Suppress your feelings. Follow the instructions of Jesus Christ in his Sermon On The Mount: "If a man beats you on one cheek, turn to him the other cheek also. If a man takes away your coat, give him your shirt also." This is very difficult in the beginning. The old Samskaras (impressions) of revenge, of "a tooth for a tooth", "tit for tat", "an eye for an eye", and "paying in the same coin" will all force you to retaliate. But you will have to wait cooly. Reflect and meditate. Do Vichara or right enquiry. The mind will become calm. The opponent who was very furious will also become calm, because he does not get any opposition from your side. He gets astonished and terrified also, because you stand like a sage. By and by, you will gain immense strength. Keep the ideal before you. Try to get at it, though with faltering steps at first. Have a clear-cut mental image of Ahimsa and its immeasurable advantages. After controlling the body, control your speech. Make a strong determination, "I will not speak any harsh word to anybody from today". You may fail a hundred times. What does it matter ? You will slowly gain strength. Check the impulse of speech. Observe Mouna (silence). Practice Kshama or forgiveness. Say within yourself: "He is a baby-soul. He is ignorant, that is why he has done it. Let me excuse him this time. What do I gain by abusing him in return ?" Slowly give up Abhimana (ego-centred attachment). Abhimana is the root-cause of human sufferings. Finally go to the thoughts and check the thought of injuring. Never even think of injuring anyone. One Self dwells in all. All are manifestations of One God. By injuring another, you injure your own Self. By serving another, you serve your own Self. Love all. Serve all. Hate none. Insult none. Injure none in thought, word and deed. Try to behold your own Self in all beings. This will promote Ahimsa. BENEFITS OF THE PRACTICE OF AHIMSA If you are established in Ahimsa, you have attained all virtues. Ahimsa is the pivot. All virtues revolve around Ahimsa. Just as all footprints are accommodated in those of the elephant, so also do all religious and ethical rules become merged in the great vow of Ahimsa. Ahimsa is soul-force. Hate melts in the presence of love. Hate dissolves in the presence of Ahimsa. There is no power greater than Ahimsa. The practice of Ahimsa develops will-power to a considerable degree. The practice of Ahimsa will make you fearless. He who practices Ahimsa with real faith, can move the whole world, can tame wild animals, can win the hearts of all, and can subdue his enemies. He can do and undo things. The power of Ahimsa is infinitely more wonderful and subtler than electricity or magnetism. The law of Ahimsa is as much exact and precise as the law of gravitation or cohesion. You must know the correct way to apply it intelligently and with scientific accuracy. If you are able to apply it with exactitude and precision, you can work wonders. You can command the elements and Nature also. THE POWER OF AHIMSA The power of Ahimsa is greater than the power of the intellect. It is easy to develop the intellect, but it is difficult to purify and develop the heart. The practice of Ahimsa develops the heart in a wonderful manner. He who practices Ahimsa develops strong will-power. In his presence, enmity ceases. In his presence, cobra and frog, cow and tiger, cat and rat, wolf and lamb, will all live together in terms of intimate friendship. In his presence, all hostilities are given up. The term 'hostilities are given up' means that all beings - men, animals, birds and poisonous creatures will approach the practitioner without fear and do no harm to him. Their hostile nature disappears in them in his presence. The rat and the cat, the snake and the mongoose, and other beings that are enemies of each other by nature, give up their hostile feelings in the presence of the Yogi who is established in Ahimsa. Lions and tigers can never do any harm to such a Yogi. Such a Yogi can give definite orders to lion and tigers. They will obey. This is Bhuta-Siddhi (mastery over the elements) obtainable by the practice of Ahimsa. The practice of Ahimsa will eventually culminate in the realization of unity and oneness of life, or Advaitic (non-dual) Consciousness. The Yogi then enjoys the highest peace, bliss and immortality. LIMITATIONS TO THE PRACTICE OF AHIMSA Absolute Ahimsa is impossible. It is not possible to the most conscientious Sannyasin or monk. To practice that, you must avoid killing countless creatures while walking, sitting, eating, breathing, sleeping and drinking. You cannot find a single non-injurer in the world. You have to destroy life in order to live. It is physically impossible for you to obey the law of non-destruction of life, because the phagocytes of your blood also are destroying millions of dangerous intrusive spirilla, bacteria and germs. According to one school of thought, if by the murder of a dacoit many lives are saved, it is not considered as Himsa. Ahimsa and Himsa are relative terms. Some say that one can defend oneself with instruments and use a little violence also when one is in danger; this is not considered to be Himsa. Westerners generally destroy their dear horses and dogs when they are in acute agony and when there is no way of relieving their sufferings. They wish that the soul should be immediately freed from the physical body. Motive is the chief factor that underlies everything. A renunciate or monk should not defend himself and use violence even when his life is in jeopardy. To an ordinary man, Ahimsa should be the aim, but he will not fall from this principle if, out of sheer necessity and with no selfish aim, he takes recourse to Himsa occasionally. One should not give leniency to the mind in this respect. If you are lenient, the mind will always take the best advantage of you and goad you to do acts of violence. Give a rogue an inch, he will take an ell: the mind at once adapts this policy, if you give a long rope for its movement. Ahimsa is never a policy. It is a sublime virtue. It is the fundamental quality of seekers after Truth. No Self-realization is possible without Ahimsa. It is through the practice of Ahimsa alone that you can cognize and reach the Supreme Self or Brahman. Those with whom it is a policy may fail many a time. They will be tempted to do violent acts also. On the contrary, those who strictly adhere to the vow of Ahimsa as a sacred creed or fundamentals cannon of Yoga, can never be duped into violence.
A tale of two tribunals Written by Long Panhavuth Wednesday, 25 March 2009
(Comments: this article written by Mr. Long Panhavuth is perhaps the best yet anything written by a Cambodia or a foreigner on the masquerade of the so-called ECCC or the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. He definitely has no agenda except not to make the ECCC look like another show trial as the one that was hastily organized by the Vietnamese and their Cambodian protégés in 1979. As I have always used the word “show” to characterize that trial, Mr. Panhavuth does the same in his article. Perhaps, more importantly, he also unmasked the hidden hands of the Hun Sen regime to use this show trial to demonize the Khmer Rouge in order to make his regime more acceptable to the international community and to legitimize his murderous regime by saying that Hun Sen may be bad but not as bad as the Khmer Rouge, and allow the Vietnamese to proclaim themselves as the ‘liberator’ of the Cambodian people, when in fact, they are the ones who created and nurtured the Khmer Rouge to be their surrogates in Cambodia. Only when the Khmer Rouge rejected their domination, did the Vietnamese turn against the Khmer Rouge, but not before allowing the Khmer Rouge to massacre one quarter of Cambodia’s population. Why, because, by allowing the Khmer Rouge to mass-murder their own people, the Vietnamese have gained a lot in weakening the Cambodian capability to defend itself against Vietnamese imperialism. So, the crime of the Khmer Rouge was not only that they had committed mass murder, but more tragically, they had committed murder against the whole nation of Cambodia, by weakening the Cambodian ability to defend itself and by allowing the Vietnamese and Hun Sen to be the lesser evil. This article is therefore one of the best ever written by anybody, no less by a Cambodian. Congratulations Mr. Panhavuth for your courage and belief in the truth and real justice. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 25, 2009)
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The ECCC must be beyond reproach in its form and function, or risk lethal comparisons to its 1979 predecessor. The atrocities committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975, and January 6, 1979, by the Khmer Rouge Regime were the focus of a trial in August 1979, conducted by the People's Revolutionary Tribunal with support from Vietnam and other communist-bloc countries. Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were tried and sentenced to death in absentia. The judgement of that tribunal, however, was not internationally recognised as legitimate and was generally considered to be a show trial. The 1979 tribunal was not independent and utterly failed to respect the right of the accused to basic due process. The 1979 tribunal was conducted precisely to legitimise the political goals of the regime at that time. The current Khmer Rouge tribunal, with the sexy name Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), is the result of more than 10 years of effort and difficult negotiations between the United Nations and the Cambodian government, and is designed to avoid the flaws of the 1979 tribunal. It is a partnership between the government of Cambodia and the United Nations that features a cumbersome structure designed in large part to ensure that the court meets basic international standards for fair trials. The participation of international professionals at all levels of the court - including the judiciary - and a requirement that decisions of the chambers be achieved by "supermajority vote" (a voting process that ensures at least one international judge concur with the decision) flow from concerns about the political commitment of the government to an independent court that meets international standards. How will the ECCC be different from the 1979 tribunal? It should be different in that international participation in the prosecution, judiciary and administration will bring wisdom acquired from the emerging international criminal justice movement rather than from communist leadership with no commitment to judicial independence or fair trials. At the ECCC, it is probably fair to say, further, that the current international participation is not to collude or to legitimise the political goals of the current elites. Their participation is to ensure that the international standards for fair trials are upheld and that political interference or other illegitimate actions are prevented or exposed, but it is probably too early to give the international actors the credit as some of them may, indeed, be here just to collude or to legitimise. A second basic difference between the 1979 tribunal and the ECCC should be demonstrated by the respect of the ECCC for the fair trial rights of the accused, but the ECCC is still struggling to gain credibility and to be a competent court amid corruption allegations within the administration of the Cambodian side. In addition, concerns about basic independence from political interference - evidenced by the disagreement among prosecutors about whether to investigate additional suspects - raises doubts about the hallmark of a fair trial: judicial independence. Furthermore, recent remarks by the government's spokesperson that more prosecutions are unnecessary feed concerns that the decision over who to prosecute is being made by politicians rather than by prosecutors. Finally, unlike the 1979 trial, the ECCC proceedings shall be transparent from beginning to end in order to allow the Cambodian people to have a basic minimum understanding of the proceedings. The current policies of the court to protect almost completely the confidentiality of the investigation process and of proceedings to resolve differences between co-prosecutors or co-investigating judges harms the ECCC's claim to transparency. The ECCC must reassess whether it is making sufficient efforts to distinguish its operations from the 1979 tribunal. The purpose of the ECCC is not merely punishment. It is also to tell more of the truth about the Khmer Rouge and to offer reconciliation with that truth. To succeed in fully distinguishing its work from that of the 1979 tribunal, the ECCC, its partners, donors and all those who act on its behalf must renew efforts to ensure that the court operates consistently according to international standards of justice, free of the taint of corruption or political interference. Furthermore, it must make much greater efforts to ensure that the people of Cambodia have a basic understanding of the proceedings. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Long Panhavuth is a program officer with the Cambodia Justice Initiative, a legal NGO monitoring the Khmer Rouge tribunal.
Cambodia: Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia (http://www.photius.com/countries/cambodia/national_security/index.html)
For a view on Soviet policy toward Vietnam and Cambodia under Gorbachev go to
(http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19870201faessay7828/dimitri-k-simes/gorbachev-a-new-foreign-policy.html), and
http://www.photius.com/countries/cambodia/national_security/cambodia_national_security_vietnamese_invasion_~50.html
Sources: The Library of Congress Country Studies; CIA World Factbook
Back to Cambodia National Security
(Comments: This is a credible account behind the real motivations behind Vietnam’s decision to invade Cambodia and who are involved in this invasion. Vietnam clearly had cleverly planned and plotted the invasion very carefully. They have picked a group of Khmer Rouge, now known as the Cambodian People’s Party of Hun Sen, to be used as front to turn their invasion into “liberation.”
First, they had denied that there was any Vietnamese troop in Cambodia, then they had admitted it. Knowing the Cambodian mentality very well, even better than the Cambodians themselves, the Vietnamese Communists maneuvered the Cambodians to corner them in the international arena by using the Khmer Rouge genocide as the real motivation behind their invasion.
This article also shows that the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia not to save the Cambodian people as they publicly proclaimed, but to bring the recalcitrant Khmer rouge under their control. Once, they have succeeded in kicking out the Khmer Rouge of Phnom Penh, they went on to secure the control of Cambodia by using any means including the infamous K 5 plan in which they had sent Cambodians to plant mine field in malaria infested areas in the west of Cambodia to build the so-called “Bamboo Wall.”
More importantly the article clearly shows how Sihanouk was then working very closely with the Khmer Rouge to fight against the invasion. Now, Sihanouk is supporting Hun Sen and declared publicly that Vietnam did not invade Cambodia but liberate it. Why did Sihanouk change his mind on this important historical fact on which the destiny of the Cambodian nation and people strongly depends on. The answer is the fact that Hun Sen control the Khmer Rouge trial process, he can bring Sihanouk to be tried under the accusation that the former king was indeed a collaborator of the murderous Khmer Rouge. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington January 25, 2009)
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The public unveiling of the KNUFNS dashed any remaining expectations that Cambodian-Vietnamese disagreements could be solved without further armed conflict, because the Hanoi-backed front openly called for the ouster of the "reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique." Because the KNUFNS was far too weak to topple the regime of Democratic Kampuchea, virtually the entire combat burden would fall on Vietnamese forces, which, for this purpose, had been steadily building up troop strength on the border during the preceding months. Nervous Khmer Rouge leaders in Phnom Penh did not have long to wait after the KNUFNS announcement, for, on December 25, 1978, Hanoi launched its offensive with twelve to fourteen divisions and three Khmer regiments (that later would form the nucleus of the KPRAF), a total invasion force comprising some 100,000 people. Vietnamese units struck across the Cambodian frontier in five spearheads that thrust initially into northeastern Cambodia. One task force drove west from Buon Me Thuot (in Dac Lac Province, Vietnam) along Route 13 and Route 14 to capture Kracheh City (the capital of Kracheh Province). A second column attacked west from Pleiku (in Gia Lai-Cong Tum Province, Vietnam), and followed the circuitous Route 19 to capture Stoeng Treng City (the capital of Stoeng Treng Province). In thus concentrating its initial thrusts in the northeast, Hanoi may have had several objectives. One of these may have been to capture quickly substantial expanses of the Cambodian territory that had been an early spawning ground for the Khmer Rouge and its fledgling RAK in the late 1960s. The remoteness of this region would have rendered it difficult to dislodge Vietnamese forces, no matter what the outcome of the war. An early occupation also would have preempted Khmer Rouge units, if they were pressed harder elsewhere, from falling back to this area where they might have enjoyed a measure of public support. The attacks in the northeast also may have been intended to confuse the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea about where the full brunt of the Vietnamese offensive would fall. Khmer Rouge commanders were not deceived by the Vietnamese thrusts toward Kracheh and Stoeng Treng, however, and made no attempt to reinforce the northeast. Instead, they erected their main defense line in an arc across the flat, rice-growing plains of southeastern Cambodia, astride the most probable Vietnamese axes of advance. Their calculation of Vietnamese intentions proved correct, as Hanoi's forces unleashed the full weight of their offensive in this area. From Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province, heavily armed Vietnamese units drove along the axis of Route 7 toward their objective, the river port of Kampong Cham. Farther south, Vietnamese units with air support attacked along Route 1, in the direction of Phumi Prek Khsay (also known as Neak Luong), the Mekong River gateway to Phnom Penh. The fifth and final Vietnamese spearhead drove west from Ha Tien, Vietnam, to capture the ports of Kampot and Kampong Saom, and thus to prevent the resupply by sea of retreating Khmer Rouge forces. Resistance to the invading Vietnamese units by the RAK could have been suicidal, given the disregard for human life previously displayed by the forces of Democratic Kampuchea. Instead, heavy fighting was localized. Major engagements were fought before Kampong Cham and Phumi Prek Khsay and at Tani, inland from the coast of Kampot Province. RAK units, already deprived of experienced commanders by party purges, withered under sustained pounding by Vietnamese artillery and airstrikes, and many of them simply scattered before the Vietnamese offensive, some to regroup later in western Cambodia.
By January 5, 1979, the main Vietnamese spearheads had driven to the eastern banks of the Mekong River. Incomplete evidence hints that the Vietnamese offensive originally may have intended to go no farther. The way to Phnom Penh lay open, however, because the Khmer Rouge units were falling back. Vietnamese forces paused briefly, perhaps to wait for bridging and ferrying equipment and the latest orders from Hanoi, then proceeded to carry out the final assault on Phnom Penh. Khmer Rouge leaders elected not to defend the city, and it fell on January 7. After the fall of the capital, Vietnamese units continued their advance in two columns into western Cambodia, capturing Batdambang and Siemreab. The columns met at Sisophon and drove on to the Thai border, where there was heavy fighting in March and in April. In the meantime, some remaining Khmer Rouge units offered scattered resistance before they melted away into less accessible areas. There the Khmer Rouge leaders soon rekindled an insurgency against the new government in power, just as they had in the late 1960s, and insecurity persisted in the countryside in spite of the continued Vietnamese presence. On the diplomatic front, Vietnam, maintaining it had no troops in Cambodia and attributing the lightning-like victory to the KNUFNS, at first denied responsibility for the invasion. When called before the UN Security Council, however, Hanoi's representative, tacitly admitting the presence of Vietnam and citing numerous Western press reports of Pol Pot's genocidal actions, implied that his country had overthrown the Pol Pot regime in the name of humanitarian and human rights. The Vietnamese sweep through Cambodia produced an unprecedented level of turmoil on the Thai border, as disorganized and bypassed Khmer Rouge units and civilian refugees fled before their advancing enemy. Amid this chaos, in 1979, two anti-Vietnamese insurgent movements, besides the Khmer Rouge, came into being. The first of these was the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF--see Appendix B), the armed wing of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF--see Appendix B), which gave allegiance to Son Sann, a noncommunist, perennial cabinet minister in successive Sihanouk administrations. The other was the Sihanouk National Army (Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste--ANS--see Appendix B), the armed wing of the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif-- FUNCINPEC--see Appendix B), which owed allegiance to Sihanouk. Fighting independently, these noncommunist guerrilla movements and the Khmer Rouge fomented continuous rebellion in the early 1980s that could not be quelled, despite a substantial Vietnamese military commitment to this purpose. Operating from refugee camps on the Thai frontier, the insurgents made forays into the Cambodian border provinces and kept the countryside in a permanent state of insecurity. In the 1984 to 1985 dry season, the Vietnamese military command in Cambodia, frustrated because of depredations by the guerrillas, undertook a sustained offensive to dislodge them from their sanctuaries in the refugee camps. These installations were pounded by artillery and were overrun by Vietnamese tactical units. The operation, which was intended to cripple the Khmer guerrillas, had the opposite effect, however. It drove them away from the border, and they undertook prolonged forays deeper into the Cambodian interior. To restrict guerrilla activity, the Vietnamese erected a physical barrier on the Thai-Cambodian border. Code-named Project K-5, the effort consisted of clearing jungle growth; of erecting obstacles, such as ditches, barbed wire, and minefields; and of building a road parallel to the border. Construction of the project, which began in 1985, was performed by corvée labor. All districts in Cambodia were tasked to provide able-bodied males for tours of duty on the project that ranged from three to six months. Living conditions were primitive in the construction camps, and the diet was inadequate; the area was malarial, and unexploded ordnance from past conflicts was a constant threat. The barrier was completed in 1987 at an unrecorded cost in Cambodian lives. Preliminary indications shortly thereafter revealed that it was having little effect on guerrilla movements to and from the Cambodian interior. Data as of December 1987 NOTE: The information regarding Cambodia on this page is re-published from The Library of Congress Country Studies and the CIA World Factbook. No claims are made regarding the accuracy of Cambodia Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia information contained here. All suggestions for corrections of any errors about Cambodia Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia should be addressed to the Library of Congress and the CIA.
Press Release: Genocide Prevention Task Force Releases Report
For Immediate Release December 8, 2008 Contact: Andrew Hollinger, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. 202-488-6133 Lauren Sucher, United States Institute of Peace. 202-429-3822
Prevent Genocide and Mass Atrocities Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen and other leading figures call on new administration and Congress to make preventing genocide and mass atrocities a national priority
Washington, DC - The Genocide Prevention Task Force today released its final report on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The report makes the case for why genocide and mass atrocities threaten core American values and national interests, and how the U.S. government can prevent these crimes in the future. Jointly convened by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The American Academy of Diplomacy, and the United States Institute of Peace, the Task Force began its work last November with the goal of generating concrete recommendations to enhance the U.S. government’s capacity to recognize and respond to emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities.
'The world agrees that genocide is unacceptable and yet genocide and mass killings continue,' said Madeleine K. Albright, former Secretary of State and Co-Chair of the Genocide Prevention Task Force. We believe that preventing genocide is possible, and that striving to do so is imperative both for our national interests and our leadership position in the world.
'This report provides a blueprint that can enable the United States to take preventive action, along with international partners, to forestall the specter of future cases of genocide and mass atrocities,' said William S. Cohen, former Secretary of Defense and Co-Chair of the Genocide Prevention Task Force. There is a choice for U.S. policymakers between doing nothing and large-scale military intervention. We hope this report will help us utilize those options.
Other Members of the Genocide Prevention Task Force include: John Danforth, Thomas Daschle, Stuart Eizenstat, Michael Gerson, Dan Glickman, Jack Kemp, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Thomas R. Pickering, Vin Weber, Anthony Zinni, and Julia Taft who passed away earlier this year.
The report, which is entitled ‘Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers’, asserts that genocide is preventable, and that making progress toward doing so begins with leadership and political will. The report provides 34 recommendations, starting with the need for high-level attention, standing institutional mechanisms, and strong international partnerships to respond to potential genocidal situations when they arise; it lays out a comprehensive approach, recommending improved early warning mechanisms, early action to prevent crises, timely diplomatic responses to emerging crises, greater preparedness to employ military options, and action to strengthen global norms and institutions. 'We are keenly aware that the incoming president’s agenda will be massive and daunting from day one,' Secretaries Albright and Cohen noted. ‘But preventing genocide and mass atrocities is not an idealistic add-on to our core foreign policy agenda. It is a moral and strategic imperative.’
The Task Force calls for the development of a new government-wide policy on genocide prevention, which would include the following specific actions designed to better equip the U.S. government to prevent genocide and mass atrocities: - Having the president himself demonstrate that preventing genocide is a national priority, for example by an early executive order, and continuing public statements on genocide prevention. - Creating an interagency Atrocities Prevention Committee at the National Security Council to analyze threats of genocide and mass atrocities and consider appropriate preventive action. - Making warning of genocide or mass atrocities an ‘automatic trigger’ of policy review. - Developing military guidance on genocide prevention and response and incorporating it into doctrine and training. - Preparing interagency genocide prevention and response plans for high-risk situations. - Investing $250 million in new funds for crisis prevention and response, with a portion of this available for urgent activities to prevent or halt emerging genocidal crises. - Launching a major diplomatic initiative to create an international network for information-sharing and coordinated action to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. - Providing assistance to build capacity of international partners including the UN and regional organizations to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. - The report concludes that the core challenge for American leaders is to persuade others in the U.S. government, across the United States, and around the world, that preventing genocide is more than just a humanitarian aspiration, but a national and global imperative.
The Task Force was funded by Humanity United and other private organizations.
About the Convening Organizations: The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, a living memorial to the Holocaust, inspires citizens and leaders to confront hatred, promote human dignity and prevent genocide. Federal support guarantees the Museum’s permanence, and its far-reaching educational programs and global impact are made possible by donors nationwide.
The American Academy of Diplomacy is dedicated to strengthening the resources and tools America brings to managing its diplomatic challenges, and accomplishes this through outreach programs, lectures, awards, and writing competitions. In doing so, the Academy promotes an understanding of the importance of diplomacy to serving our nation and enhancing America’s standing in the world.
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase peace-building capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peace-building efforts around the globe.
The report may be downloaded for free at: www.ushmm.org, www.academyofdiplomacy.org, www.usip.org.
"Scream Bloody Murder"; a CNN Program on Genocide Voices of hope in the face of evil · Read · VIDEO By Christiane Amanpour
CNN Chief International Correspondent (CNN) -- No one teaches reporters how to cover a war, much less wars that include genocide. Most of us rely on the wisdom of experienced colleagues and a lot of on-the-job training.
CNN's Christiane Amanpour in a Sarajevo cemetery; she returned to Bosnia for "Scream Bloody Murder."
My first war assignment -- Bosnia, in the 1990s -- included visits to the Sarajevo morgue to see the bodies. How else would a journalist know exactly how many Muslim children were cut down by Bosnian Serb snipers? How else could we put names to civilians left faceless by mortar shells from the surrounding hills? I learned what it means to bear witness. I found my voice and my mission in Bosnia. I learned to seek the facts, to tell the truth no matter how difficult or unpopular. I learned that objectivity meant covering all sides and giving all sides their hearing, but never to draw a false moral equivalence when none exists. I learned never to equate victims with their aggressors. I learned that there are limits to the style of journalism that goes: "On the one hand, on the other hand." Most of all, I learned that as reporters our words and our actions have consequences and that we must use this powerful platform, television, responsibly. But how many times have people asked me, when I've come back from a place like Bosnia or Rwanda: Is it really that bad? I have found that many people want to believe that I am exaggerating. I guess they do not want to believe such evil can exist. Or perhaps they just do not want to be pushed into that moral space where they would have to take a stand and do something. Genocide is hard to imagine -- despite all we know about the Holocaust. Or perhaps, ironically, as a result of it being the most documented event in modern history. Many people now believe that if the extermination is not done on the Nazis' industrial scale or is less than complete, it is not genocide. Don't Miss · In Depth: Scream Bloody Murder They are wrong. Genocide is mass murder with the intent to wipe out a significant part of an ethnic, religious or national group. It means killing people not because of what they did, but because of who they are. It is the world's most heinous crime. And it continues, despite an international treaty written 60 years ago this month. With a unanimous vote on December 9, 1948, the fledgling United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. The signatories committed themselves to act, although the convention does not say what intervention is required. And sure enough, instead of using the convention as a springboard to action, political leaders in the ensuring years have invoked reason after reason not to stop the bloodshed. If there is any hopeful sign, it is in the voices of people with the emotional and intellectual courage to stand up and scream bloody murder -- often at personal or professional risk. Some are members of the political establishment who believe that doing the right thing is also the pragmatic thing to do. Others are ordinary people caught up in extraordinary circumstances. What makes them do it? Over the course of filming a two-hour documentary, I found a few common threads. Watch "Scream Bloody Murder," Thursday December 4 at 9 p.m. ET Unlike politicians who make policy from the detachment of their national capitals, these men and women have been on the front lines. Like Father François Ponchaud, a French missionary in Cambodia when the Khmer Rouge seized power in 1975, they have seen the victims' suffering first hand.
Scream Bloody Murder
Christiane Amanpour introduces you to the courageous few who saw evil and tried to stop the killing.
December 4, 9 p.m. ET
see full schedule »
Like Peter Galbraith, an idealistic staff member on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee who wanted the U.S. to punish Saddam Hussein for using chemical weapons against the Kurds, they are convinced that the accounts of refugees are true. And like Richard Holbrooke, a U.S. diplomat whose Jewish grandfather fled Germany when Hitler came to power, they see where action -- sometimes military action -- can make a difference. None considered himself a hero. And some, like Canadian Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, who led a U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda, believe they did not do enough. Dallaire was one of those good men who put on a uniform and felt that it meant something, that he was actually there to make a difference. Unfortunately, he was sent to Rwanda with an impossible mandate and without the backing of the international community. He was helpless to stop the slaughter of 800,000 to 1 million ethnic Tutsis at the hands of their Hutu countrymen. Imagine if that had happened to you or me? How would we be able to live with ourselves? In any single crisis, I can understand that political leaders are under pressure not to intervene. But stepping back to look at the consistent pattern, one must ask: Is it acceptable?
Amanpour Live CNN's Christiane Amanpour takes your questions about genocide in a 30-minute special on CNN.com Live
December 4, 1 p.m. ET
iReport.com: Submit questions »
see full schedule »
In the 1970s, the Carter administration touted human rights as a core value in U.S. foreign policy, but knew that military intervention against the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was politically inconceivable after the disastrous war in Vietnam. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration was courting Iraq as an ally against Iran and as a market for U.S. exports when Saddam Hussein was gassing the Kurds; a punishing trade embargo would have destroyed the budding relationship. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration would not take military action against the Bosnian Serbs without backing from the European allies. And some U.S. officials even avoided characterizing the slaughter in Rwanda in 1994 as genocide lest it lead to a call for action under the U.N. Genocide Convention. Military force: The last resort? Or the first resort? » But three years into the Bosnian war -- after the massacre at Srebrenica -- the U.S. finally forged a coalition of previously reluctant allies to bomb the Bosnian Serb military positions. They stopped the war, then led the peace process and the peace enforcement that has survived to this day. And because we the press, the storytellers, finally made it impossible for our Western democratic governments to tolerate mass murder of men women and children in the age of 24/7 satellite TV, 3½ years later, the U.S. led its allies in a pre-emptive strike against genocide in Kosovo. NATO, established to protect the West during the Cold War, had launched its largest military strike -- for a purely humanitarian mission. And today, there is a grass-roots American movement that has brought the genocide in Darfur to such prominence.
We're always told that evil happens when good men do nothing. And the question -- my question as a reporter and as a witness to history is: Will we ever learn? Or will I or my children or my successors be reporting on this same kind of atrocity and inhumanity for years and years to come? This is what I don't understand about the human race. So thank goodness for the few good men and women who summon the courage to do something in the face of evil, to stand up and confront it. They give me hope. E-mail to a friend
Share this on: Mixx Digg Facebook del.icio.us reddit StumbleUpon MySpace | Mixx it | Share Priest tried to warn of Cambodia's insanity - Story Highlights
- Francois Ponchaud was sent to do missionary work in Cambodia in 1965
- A priest, he became a crusader against the worst genocide since the Holocaust
- Ponchaud kept a dossier of refugee accounts and radio transmissions
- His articles and book helped expose the Khmer Rouge's brutal totalitarian regime
- Next Article in World »
· Read · VIDEO · INTERACTIVE
By Erika Colin
CNN
PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (CNN) -- Francois Ponchaud was a newly ordained Catholic priest when he arrived in Cambodia in 1965 from a small village in France.
Francois Ponchaud said refugees' accounts of the genocide "went beyond my wildest imagination."
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He was sent to do missionary work. But within a decade he would become a crusader against the worst genocide since the Holocaust. "I was staying by the Cambodian people's side," Ponchaud said, "through the good and the sadness and the suffering." When he arrived at age 26, Cambodia was a peaceful place: a bucolic land of villages, peasants, rice paddies and Buddhist monks. Ponchaud studied Cambodian history and Buddhism, became fluent in Khmer, made friends and immersed himself in the culture -- falling in love with the country and its people. But the peacefulness was short-lived. By 1970, Cambodia was descending into chaos as the Vietnam War spilled across its borders. In the countryside, the Americans were carpet-bombing Vietcong outposts. In the capital, Phnom Penh, Washington was propping up a corrupt government. From the jungles, a sinister and brutal communist rebel group called the Khmer Rouge was fighting to overthrow Cambodia's U.S.-backed regime.
Scream Bloody Murder
Christiane Amanpour introduces you to the courageous few who saw evil and tried to stop the killing.
December 4, 9 p.m. ET
see full schedule »
On April 17, 1975, Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge. They began to reinvent Cambodia according to an insane blueprint. They emptied the cities, including some 3 million in the capital, forcing all the residents into the countryside -- and toward a dark future. "As of noon, all the people started leaving," Ponchaud said. "Then I saw all my friends who were leaving. ... There were hundreds of thousands of people who were trudging along a few kilometers an hour. It was truly a staggering sight. Incredible." Watch Ponchaud describe the exodus from Phnom Penh » Ponchaud was told to stay at the French Embassy, where thousands fleeing Phnom Penh desperately sought asylum. One of the few foreigners able to communicate with the Khmer Rouge, he spent days at the embassy gate, trying to negotiate. Watch Ponchaud discuss the significance of the embassy gate » In the weeks that followed, the Khmer Rouge let him leave the embassy twice. Both times he searched for clues about what was happening in the country. But Phnom Penh was empty. Read a reporter's notebook of his journey through Cambodia's killing fields » Ponchaud was expelled from the city in the last evacuating convoy, as the Khmer Rouge forced all foreigners onto trucks and out of the country. At the border, Ponchaud broke down, weeping. "It was as though we had gone mad," he said. "We were getting out of a country of the living dead." With the country sealed, the Khmer Rouge went about creating their new Cambodia -- and the killing began in earnest. The Khmer Rouge envisioned a return to Cambodia's medieval greatness -- a "pure" nation full of noble peasant farmers. Don't Miss · In Depth: Scream Bloody Murder · Former Khmer Rouge: 'If you don't do what they say, you die' · Killing fields survivor documents Cambodian genocide · Reporter's notebook: Cambodia's killing fields For that, though, they had to purge everyone else: the rich, the religious, the educated, anyone from a different ethnic group. "All those who were opposed to the government were killed," Ponchaud said. "And all those who didn't work quite hard enough were killed." Hundreds of thousands were worked -- or starved -- to death. "Perhaps a good chunk -- a solid half -- died from sickness and lack of health care," he said. By September 1975, Ponchaud was back in France and ready to resume his work. His missionary society in Paris asked him to keep track of events in Cambodia. He quickly became the "go-to" person for Cambodian refugees arriving from Thailand, and he began documenting their stories. At first, Ponchaud had a hard time believing the accounts of execution, torture, deportation, forced labor and starvation. Read how a Khmer Rouge survivor is documenting the genocide "They were burning villages ... sending people into the forest without giving them anything to eat," Ponchaud said. "It went beyond my wildest imagination." Horrified, Ponchaud devised a plan to gather more information: A friend living on the Cambodian border would record and send him broadcasts from Radio Phnom Penh -- the official voice of the Khmer Rouge -- in which the government described its transformation of the country. Read a former Khmer Rouge member's account of the killings Ponchaud found that the broadcasts substantiated the refugees' claims. As unbelievable as those claims were, the broadcasts told of the same policies. What the refugees were saying was true. "I decoded the radio -- the official declarations. And then the refugees would give me the 'experienced' side. It matched up," he said. "On one hand, the ideology, and on the other, the lived experience." Watch Ponchaud describe how he was able to decode the Khmer Rouge ideology » For months, Ponchaud gathered and documented information, repeatedly denouncing the Khmer Rouge. His testimonials appeared in the French press as early as October 1975. He also wrote to the president of France and Amnesty International, and appeared before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Watch Ponchaud discuss his efforts to alert people to the genocide » In 1976, angered by inaccuracies in Le Monde's reporting on the Khmer Rouge, Ponchaud fired off a letter to the newspaper's editor -- along with a dossier of refugee accounts and radio transmissions. He was contacted immediately and asked to write for the newspaper. His articles were published in February 1976. Watch Ponchaud tell the Le Monde story » Though few accounts of Cambodia's nightmare were appearing in the press, the U.S. government was receiving frequent briefings about what was happening there. In a meeting in November 1975, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger acknowledged the brutality of the Khmer Rouge. But he also knew that they shared an enemy with the U.S. -- Vietnam. "Tell the Cambodians that we will be friends with them," Kissinger told an official in the region, according to a declassified State Department account. The Khmer Rouge "are murderous thugs," he said, "but we won't let that stand in our way." Read Kissinger's words in the declassified State Department document (pdf) By 1977, the Khmer Rouge had been in power for two years, and much of the world remained unaware or uninterested. Many who did hear accounts of Khmer Rouge brutality found them hard to believe. Even prominent liberals and intellectuals doubted that a supposedly egalitarian peasant movement would perpetrate such horrors on their own people.
Amanpour Live CNN's Christiane Amanpour takes your questions about genocide in a 30-minute special on CNN.com Live
December 4, 1 p.m. ET
iReport.com: Submit questions »
see full schedule »
Ponchaud then published a startling book called "Year Zero." It was one of the first to expose the brutal totalitarian regime of the Khmer Rouge to the world. Still, no help came for Cambodia. "I was pretty frustrated," he said. "The governments did not react. You know, countries don't defend human rights. They are always subservient to politics." In January 1977, the inauguration of President Jimmy Carter promised a change. Carter vowed to put human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy. But it would take 15 months for him to publicly condemn the Khmer Rouge as the world's "worst violator of human rights." Even then he took no action to stop the slaughter. Invasion, he said, was not an option for a country still recovering from the Vietnam War. Instead, in December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia after years of cross-border skirmishes. The Vietnamese quickly overthrew the Khmer Rouge, who fled back into the jungle. The world would finally start to see that all Ponchaud had said was true. More than 2 million Cambodians were dead. The scope of the catastrophe quickly became clear. In the fall of 1979, Carter responded, raising $32 million to help the refugees.
Today, Ponchaud is back in Cambodia, continuing his efforts for the Cambodian people, building schools, holding Mass and working on local projects. Often referred to as "the friend of the Cambodians," he is considered an expert on the country. But this time he has no illusions. "No one defends human rights," he said. "Governments are cold beasts looking out for their own interests." E-mail to a friend
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Our Cambodian-American group's activites to help Cambodia In my suggest Road map to freedom for the Cambodian people (posted just above in this page), I had specifically mentioned the role of the Cambodian Diaspora as follows; Cb "Cambodian Diaspora can and must play a positive role in this endeavor, by taking full advantage of its freedom and accessibility to education, management and skill formation for the pursuit of material and spiritual well-being, and last but not least, by exercising their constitutional rights to participate fully in the democratic process in those Western democratic countries to influence and to bring about international support to Cambodia. However, the main effort remains in the hands of the Cambodian people themselves. " Following that prescription, here are some selected acitivities of our group, as part of our efforts to save our people from certain death, namely, consisting of allerting members of the US Congress on the tragic condition and plight of the Cambodian people living in South Vietnam, known as the Khmer Krom (Cambodians from lower Cambodia). They have been subjected to wholesale mistreatment byu the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), which by definition, amounts to a genocide, as reported by a German human right advocate and film-maker, Rebecca Sommer entitled "Eliminated without bleeding." (please, see that video from the link contained in tour letter to the US senators posted below) Unfortunately, the majority of Cambodians, especially the Hun Sen government with the tacit approval of Sihanouk, not only did not help our Khmer Krom compatriots, but, instead, they are helping the SRV in its continued policy systemic and systematic mistreatment of the Khmer Krom people, For instance, the Hun Sen government had kinapped the Reverend Tim Sakhorn, a Bhuddist monk, Patriarch of a pagoda in Takeo province, and then secretely delivered him to the SRV to be tried and quickly condemned for breaking the so-called treaty of' Friendship and cooperation' between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Hun Sen's government. As part of my 'suggested road map to Freedom for the Cambodian people', and as Cambodian-Americans, our group has written letters (posted below) to all 100 US senators to allert them of this plight of the Khmer Krom people, and to ask them to take up and incorporate the wholesale mistreatment of the Khmer Krom by the SRV issue when the Senate will discuss House Resolution 3096 on human rights violation in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and to incorporate the Khmer Krom genocide issue into the US Senate version of that resolution. Wahsington DC. February 17, 2008 Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D.
Khuang Abhaiwongse (Prime Minister of Thailand of Khmer origin) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search (Comments: Recently, a lot of Cambodians, especially those who are from overseas have been very excited and very nationalistic with regard to the row with Thailand on the recent Preah Vihear dispute. By so behaving, these well-meaning people have forgot that they are playing into the bloody and treacherous hands of Hun Sen who has been using the old conflict between Thailand and Cambodia to deflect the real and deadly problem for Cambodia's survival, that is the Vietnamese imperialism and genocidal practice against the Khmer people and the Khmer Krom, in particular. These so-called nationalists should have asked themselves the following questions: (1) which one of the two neighboring countries is more deadly for Cambodia, Thailand or Vietnam; (2) which of the two Cambodian minorities who are now living in Soutn Vietnam (Khmer Krom) and Surin province (Khmer Surin) in Thailand are being liquidated, the Khmer Krom or the Khmer Surin? (3) Is Hun Sen a nationalist or a Traitor? Without any doubt in my mind, it is the Khmer Krom who are being physically and culturally eliminated (defined as genocide according to the geneva convention on genocide), and not the Khmer Surin. On the contrary, the Khmer Surin are being totally integrated into the Thai society, and even one of them (Khuang Aphaivong became prime minister of Thailand three times during the 1940's, as the article pasted below has shown. Please, think again, before pushing Cambodia even closer into the abyss, by emotionally and blindly supporting Hun Sen in his Marchialvelian scheme to make Thailand the enemy number one of Cambodia; when in reality, it is Vietnam that is the main enemy of the Cambodian people as the whole content of this web site has shown. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. November 24, 2008)
Major Luang Khuang Abhaiwongse (May 17, 1902 - March 15, 1968; Thai ควง อภัยวงศ์) was three times the prime minister of Thailand. Khuang was born in Battambang now belonging to Cambodia as the son of the Siamese governor of the province Battambang, Chao Phraya Abhayabhubet. He visited the Debsirin school and the Assumption College, Bangkok, and studied engineering at the Ecole Centrale de Lyon in France. After his return to Thailand he worked in the telegraph department, finally becoming the director of the department. During World War II he received the title Major, as he joined the guard of King Rama VII. This service also earned him the title Luang Kowitabhayawongse. In the governments of Phraya Phahol Pholphayuhasena and Plaek Phibunsongkhram he became minister, and was elected as prime minister on August 1, 1944, after Plaek's plans to move the capital to Phetchabun and to create the Phutthamonthon park failed to get enough approval from the parliament. On August 17, 1945 he resigned to make way for a new administration. In 1946 he was one of the founders of the Democrat Party, and became its first leader. The fourth national elections on January 6, 1946 were won by the Democratic Party, which gained him a second term as prime minister starting on January 31. Only 45 days later, on March 24, his government lost an election in parliament and he resigned. He became prime minister a third time on November 10, 1947 following a coup d'état led by Phin Chunhawan. However, the coup leaders were not pleased with the performance of Khuang's government and forced him to resign on April 8, 1948. This also ensured Plaek to become prime minister again. Khuang continued in politics as the opposition leader and leader of the Democratic Party.
Khmer Krom gather in Mekong Delta for festival celebrations | | | |
(Comments: Khmer from Kampuchea Krom are very resilient and continue to fight for their survival a race and a community. The chance for their success is very slim as long as the Hun Sen regime backed by Sihanouk continues to submit to the Vietnamese imperialism.
It is unfortunate that some Khmer krom In a recent telephone conversation, I heard a young Cambodian American of Khmer Krom ancestry told me that he felt more confortable with the Vietnamese than with the Thai. Despite all the ongoing genocidal acts committed against them by the Vietnamese, some Khmer Krom still believe that they are better treated by the Vietnamese than their compatriots, the Khmer Surin in Thailand.
This kind of irrational attitude makes me feel more pessimistic than ever before about the viability of the Khmer Krom community in South Vietnam, and about the survival of the Cambodian people in particular. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. November 15, 2008)
The Phnon Penh Post; Written by kay kimsong | Friday, 14 November 2008 |
LOST LANDS Kampuchea Krom covers an area of 89,000 square kilometres in southern Vietnam. The Khmer Kampuchea Krom Foundation claims eight million ethnic Khmers live in the region, facing cultural and religious persecution by the Vietnamese government.
Despite government restrictions on religious practices, Khmers in southern Vietnam take part in the traditional Cambodian festival
THOUSANDS of ethnic Khmers known as Khmer Krom turned out Tuesday and Wednesday to celebrate the annual Water and Moon Festival in southern Vietnam, witnessing two days of dragon boat races and other festivities.
Thirty dragon boats competed for prizes in the event, which was chaired by the Vietnamese provincial governor and the head Buddhist monk, according to the Khmer Kampuchea Krom Association.
Yoeun Sin, head of the Khmer Krom Monks' Association, said up to a million Khmer Krom from across the Mekong Delta attended the Water Festival celebrations in Vietnam's Soc Trang province - known in Khmer as Khleang.
In kampuchea krom, we can't implement everything we would wish for.
"Many monks came to support the dragon boats from each province," said Yoeun Sin, adding that the celebration was vital to preserve Khmer culture inside Vietnam.
"We have to organise the Water Festival every year to remember our traditions and cultural practices," he said.
Yoeun Sin added that the Khmer Krom boat races, which were held at a local dike, lacked the support of concurrent events inside Cambodia.
"There are no big sponsors here like in Phnom Penh," he said. "But Kampuchea Krom monks are following their boats and have supported them with food and money. The special thing [here] is that monks have freedom to support and watch the boat races freely."
Preserving Khmer culture
Hul Pirom, 26, a Khmer Krom student at Pannasastra University in Phnom Penh, said that cultural practices - including the celebration of the festival - were limited by the Vietnamese government and less lavish than the national festival organised in Preah Vihear.
"I am very proud of the government for an exciting celebration of the Water Festival," he said. "In Kampuchea Krom, we can't implement everything we would wish for," he added.
Thach Setha, president of the Khmer Kampuchea Community, said the festival was a way for the Khmer minority in southern Vietnam to resist government oppression.
"Every family in Kampuchea Krom celebrates the Water Festival to remember Khmer heroes and military commanders who once protected the territory," he said. "The special meaning of the festival is to demand freedom."
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One big happy family in Cambodia By Bertil Lintner Asia Times March 20, 2007 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cambodia’s family tree link by global Witness (http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/546/en/cambodias_family_trees) --------------------------------------------------------------- PHNOM PENH - Cambodia's rough-and-tumble politics have long been bloody, marred by frequent political assassinations and violence. But never before have they been quite so blood-linked. The English-language fortnightly Phnom Penh Post published without comment in late February a family tree it had compiled, revealing how the top leaders of the ruling Cambodia People's Party (CPP) have become more intimate through an old-fashioned Cambodian custom: arranged marriage. And the growing family ties run all the way to the top of Cambodia's political pyramid, Prime Minister Hun Sen, Southeast Asia's longest-serving leader. For instance, there is Hun Sen's brother, Hun Neng, currently serving as governor of Kompong Cham, whose daughter, Hun Kimleng, is married to the deputy commissioner of Cambodia's National Police, Neth Savoeun. Meanwhile, Hun Neng's son, Hun Seang Heng, is married to Sok Sopheak, the daughter of Sok Phal, another deputy commissioner of the National Police. Hun Sen's 25-year-old son, Hun Manith, is married to Hok Chendavy, the daughter of Hok Lundy, the National Police commissioner. Another of the premier's sons, Hun Many, 24, is married to Yim Chay Lin, the daughter of Yim Chay Li, secretary of state for rural development. One of Hun Sen's daughters, Hun Mali, 23, meanwhile, is married to Sok Puthyvuth, the son of Sok An, Hun Sen's right-hand man and minister of the Council of Ministers. The friendship between Hun Sen and Sok An dates back to the early 1980s, when Hun Sen was foreign minister and Sok An director of the office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Now those personal ties run blood deep as in-laws. And that's just a sampling of the connections at the highest echelons. Heng Samrin, who was Cambodia's head of state from the Vietnamese invasion in January 1979 to the United Nations intervention in 1991, and now serves as president of the National Assembly and honorary CPP president, has a daughter named Heng Sam An, who is married to Pen Kosal, an adviser to Sar Kheng, deputy prime minister and minister of the interior - as well as brother-in-law of Senate and CPP president Chea Sim. Heng Samrin's adviser, Cham Nimol, is the daughter of Cham Prasidh, minister of commerce. Another of Cham Pradish's daughters, Cham Krasna, is engaged to Sok Sokann, another of minister Sok An's sons. Sar Kheng's son, Sar Sokha, meanwhile, is married to Ke Sunsophy, daughter of Ke Kim Yan, commander-in-chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. And Hun Sen's wife, Bun Ramy, currently serves as president of the Cambodian Red Cross, while its second vice president, Theng Ay Anny, aka Sok An Anny, is Sok An's wife. Family traditions There has been no official reaction to the Phnom Penh Post's revealing study. Intermarriage among members of the ruling political and business elites is not uncommon in Asia. In neighboring Thailand, Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan's son, Chatichai Choonhavan, became prime minister of Thailand, while his daughter, Khun Ying Udomlak married Phao Sriyanond, director general of the Thai police. Another high-ranking Thai army officer, Thanom Kittikachorn, was the brother-in-law of fellow military dictator Praphas Charusathien, while his son, Narong Kittikachorn, also became a military strongman, while his sister Songsuda married Suvit Yodmani, who has served with several Thai governments. Sino-Thai tycoons are known to have arranged their children's marriages to members of other top business families to progress their commercial interests. But in Cambodia's case, where many of the political elite were wiped out during Khmer Rouge-led purges between 1975 and 1979, the number of political marriages is extraordinary. And these new family ties between the children of ministers and top officials potentially set the stage for the CPP's grip on power to continue for generations. Significantly, the CPP's family connection is emerging simultaneously with a waning of the royal family's influence over national politics. Ever since Hun Sen and his inner circle of friends and advisers ousted former prime minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh in a 1997 coup, the royalist Funcinpec party's political fortunes have waned. Ranariddh was forced into exile after the bloody putsch that killed many of his party members, but later returned to Cambodia to become president of the National Assembly after inconclusive general elections in 2003, when the CPP was unable to garner enough votes to form a one-party government and after much squabbling joined with Funcinpec in a wobbly coalition. One of the sons of former king Norodom Sihanouk and half-brother of the present monarch, Sihamoni, Ranariddh resigned that post last March and subsequently left the country again. While he was away, he was dismissed as co-chairman of the Council for the Development of Cambodia as well as the National Olympic Committee. He later returned to Cambodia - and was ousted as president of Funcinpec, the main opposition party, amid an internal power struggle in October that many political analysts believe Hun Sen had a hand in. Not surprisingly, perhaps, several of Funcinpec's original leaders were also related. Ranariddh's uncle and former king Norodom Sihanouk's younger half-brother, Norodom Sirivudh, served as foreign minister in a Funcinpec-led government in 1993. Ranariddh's half-brother, Norodom Chakrapong, meanwhile, helped found Funcinpec but later defected to the CPP. Their half-sister and Sihanouk's eldest child, Norodom Bopha Devi, has served as minister of information and culture, while her latest consort, Khek Vandy, was elected to the National Assembly on a Funcinpec list in 1998. But Funcinpec's family pride has waned considerably since it emerged as the biggest party in the UN-supervised elections in May 1993, when it captured 45% of the popular vote and outpaced the CPP, which came in a close second with 38%. Many political observers think Ranariddh's recent ouster from Funcinpec may represent his last political gasp. His former Funcinpec colleagues recently sued him on allegations that he embezzled US$3.6 million from the sale of the party's headquarters last August. The Phnom Penh Municipal Court found the prince guilty and sentenced him - in absentia - to 18 years in prison. Ranariddh had recently set up a new party, aptly named the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP). Funcinpec, the NRP and the opposition Sam Rainsy Party will be among 10 different political parties standing against the CPP juggernaut in upcoming commune council elections, which are scheduled for April 1 and widely viewed as a bellwether indicator for next year's general elections. It may well be an April Fool's election, with the opposition fractured and vulnerable and the CPP allegedly pursuing a campaign of violence and intimidation against opposition candidates and their supporters in rural areas. Khieu Kanharith, CPP minister of information, predicted on February 22 that his party would win about 97% or 98% of the positions in the commune councils, and 95% of the vote in the general elections next year. That may well be the case, as Cambodia is fast morphing into a one-party state dominated by the CPP. The Phnom Penh Post in its February 9 edition quoted a foreign diplomat as saying: "The CPP controls the government, the National Assembly, the Senate, 99% of the village chiefs, the provincial governments. Their influence goes through the judiciary, through the police ... Practically everything is controlled by one party." That assessment would appear to jibe with 55-year-old Hun Sen's January 9 pronouncement that he does not intend to stand down from the premiership until he is at least 90 years old. By then, a third generation of CPP family-tied politicians and officials, if everything goes according to the apparent plan, will just be coming of political age. Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review, where he reported frequently on Cambodian politics and economics. He is currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media Services. (Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Cambodia, Vietnam vow to boost bilateral ties ASEAN BUSINESS; November 10-16, 2008
(Comments: the article posted below is another ominous sign that Hu Sen is just a stooge of the Vietnamese. He is no Cambodian patriot as he recently tried to fake his way through in the Preah Vihear controversy with Thailand. The sadest part obout this Preah Vihear confict is the fact that so many well-menaing but short-sighted Cambodians including those who are living overseas, were so worked up by Hun Sen's fake nationalism that they forgot who Hun Sen really is. All objective and well known observers have indicated that Hun Sen is not a Cambodian patriot but a Vietnamese stooge, as this article has shown. He is, to simply put, a traitor. Now, let 's ask ourselves a fundamental question; can a traitor be a nationalist at the same time? Think again, my fellow-Cambodians. Cambodia cannot afford to fight on two fronts. Hun Sen had used the Preah Vihear issue for the sole purpose to divert the attention from the deadly and long-standing grip of Vietnam on Cambodia, known as 'Nam Tien,' as he did in 2003, when he organized a frenzy mob to sack and burn a number of Thai business firms in Phnom Penh. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. November 11, 2008) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cambodia and Vietnam agreed Nov 4 in Hanoi to intensify their friendship and comprehensive cooperation to lift the ties to a new height in the years to come.
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Vietnamese counterpart Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung expressed their satisfaction at the development of bilateral relations over the recent past during their talks held after a welcome ceremony in Hanoi, Vietnam News Agency (VNA) reported.
Vietnamese PM Dung stressed the significance of the visit by the Cambodian PM, saying that the visit would help strengthen neighborliness and comprehensive cooperation between the two countries. The Vietnamese government leader spoke highly of his Cambodian counterpart’s contribution to cementing friendly and cooperative ties between the two sides and congratulated him on being re-elected as Cambodian Prime Minister for the fourth term.
Hun Sen said his visit aims to enhance friendship and comprehensive cooperation between the two countries. He thanked the Vietnamese Government and people for their assistance to Cambodia in the past as well as during the current national construction and development. The two PMs agreed to promote the exchange of visits by delegations at all levels to increase mutual understanding and give priorities to cooperation in human resources development, trade and investment, energy, mining, oil and gas, industrial crops and transport.
The two sides were unanimous in creating favorable conditions for trade and service activities in order to raise two-way trade to more than US$2 billion by 2010, and encouraging cooperation between localities.
They also agreed to continue their close cooperation in security and defense, as well as the fight against terrorism, transnational crimes, smuggling, and drug and human trafficking. The two sides reaffirmed their principle of preventing all hostile forces from using the territory of either country to do harm to the other and undermining the Cambodia-Vietnam friendly and cooperative ties. The two PMs highly valued the achievements made in the planting of border markers and affirmed their determination to accelerate the work in the principle of strictly observing the 1985 treaty on land border demarcation and the 2005 supplementary treaty. They were resolved to complete the historical work in the first six months of 2012.
During the talks, the two PMs also exchanged views on regional and international issues of mutual concern and agreed to further their cooperation at international and regional forums. Following the talks, the two PMs witnessed the signing of five agreements, including the ones on visa exemption for ordinary passport holders, transit of goods and railway cooperation.
Other cooperation agreements were reached between the Cambodian and the Vietnamese Ministry of Information and Communications, and between the Cambodian National Radio and the Radio Voice of Vietnam.
Vietnam Genocide Against Khmer Kampuchea Krom Link to Khmer Krom wholesale persecution by Vietnam entitled ‘Eliminated without Bleeding’ (Comments: a word of caution before watching this series of film clips on how Vietnam is committing an ongoing genocide to eradicate our brothers and sisters from Kampuchea Krom from the surface of the earth, while Sihanouk and Hun Sen claim that it is not a Cambodian problem but an internal problem of Vietnam. Please, click either on the underlining title "ELIMINATED WITHOUT BLEEDING' pasted below to watch this sequence of film clips showing an extemely detailed depiction of how much suffering our Cambodian brothers and sisters are enduring daily from the murderous hands of the Vietnamese government. If the Khmer Krom are allowed to perish without anything done to help them from all of us, we certainly are going to disappear soon as well. So, wake up Cambodians, wherever you may be living now. The end is very near. Naranhkiri Tith Ph. D. Washington DC, November 27, 2007)
ELIMINATED WITHOUT BLEEDING is a one-hour documentary on the Khmer Krom (Cambodians from lower Cambodia) indigenous peoples who are living in their ancestral land in the Mekong Delta in Southern Vietnam. The Khmer Krom explain how they are oppressed and eliminated as a minority people. There is no freedom of speech, religion or culture. Aggressively Vietnamized, the Khmer Krom struggle to maintain their way of life and identity. Please, to watch the tragic and horrible saga of the Khmer compatriots from Kampuchea Krom vividly captured by this set of film clips. to watch, please, either click on the link pasted below, or copy and paste it on a 'http' browser. http://rebeccasommer.org/documentaries/Khmer-Krom/index.php
Vietnam’s Expansionism in Indochina: Strategies and Consequences on the Regional Security by Kang P.
Summary
(Below an excerpt from an article entitled ‘Vietnam’s Expansionism in Indochina’ by Kang, P. gave a vivid account of the barbarity with which Vietnam had inflicted on the Cambodian people. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. October 12, 2008) The performance of Vietnam’s current expansionism in Indochina is a result of its Strategic Southward Move. In the space of a few hundreds years, Vietnam had managed to built its Empire through successive annexions and new forms colonization.
Not only the Fundamental Rights of People annexed [Cham, Montagnards (Mien, Mnong, Koho, Jarai, Degar), Hmong Khmer Krom] – representing in 1998-99 more than 13% of Vietnam’s total population * - or placed under Vietnam’s control (Cambodian and Laotian) are ignored and violated but South East Asia’s security order may also be threatened am’s hegemonic ambitions. That is why this expansionism performed by this country constitutes a real danger for regional and international security.
Based on the Cambodian case, this paper tries to analyse the strategies implemented by Vietnam for its expansionist process and assesses its consequences on the regional and international security.
Key Words:
Annexation – Ethnic Minorities – Strategic Manipulations - Violation of Self Determination Rights – Hegemonic Ambitions – Threat for Regional Security.
* Dang Nghiem Van, Chu Thai Son and Luu Hung: Ethnic Minorities in Vietnam, Culture & People, 2000. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I - Southward Expansion Policy and Strategies After breaking away from China, the cradle of the Vietnamese nation in the 10th century was only the area encompassed by the Delta of Tonkin. As early in the 13th century, Vietnam began its southward expansion policy. Initially, it encroached and definitely annexed the Kingdom of Champa (currently central Vietnam) in 1693. Then in early 17th century, it began encroaching and occupying Khmer territory of Cochin-China or Kampuchea Krom (present-day South of Vietnam). Today, this invading process is accelerating in an unprecedented pace. . -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
(9 December 1948)
Article I. The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article II. In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III. The following acts shall be punishable:
a) Genocide;
b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
d) Attempt to commit genocide;
e) Complicity in genocide.
Article IV. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
Article V. The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.
Article VI. Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
Article VII. Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.
Article VIII. Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.
Article IX. Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vietnam’s repression of the heroic nationalist movement led by Mr. Son Sann’s ancestors to liberate temporarily, Oknha Son Kuy of Kampuchea Krom, who was decapitated by the Vietnamese was brutal and can be considered as genocide, as defined by the 1948 Geneva Convention as posted above. Nevertheless, the revolt had succeeded, and gave Cambodia back their reduced land area and a temporary freedom, until the Khmer kings, because of their constant and destructive family disputes, had asked Dai-Viet and Siam to provide protection, and to take jointly control of Cambodia, under as co-suzerainty pact.
In 1863, King Norodom asked the French to come and ‘protect’ Cambodia, from these two perennial enemies of Cambodia. This request for help from France, a colonialist country, was a totally naïve and ignorant move by Norodom, not being aware of what colonialism really was. While king Mongkut or Rama IV, the great reformer of Siam, did the opposite, and successfully fought off the British and the French’s attempt to impose colonialism in his country. In addition, you can also see in that excerpt, the parallelism between the Vietnamization of Champa and Cambodia. “Just to remember what happened in Kampuchea Krom. After presenting Princess Ngoc Van, in 1630, to young King Chey Chetha II, Vietnam asked the king the permission for Vietnamese to settle in Preah Suakea (Ba Ria) and Prey Nokor (Saigon). The king Chey Chetha II had to accept the pressures made by his newly wed wife, Ngoc Van. Thanks to this “sex and marital alliance ” tactics, which was already applied in the Kingdom of Champa with Princess Ngoc Khao, Vietnam managed to corrupt the soul of the khmer king and to realize its demographic conquests. Once its bases strongly consolidated, Vietnam was to commit ultra atrocious violence to repress khmers’ opposition.
During the period 1813 - 1815, Vietnamese perpetrated the infamous massacre, known to every Khmer as “Prayat Kompup Te Ong”. It was the most barbarous torture style in which the Khmer were buried alive up to their neck. Their heads were used as the stands for a wood stove to boil water for the Vietnamese masters. As they were burned and suffered, the victims shook their heads. At that moment, the Vietnamese torturers jokingly said “Be careful, not to spill the master’s tea”. Other kinds of massacre were the beheading and human collective autodafé (keeping Khmers locked up in granaries and burning them alive). Thousands of Khmers were so massacred in such a human collective autodafé. In 1841, Oknha Son Kuy (Chauvay Kouy), one of Khmer Krom leaders and the ancestor of defunct Son Sann, was atrociously beheaded. In front of such barbary, Khmer people, under the command of Sena Sous, rose up, in 1859, against the Vietnamese first in the province of Srok Kleang (today Soc Trang in Vietnamese designation). After the murder of Sena Sous by a Vietnamese undercover agent, the revolt was pursued by two other Khmer Krom leaders Sena Mon and Sena Tea. In spite of the bravery of Khmer Krom leaders, Vietnam managed to control all Khmer Krom territory thanks to military and demographic conquests. And in June 1949, France, then colonizator of Indochina, transferred Kampuchea Krom, in spite of strong opposition from the Khmers, to Vietnam then under Bao Dai government.” ................. Vietnam’s Expansionism in Indochina
Contemporary Motivations
In the contemporary period, the southward move is motivated by the will of becoming an unmissing regional power, even more, an inevitable interlocutor in Asia. At the time of the competition for the geopolitical repositioning, the control over Laos and Cambodia will enable Vietnam to gain/reinforce its position in the international scene. Within ASEAN, Vietnam acts as one country with three potential voting rights (Vietnam+ Cambodia + Laos) and wants to do the same within the World Trade Organization. With the concept “One Country, Three Voting Rights”, a concept the author will develop in next chapter, Vietnam hopes to become a courted country. Thanks to this concept, Vietnam holds a potential power to negociate with some countries in any domain and will be able to diplomatically make pressure on others. Currently, Vietnam is trying to draft an institutional framework which will promote the free mobility of population within ASEAN zone. Once passed, this institutional framework will legalize Vietnam’s demographic conquests. The rate of Vietnamese settlement in South East Asia will be very high. With the redistribution of its population, Vietnam hope to extend, regardless the other countries’ boundaries, the geographic and political space of its Nation. Clearly Vietnamese Leaders want to build a “Great Vietnam” through the following expression : “ Chõ Nào Co Nguòi Viêt, Chõ Do Se Là Dât Nuôc Viêtnam” that means “Where there are Vietnamese, there will be Vietnam”. All these contemporary motivations can be resumed by the author’s expression “Vietnamspansionism”. 2) Strategies and Machiavellian Manoeuvres The conquest of the south was backed by several types of strategies : mainly military attacks, demographic conquests, manipulations and strategic alliances with other Powers. These strategies were/are not exclusive at all. They were/are often combined in order to obtain a better efficiency. a -Strategies implemented within the victim countries Contrary to what happened in the Kingdom of Champa and Kampuchea Krom, the strategies applied by Vietnam in Cambodia are very subtle and very well camouflaged making them imperceptible on the surface. As we will see it in the figure 2, Vietnam acted and is still acting through an “invisible hand”. Vietnam essentially used violence and massacre. This method was/is very costly both in human and material terms for Vietnam. Because the physical agression did/does not only generate, in return, violence but increased/increases patriotism on the part of the victim country or the victim people. Please, click here to read or to download a file on 'Vietnam's Expansionism in Indochina' **** Please, click on the four links posted below, to listen to the interviews that I gave to Ms. Naline Pea, a broadcaster from Radio Free Asia (RFA) on October 23, 2007, on the main internal and external factors underlying the accelerated pace of the final phase of the Vietnamization of Cambodia.
RFA interview1 Vietnamiz final phas RFA interview2 Vietnamiz final Phas RFA interview3 Vietnamiz final phas RFA interview4 Vietnamiz final phas
Cambodian, VN Firms to Build Golf Resort at Border (Comments: This is probably the only golf course in the world that is straddling along the border between Cambodia and Vietnam, two countries that are not known for their friendly relations. This is another sign that Hun Sen and Sihanouk are giving away, bit by bit, the Cambodian land to Vietnam - not not only without putting up any fight, - but willingly. That is sad but true. Nobody seems to care anymore. Naranhkiri Tith, Ph. D. Washington DC, June 10, 2007) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Business Press, No. 155, June 4-10, 2007
Cambodian firm, CVI Resort Ltd. With assistance from a Vietnamese Provincial Committee, plans to build a golf resort straddling the nations’ borders, Vietnam News reported May 26.
The project is part of a Co-operative framework on neighboring development between Svay Rieng and neighboring Tay Ninh province, which was agreed and signed by leasers on January 12, this year.
Under the plan, the golf complex will cover an area of 120 ha. at Moc Bai border point, with half located in Vietnam and half in Cambodia. The resort will consist of a park, an 18 hole-course, hotels, restaurants, and tax-free shops.
According to the project’s investors, the area in Cambodia has been already granted a license by the government and they made detailed plans for Vietnamese government approval. Sok Kong: I am a Vietnamese
20 March 2008
Translated from Vietnamese by Wanna
Originally posted at: http://www.xwanna.com
Original article in Vietnamese: “Tôi là người Việt Nam!"
Maybe some people are still skeptical about who is Sok Kong? Now, believe me and believe him (Sok Kong)!
Oknha Sok Kong said...
Tôi sinh ra ở Prey Veng. Ba mẹ tôi là người VN, tôi được sinh ra ở CPC. Năm 1975 sang VN làm ruộng ở Đồng Tháp. Lúc đó tôi 23 tuổi. Năm 1979 tôi trở lại CPC
Translation: I was born in Prey Veng. My parents are Vietnamese, I was born in Cambodia. In 1975, I backed to VN and do farming at Don Thap province. I was then 23. In 1979, I returned to Cambodia
Tôi giàu con lắm, có đến sáu đứa: ba trai, ba gái. Con trai đầu làm việc ở TP.HCM, con trai thứ hai quản lý khách sạn và xí nghiệp may số 1, con trai thứ ba quản lý xí nghiệp may 2, ba đứa con gái còn đi học ở Úc.
Translation: I have many children, including 6: 3 sons, 3 daughters. My eldest son works at HCM(Ho Chi Minh) city; My second son is a manager of a hotel and garment factory Number 01; My third son is a manager of garment factory Number 02; My three daughters are all studying in Australia.
Trước đây vì một số lý do tôi không muốn ai biết mình là người VN. Còn bây giờ thì không. Tôi là người VN. Tôi vinh dự về điều đó!
Translation: In the past, from some reasons, I don't want anyone to know that I am a Vietnamese. Now, it's NOT. I am a Vietnamese. I'm proud of that.
To learn more about Sok Kong, click on:
Sok Kong via Cambodian Information Center - Search
SOKIMEX; Sok Kong Import Export Co Ltd
(Comments: This article provides an in-depth view of the company known as SOKIMEX and owned by a Vietnamese citizen, Sok Kong, who is a close friend of Dictator Hun Sen. SOKIMEX owns practically every important businesses in Cambodia, including oil, tourism, and financial institutions. A recent research (Due diligence analysis) by an American law firm had discovered that SOKIMEX is 60 percent owned by the Vietnamese and 40 percent owned by Hun Sen and his extended family. So, Cambodia’s national resources are diverted to Vietnam through SOKIMEX in a big way. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. October 31, 2008)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SOKIMEX organization and management structure
(http://sokimex.8k.com/page2.html)
Cambodian Economy Studies by US Government
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You arrive at Siem Reap full of anticipation. Three days, five days, perhaps a week you have set aside to explore some of the most magnificent ancient structures on the planet. Leaving the town of Siem Reap you head north along the road to Angkor Wat. Soon you see a large toll gate facility off the right side of the road. Your driver dutifully takes you there whereupon you fork over a hefty sum of US dollars for your pass to visit the temples. A single day - $20. Three days - $40. And a week - that'll be $60. You're even asked for a passport style photograph, or in the absence of one, you're led into a room and photographed. What next? Fingerprints. Well, not yet. You're then handed your laminated pass as the ticket seller politely runs down the list of rules - don't give/sell/transfer the ticket to anyone, don't lose it, don't be caught in a temple without it, etc. "Uh-huh, uh-huh," you nod your head in bewilderment. As you head north towards Angkor Wat, capturing that first glimpse of the famous towers peaking out from behind the trees, you no doubt think, 'at least my money is going to save the temples... isn't it?'
Look at that ticket again. Above the picture of Angkor Wat it says "Sokha Hotel Co., LTD." They are the ones taking your money. Sokha Hotel is a division of Sokimex - a corporation founded in 1980 with close ties to the CPP government. Aside from the Angkor ticket concession, Sokimex is a petroleum company, and is a supplier to the government of military uniforms, medicines, and food for the military. It is also involved in import-export, rubber, transportation, and real estate.
In April 1999 with no public debate or prior warning the government of Cambodia quietly entered into an agreement with Sokimex to operate the ticket concession at the Angkor Archaeological Park. This deal required Sokimex to pay a flat $1,000,000 US per year to the government in exchange for the right to control the ticket concession. Whatever money Sokimex received in excess of the one million dollars was pure profit. Given the utter lack of transparency in this deal, combined with the perceived privatization of Cambodia's cultural heritage, there was immediate opposition to this deal. But the deal stood, taking effect on May 1, 1999, with only a fraction of tourist dollars going to the temples via the government agency - Apsara Authority - which oversees the preservation, restoration, etc. of the monuments.
This deal remained in place until August 15, 2000 when a new and better deal (for Apsara - and the monuments) was hammered out. But in the 15 months from the implementation of the original deal to the recent renegotiation of the contract the following changes have taken place at the Angkor Park. First, the souvenir sellers were kicked out of the temples. Good for the tourists, bad for the local economy. The second move was a proposal to ban all motorized traffic from within the park - a scenario that would require all tourists to be shuttled around in electric cars provided by a Korean firm. There was loud opposition from the motorcycle and taxi drivers and the idea was, at least temporarily, shelved. In an interview I had last March with the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Tourism, Dr. Thong Khon, he informed me that no such deal would be permitted, "although this deal is not with the government, we are committed to free choices for tourists."
The next visible change at the park came in the procedure for checking admission tickets. At almost every temple guards have been stationed who examine the ticket of every entering tourist. This policy has not been well received by the tourists, but to give credit where credit is due, most of the Sokimex employees do show a very high level of politeness and professional courtesy to the visitor.
Upon taking over the ticket concession, one serious problem Sokimex had to face was overcoming the extremely high incidence of fraud that had existed in the sale and usage of temple tickets.
Prior to the Sokimex deal there was minimal control over the sale of temple tickets. While most tourists were buying tickets and paying full price for them, who actually got the money was anybody's guess. The most common scam was the recycling of used tickets. The perpetrators were usually the guesthouses and their resident motorbike drivers. Relieving departing tourists of their tickets and using whatever available stripping agent was handy, nail polish remover was effective, they'd remove all the details of the previous user and resell the ticket to the unsuspecting tourist. In defiance of all regulation the guesthouse would offer to purchase your ticket for you, but in fact they were selling you a recycled ticket and pocketing the $20, $40, whatever. Under Sokimex's tight controls this scam has been eliminated, though some would argue it's all still a scam, but now it's a fat corporation taking all the money instead of the guesthouses and motorbike drivers. You decide.
In a recent interview I had with Ang Choulean, Director of the Department of Monuments and Culture for the Apsara Authority, I asked him about the problems with fraudulent tickets, "There were an incredible number of fake tickets before Sokimex. But I think that after the first contract if there were still fake tickets there were much less than before. But I hope now there are no more fake tickets." From what I have observed the problem has been eliminated.
As the number of visitors to the Angkor Park has risen rapidly it should come as no surprise that the government, and certainly the Apsara Authority would seek to renegotiate the contract with Sokimex. In the original negotiation in April 1999 the Apsara Authority was not part of the process, but it had significant say in the renegotiation and as a result it now has a much better financial situation and far greater control over the doings of Sokimex. As reported in the Phnom Penh Post in the August 18-31, 2000 issue, the new deal provides for 50% of all income to the first $3 million dollars to be handed over to the government and 70% of all sales over the $3 million mark. This puts the Apsara Authority in a far greater position both financially and in terms of control of the park operations.
Based on these figures Ang Choulean has projected that roughly 28% of all park money will go directly to the temples and 31% will go to park maintenance and construction of much needed infrastructure. So for the time being approximately 59 cents of every dollar is landing in the proper hands, a vast improvement over a couple of years ago when that figure may have been as low as 5 cents of every dollar.
But with its new found wealth, what can we expect from Apsara and from Sokimex? According to Ang Choulean. "We are controlling them strictly because this is very clearly specified in the contract. We have two persons from our department of tourist development who are controlling every day the number of tickets sold because each ticket sold has to have the Apsara stamp." And... "The contract began from May 1999 and we were not at the direct negotiation for this first contract. But we are controlling them, we control Sokimex according to the terms of the contract already signed. We were directly involved with the renegotiation and we continue to have strong control of this." And... when asked if he was pleased with the new arrangement? "Happier than before. (Laughter) But we are ambitious to have more (control)."
-------------
For more information see:
O'Connell, Stephen, and Soeum, Yin. "All that glitters seems to be... Sokimex." Phnom Penh Post, 28 April-11 May 2000.
Sokheng, Vong, and Marcher, Anette. "Sokimex and Government revisit Angkor deal." Phnom Penh Post, 18-31 August 2000.
The Phnom Penh Post internet site is at http://www.phnompenhpost.com Cambodia: Weakness in Family Structure and Relationship (Comments: This article is one of the most important social analyses of the many major weakness of the Cambodian society, the family structure and relationship. This weakness in family structure and relationship dated back to the Angkorian time. Yet, it still persists until today, without much change. The worst is the fact that most Cambodians do not realize that this major social flaw exists amidst them. This suppression of identity of most Cambodians by the monarchy led to the lack of pool of potential leaders from which a country can its future leaders. Cambodians continue to depend only on the monarchy to solve all the problems in Cambodia, despite the fact that the royal family of Cambodia has only disdain for the Cambodian people than most other autocratic regimes in the world. Without changing this flaw, Cambodians cannot get out of the big mess it is now in created by internal and external foes. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC July 24, 2007) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the late 1980s, the nuclear family, consisting of a husband and a wife and their unmarried children, probably continued to be the most important kin group within Khmer society. The family is the major unit of both production and consumption. Within this unit are the strongest emotional ties, the assurance of aid in the event of trouble, economic cooperation in labor, sharing of produce and income, and contribution as a unit to ceremonial obligations. A larger grouping, the personal kindred that includes a nuclear family with the children, grandchildren, grandparents, uncles, aunts, first cousins, nephews, and nieces, may be included in the household. Family organization is weak, and ties between related families beyond the kindred are loosely defined at best. There is no tradition of family names, although the French tried to legislate their use in the early twentieth century. Most Khmer genealogies extend back only two or three generations, which contrasts with the veneration of ancestors by the Vietnamese and by the Chinese. Noble families and royal families, some of which can trace their descent for several generations, are exceptions.
The individual Khmer is surrounded by a small inner circle of family and friends who constitute his or her closest associates, those he would approach first for help. In rural communities, neighbors--who are often also kin--may be important, too, and much of housebuilding and other heavy labor intensive tasks are performed by groups of neighbors. Beyond this close circle are more distant relatives and casual friends. In rural Cambodia, the strongest ties a Khmer may develop--besides those to the nuclear family and to close friends--are those to other members of the local community. A strong feeling of pride--for the village, for the district, and province--usually characterizes Cambodian community life. There is much sharing of religious life through the local Buddhist temple, and there are many cross-cutting kin relations within the community. Formerly, the Buddhist priesthood, the national armed forces, and, to a lesser extent, the civil service all served to connect the Khmer to the wider national community. The priesthood served only males, however, while membership in some components of the armed forces and in the civil service was open to women as well.
Two fictive relationships in Cambodia transcend kinship boundaries and serve to strengthen interpersonal and interfamily ties. A Khmer may establish a fictive child-parent or sibling relationship called thoa (roughly translating as adoptive parent or sibling). The person desiring to establish the thoa relationship will ask the other person for permission to enter into the relationship. The thoa relationship may become as close as the participants desire. The second fictive relationship is that of kloeu (close male friend). This is similar, in many ways, to becoming a blood brother. A person from one place may ask a go-between in another place to help him establish a kloeu relationship with someone in that place. Once the participants agree, a ceremony is held that includes ritual drinking of water into which small amounts of the participants' blood have been mixed and bullets and knives have been dipped; prayers are also recited by an achar (or ceremonial leader) before witnesses. The kloeu relationship is much stronger than the thoa. One kloeu will use the same kinship terms when addressing his kloeu's parents and siblings as he would when addressing his own. The two friends can call upon each other for any kind of help at any time. The kloeu relationship apparently is limited to some rural parts of Cambodia and to Khmer-speaking areas in Thailand. As of the late 1980s, it may have become obsolete. The female equivalent of kloeu is mreak.
Legally, the husband is the head of the Khmer family, but the wife has considerable authority, especially in family economics. The husband is responsible for providing shelter and food for his family; the wife is generally in charge of the family budget, and she serves as the major ethical and religious model for the children, especially the daughters. In rural areas, the male is mainly responsible for such activities as plowing and harrowing the rice paddies, threshing rice, collecting sugar palm juice, caring for cattle, carpentry, and buying and selling cows and chickens. Women are mainly responsible for pulling and transplanting rice seedlings, harvesting and winnowing rice, tending gardens, making sugar, weaving, and caring for the household money. Both males and females may work at preparing the rice paddies for planting, tending the paddies, and buying and selling land.
Ownership of property among the rural Khmer was vested in the nuclear family. Descent and inheritance is bilateral. Legal children might inherit equally from their parents. The division of property was theoretically equal among siblings, but in practice the oldest child might inherit more. Each of the spouses might bring inherited land into the family, and the family might acquire joint land during the married life of the couple. Each spouse was free to dispose of his or her land as he or she chose. A will was usually oral, although a written one was preferred.
Private ownership of land was abolished by the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s. Such ownership is also not recognized by the PRK government, which for example, refused to support former owners when they returned and found others living on and working their land. Some peasants were able to remain on their own land during the Khmer Rouge era, however, and generally they were allowed to continue to work the land as if it were their own property. In 1987 the future of private ownership of land remained in doubt. According to Cambodia scholar Michael Vickery, the PRK government planned to collectivize in three stages. The first stage involved allotting land to families at the beginning of the season and allowing the cultivators to keep the harvest. The second stage involved allotting land to each family according to the number of members. The families in the interfamily units known as solidarity groups (krom samaki) were to work to prepare the fields, but subsequently each family was responsible for the upkeep of its own parcel of land. At this stage, each family could dispose of its own produce. In the final stage, all labor was to be performed in common, and at the end of the season any remuneration was distributed according to a work point system. Livestock at this stage would still belong to the family. By 1984 the first stage groups accounted for 35 percent of the rural population, but the third level accounted for only 10 percent of the farms (see Agriculture , ch. 3).
Source: US Congress Library; Country Studies, 1990
Justice in Cambodia: Past, Present, and Future Margaret de Guzman Al
(Comments: this article entitled 'Justice in Cambodia: Past, Present, and Future' clearly shows how Hun Sen is still deeply involved in prolonging the Khmer Rouge Trial process by demonizing the demons, as long as possible in order to make himslef look better in the eyes of the internaitonal community, and to give himself more time to consolidate his dictatorial power in Cambodia, fully supported by Sihanouk.
The future of the Khmer Rouge trial is on the brink of collapsing, and is as bleak as ever. This is why our group WCC (World Cambodian Congress for Progress and Democracy - http://www.wccpd.org/), had decided not to participate in this politically motivated seminar orchestrated by Hun Sen under the direction of Sean Visoth and Helen Jarvis, and with the cooperation of two Cambodian-Americans, Ronnie Yimsut and Leakhana Nou. Because of our refusal, Yimsut and Nou had blamed WCC for not cooperating with them and for obstructing the ECCC (Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia). For more detalis on this preposterous accusation, please see the set of emails exchange between me and Mr. Yimsut posted just below in this same page
WCC is not against the Khmer Rouge trial and the ECCC at all. On the contrary, we have been advocating for real justice for the Cambodian people for a very long time, and is long overdue. This web site is the illustration of such an effort. However, we have made it clear to the general public that we are against the parody of justice that Hun and his close associates have been practicing to hijack real justice by delaying and by taking over the trial process claiming to do so for protecting the sovereignty of Cambodia. What sovereignty does Cambodia have, today? It is common knowledge that Hun Sen a creation of Vietnamese imperialism over Cambodia. Unfortuantely, there are too few Cambodians who are interested in this crucial issue for Cambodia's future, and are willing to stand and fight for it. WCC did its best to expose this shameful manipulation and politicizing of justice by Hun Sen and his CPP. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. May 4, 2008) -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reviewing: Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: Prosecuting Mass Violence Before the Cambodian Courts (Jaya Ramji & Beth Van Schaack, eds.). Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2005, 441 pp.
November 20, 2007 marks an important and long-awaited milestone for Cambodia. On that day the first public hearing took place in the prosecution of a Khmer Rouge member for his role in the massacre of approximately 1.7 million Cambodians from 1975-1979. The three-decade delay in achieving this milestone is a result of complex political dynamics both within Cambodia and at the international level. Unfortunately, many of the same forces that delayed justice for Cambodia threaten to smother the embers of the judicial fire that has finally been lit. Certainly, there has been significant progress in the two and a half years since the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Extraordinary Chambers or ECCC) finally became operational. The relevant personnel are in place, internal rules have been adopted, and five defendants have been charged and are in custody.
Sadly, this progress is marred by serious concerns about the independence, impartiality, and competence of the Extraordinary Chambers. Just three weeks after the co-investigating judges received the first Introductory Submission, Prime Minister Hun Sun requested that the King appoint the Cambodian investigating judge to the Cambodian Court of Appeal. Although a potential crisis was averted when Hun Sen announced that Judge You Bun Leng would remain at the ECCC despite his promotion, the incident raised concerns about political interference in the judicial process. The judicial independence of the Extraordinary Chambers was also put into question by a Cambodian cabinet minister’s statement that the government could “terminate” the ECCC if it attempts to bring charges against retired King Norodom Sihanouk. When the Open Society Justice Initiative made allegations of rampant corruption among Cambodian ECCC personnel, the Cambodian government responded by threatening to ban the Justice Initiative from Cambodia. Most recently, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released the results of an internal audit revealing serious deficiencies in the ECCC’s human resources practices with regard to its Cambodian staff. The UNDP went so far as to recommend that all recruitment of ECCC staff to date be nullified and the recruitment process begun anew. UNDP further recommended the UN consider withdrawing its support from the tribunal “if the Cambodian side does not agree to the essential measures that are, from UNDP perspective, necessary to ensure the integrity and success of the project.” It remains an open question, therefore, whether the Extraordinary Chambers will contribute to justice and the rule of law in Cambodia or instead reaffirm the entrenched culture of corruption and impunity that has characterized the country’s judiciary in recent history.
Nothing less than the future of democracy in Cambodia hangs in the balance, as the editors of this remarkable volume demonstrate. Jaya Ramji-Nogales and Beth Van Schaack were among the earliest advocates of a tribunal to try Khmer Rouge leaders when discussions began ten years ago between the United Nations and the Cambodian government. As legal advisors to the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), they have conducted trainings, performed field research, and provided various forms of legal assistance relevant to the nascent efforts to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to justice. With this book, the editors assemble a collection of authors equally impressive and well versed in Cambodia legal and political history. The authors’ extensive range of experience and expertise – from Buddhist studies to politics, human rights, and documentation – yields a comprehensive study of the past, present, and future of justice in Cambodia.
In the introduction, the editors promise an exploration of the legal and political challenges facing the ECCC, but also a window into broader questions surrounding the evolution of international criminal law and practice. The book delivers on this promise. The dominant theme linking the various contributions is the imperative of molding the international community’s response to mass criminality to meet the needs of the affected populace and polity. This is a time of experimentation in the bourgeoning field of international criminal law. Early post-Nuremberg efforts at international criminal justice focused primarily on the international community’s desire for individual accountability and retribution, rather than on the preferences of the affected populations. Thus, relatively little thought was initially given to how the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda could best contribute to the process of reconciling antagonistic sectors of those communities and rebuilding their civil societies. The recent move toward hybrid tribunals is emblematic, at least in part, of an increased international awareness of the contributions such tribunals can make to rebuilding post-conflict societies. A growing consensus among participants in the international criminal justice system holds that tribunals integrated with the affected communities are better able to address the populations’ specific needs than are entirely international tribunals with non-national staffs, laws, and facilities.
Among hybrid courts, the ECCC is unique in the extent to which the balance of power rests in the hands of the national participants. The Cambodian government believes it is only right that Cambodians try the Khmer Rouge in Cambodian courts. As a result, the ECCC is subject to a novel supermajority voting formula whereby the agreement of at least two Cambodian judges and one international judge is required for any decision. Many national and international participants and observers, on the other hand, see Cambodian control of theECCC as its Achilles heel and fear that instead of justice for Khmer Rouge victims and a strengthened Cambodian judiciary the process will leave Cambodia further weakened and the international community with unclean hands. Ramji-Nogales and Van Schaack’s book explores the historical and political forces that brought Cambodia to this tipping point, engages normative questions of how best to adapt accountability mechanisms to meet population-specific needs, and posits the challenges for Cambodia and the international community to overcome if the ECCC is to be a success by any measure.
The academic contributions to the volume are enclosed between literary bookends that remind the reader of the profound human suffering that provides the raison d’etre of the analysis. In the prologue, Peter Hammer offers a brief account of a dream that continues to haunt his partner, a survivor of the Cambodian killing fields. Hammer posits several potential interpretations of the dream, including chillingly suggesting that it may symbolize the devastating effects on the Cambodian people of the international community’s inaction in the face of Khmer Rouge atrocities. The dream is powerful and Hammer’s analysis insightful. At the same time, with so many survivors still able to recount the horrors they experienced, a first hand narrative might have provided a more apt opening to the book’s legal and socio-political analysis.
Rithy Panh’s epilogue, in contrast, could not be more personal. Panh gives a gut-wrenching account of how he became a documentary film-maker in order to expose the pure evil of Khmer Rouge atrocities. He begins by expressing the guilt he feels that, although a mere boy, he was unable to help those dying around him. He then powerfully states the imperative of remembering: To fail to come to terms with the history of genocide would be to “face the worst kind of death – the death of memory.” Looking to the future, Panh echoes a theme that resonates throughout the volume: Cambodia’s social, economic, and political development requires the rejection of impunity for the Khmer Rouge leadership through criminal trials. Impunity according to Panh breeds fear, distrust, and an inability to imagine a future together. Panh also reminds us, however, that criminal trials are not enough. Cambodians need help rebuilding their economy, educating their children, and strengthening civil society if they are to overcome the legacy of the Khmer Rouge horror. Above all, to build a truly democratic society characterized by equitable shared development Cambodia must come to terms with its memory, an endeavor that Panh has made his life’s work.
The book’s academic discussion of the Khmer Rouge trials begins with a helpful contribution by Peter Hammer and Tara Urs setting forth the historical and political context into which the ECCC was born. Hammer & Urs divide their analysis into four historical “chapters:” the politics of Ideology (1975-89), of Reconstruction (1989-96), of Personality (1997-98), and of Politics (1998-2004). In discussing each of these periods of Cambodia’s past, the authors highlight the many ways in which Cambodian and international politics conspired to deny justice to the Cambodian people. The 1979 “show trial” in absentia of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary provides a poignant example of how legal proceedings can be used to fulfill political ends at the expense of justice. The chapter concludes with a description of the drawn out and contentious negotiations between the United Nations and the government of Cambodia to establish a tribunal to try Khmer Rouge leaders. The authors opine that justice this long delayed can be no more than “tokenistic,” serving a largely symbolic function for Cambodia and the international community. Although the power of criminal justice has certainly been diluted with time, other contributions to the volume make clear the critical importance to Cambodia of holding nationally and internationally respected trials even at this late date.
In keeping with the editors’ goal of placing the search for justice after mass atrocities in the appropriate cultural context, the second chapter examines the role Cambodian Buddhism can and should play in framing the country’s approach to accountability. Ian Harris elucidates some basic Theravāda canonical concepts relevant to the discussion of individual accountability for Khmer Rouge crimes and wonders whether it is “too much to ask that [Buddhist] influences might be deployed in the context of [the] tribunal.” Unfortunately, the answer the ECCC has given, constrained as it is by political and economic forces, is that such cultural sensitivity is, in fact, too much to ask. Editor Jaya Ramji-Nogales has criticized the Extraordinary Chambers for failing to incorporate into the process such Buddhist norms as the emphasis on reconciliation over retribution. Given the book’s primary audience of legal academics and lawyers, many readers will find Harris’ religious exegesis elusive. Nonetheless, his discussion of the legacy of traditional law and the importance of recognizing religious and cultural factors in the quest for justice are important contributions to the book and to the broader discussion of cultural specificity in international accountability mechanisms.
The premise that justice in Cambodia should be tailored to fit the needs of the Cambodian populace is addressed directly in the third chapter. William Burke-White employs three theoretical frameworks to explain why the preferences of affected populations matter to the quest for justice after mass atrocities. First, restorative justice theory emphasizes the importance of using accountability mechanisms not merely as ends in themselves, but to help rebuild shattered societies. Second, liberal international relations theory, seen through the normative lens of democratic entitlement, requires that justice respond to population preferences. Finally, the individualization of international law has refocused international legal efforts on addressing the needs of citizens. These theoretical approaches support Burke-White’s thesis that the process of securing accountability for Khmer Rouge atrocities must respect the preferences of individual Cambodians if it is to facilitate national reconciliation and promote democracy. Having established the importance of citizen preferences, Burke-White presents data from approximately 50 “in-depth individual and group conversations” he conducted in 2002. These conversations indicated a strong preference among participants for prosecutions over other forms of accountability. The most frequently voiced rationales for prosecutions were a desire for vengeance and a need to remember and document the past.
Burke-White makes such a strong case for the importance of ascertaining and incorporating Cambodian preferences in the accountability process that the acknowledged limitations of his data leave the reader wishing for a more comprehensive survey. Unfortunately, no such study has been conducted to date. The only other survey Burke-White references is a study that editor Ramji-Nogales conducted in 1997 involving 25 interviewees, many of whom expressed a preference for peace and even amnesty over justice. Additional studies of Cambodian preferences are worth mentioning. For example, in 2002, DC-Cam conducted a survey of readers of its monthly magazine. The 712 responses collected revealed, like Burke-White’s conversations and most available opinion data, that Cambodians overwhelmingly prefer criminal justice to other accountability mechanisms. Unlike Burke-White’s findings, however, very few respondents wanted revenge. In fact, most felt that trials alone, regardless of quality, would enable them to forgive. In 2004, the Khmer Institute of Democracy surveyed 536 people in Phnom Penh and ten provinces. Interestingly, almost half of the participants in this survey preferred no trial at all to a substandard trial. The conflicting results of the studies support Burke-White’s conclusion that: “Effort is needed to determine what [Cambodian] preferences actually are on a scale and in a more sophisticated way than this study does.” It is not too late for the Extraordinary Chambers to heed this call. The ECCC office of Outreach and Media has conducted many interviews, meetings, press briefings, and tours since the court’s inception. Perhaps the office’s outreach component could also include a nation-wide survey of Cambodian opinions regarding how the ECCC process can best contribute to national reconciliation.
The ECCC’s novel Cambodia-dominated hybrid model prompts Brad Adams to explore whether an internationalized tribunal entrenched in a corrupt and ineffectual domestic system can render justice. An historical survey of Cambodia’s judicial system reveals long periods in which there was essentially no functioning judiciary and the majority of participants in the legal system were corrupt, incompetent, or both. Even today, political and military intervention in judicial decisions is common and sometimes violent, giving judges reason to fear for their lives. In light of this context, Adams is highly critical of the decision of the international community to entrust the Cambodian judiciary with the task of bringing the Khmer Rouge to justice. Despite strong objection from the United Nations Secretary General, the international community accepted a supermajority formula for decision making at the tribunal that, according to Adams, virtually ensures that Prime Minister Hun Sen will manipulate the process to serve political ends at the expense of justice for the Cambodian people. In fact, Adams indicts key participants in the negotiating process, opining that the United States and other governments likely assume that Hen Sen will interfere in the tribunal’s work. According to Adams, these governments are motivated less by the goal of justice for Cambodians than by the desire to assuage their guilt for failing to stop the killing and for supporting the Khmer Rouge after the Vietnamese liberation. Adams pessimistically concludes: “a mixed tribunal under the political control of the Cambodian government has little or no chance of rendering either justice or an accurate historical account of the period.”
Certainly, there are valid reasons to fear that Adams’ dire predictions are playing out. Prime Minister Hun Sen appeared to be attempting to interfere in the judicial process when he appointed co-investigating judge You Bun Leng to the Cambodian Court of Appeal. Relations have been tense between international and Cambodian participants at the ECCC, reaching a nadir last April when the international judges threatened a boycott over proposed exorbitant fees for foreign defense counsel. At the same time, the indictment and arrest of Ieng Sary and Kheiu Samphan provides a glimmer of hope that the ECCC will be permitted to pursue justice without crippling political interference. Sary received a Royal pardon in 1996 when he defected from the Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen has made numerous statements in the intervening years indicating he would not allow Sary to be prosecuted. Thus, although recent developments do not fully alleviate Adams’ fear that the Cambodia-dominated hybrid formula of the ECCC will simply compound past injustices, there is a glimmer of hope.
In a logical segue to Adams’ discussion of the Cambodian justice system, Scott Worden examines the constitutional and procedural framework of the Extraordinary Chambers and analyzes how its various elements may advance or detract from the quest for justice. Worden’s discussion of the potential negative impact of flaws in the Cambodian judicial system overlaps somewhat with Adams’ discussion of the same subject in the previous chapter. Also, some of the issues Worden raises have been resolved or are in the process of being resolved. Since the book was published, judges have been selected, the co-prosecutors have begun to work together, and preliminary indications suggest the prosecutions will focus primarily on Khmer Rouge leaders, rather than the broad interpretation of “those most responsible” that Worden suggests. By indicting and detaining Ieng Sary, the prosecutors and investigating judges have signaled their agreement with Worden that Sary’s pardon does not protect him from prosecution, at least for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Worden’s fear that the Cambodian posts at the ECCC would fall prey to the system of political patronage has materialized as the UNDP audit demonstrates. Finally, the ECCC has adopted Internal Rules that respond to some of Worden’s concerns. For example, the Internal Rules clarify the role of the judicial police in conducting investigations and set forth the procedures for the arrest and detention of accused.
Worden’s analysis of the Extraordinary Chambers nonetheless remains relevant to ongoing efforts to achieve accountability in Cambodia and informs the broader academic discourse surrounding the value of hybrid efforts at justice. For instance, Worden’s discussion of the complexities of ascertaining and applying domestic rules of criminal procedure while adhering to international standards remains salient both for the ECCC and for hybrid tribunals generally. Although the Extraordinary Chambers have adopted Internal Rules, many lacunae remain that will likely be filled by reference to both Cambodian and international standards. Worden’s chapter is thus a must-read for those studying or participating in hybrid tribunals.
Unlike their Nazi predecessors, the Khmer Rouge took great pains to perpetrate atrocities as secretly as possible and succeeded in destroying many of their documents before the Vietnamese invasion. Nonetheless, the tireless work of Youk Chhang and others at DC-Cam and the associated Tuol Sleng Archives has yielded a wealth of documentary evidence that will be invaluable to the Extraordinary Chambers in the upcoming trials. Chhang, along with John Ciorciari, a legal advisor to DC-Cam, provide a useful outline of the types of documents now at the disposal of the ECCC as well as an analysis of some of the hurdles the prosecutors will face in getting such documents admitted as evidence. Since the piece was written, the ECCC has adopted very lenient admissibility rules, answering some of the questions the authors raise. For example, as the authors predicted, hearsay will be admissible. Nonetheless, many of the issues discussed in this chapter remain at the forefront of the work undoubtedly underway in the offices of the co-prosecutors. For example, the prosecutors are certainly grappling with how to authenticate Khmer Rouge documents that lack official seals, stamps or letterhead. The article and the expertise of DC-Cam more generally will be important resources for ECCC participants seeking to decipher the Khmer Rouge’s coded names and language. Finally, the chapter provides a helpful overview of how available documents may be used to establish direct and superior liability and to prove the substantive elements of the crimes. Unsurprisingly, the indictments the ECCC has issued thus far dodge the difficult and much debated question whether Khmer Rouge atrocities meet the definition of genocide. Ciorciari and Chhang’s piece provides a useful evidentiary roadmap, however, for the charges that have been laid by the tribunal.
One of the thornier issues facing the ECCC is what effect, if any, to give to amnesties and pardons the Cambodian government granted to members of the Khmer Rouge who may be defendants at the court. In 1994, the Cambodian government passed legislation outlawing the Khmer Rouge and providing amnesty for members of the organization who defected to the government within six months of the law’s effective date. The law excluded Khmer Rouge leaders from eligibility for the amnesty. In 1996, King Sihanouk issued a Royal Decree at the request of Prime Minister Hun Sen and his then co-prime minister, pardoning Ieng Sary with respect to his 1979 conviction for “genocide” and granting him an amnesty from liability under the 1994 law. The agreement between the United Nations and the government of Cambodia regarding the ECCC, as well as the law establishing the ECCC, leave it to the Extraordinary Chambers to decide the scope of these amnesties and pardons.
Ronald Slye presents a compelling normative case that these amnesties are illegitimate because they are of the “amnesic” variety: they provide no accountability, no benefits to victims, and no revelations of the crimes of their beneficiaries. Slye argues the ECCC should temporally limit Sary’s 1996 pardon and review any amnesties granted pursuant to the 1994 law with an eye to enticing subordinate beneficiaries to provide evidence in the trials of the leaders. The ECCC appears to be side stepping the matter of Sary’s pardon by charging him with crimes other than genocide. Additionally, it has become clear that the ECCC proceedings will be limited to a very small number of leaders. Nonetheless, Slye’s broader normative analysis of amnesties – who should benefit and how long they should last -- remains pertinent to the global academic and legal discourse surrounding accountability for international crimes.
Dinah PoKempner addresses the question whether the trial of Khmer Rouge leaders can contribute to efforts to chip away at the culture of impunity that continues to dominate Cambodian society. She emphasizes the long history of patronage and political violence that predates the Khmer Rouge era as well as the continuing lack of democratic governance that hinders efforts to build a culture of accountability. PoKempner examines the different agendas the Cambodian people, the international community and the Cambodian government bring to the table. Because these agendas diverge in significant respects, PoKempner is skeptical of the ECCC’s ability to make inroads into Cambodia’s culture of impunity. PoKempner provides an insightful analysis of the dangers of conflicting agendas. Her assertions about the views of Cambodians, however, are based on approximately twenty-four interviews of socially active Cambodians in the capital and foreigners with long-term research or humanitarian activities in Cambodia. Like Burke-White’s study, PoKempner’s discussion of Cambodian opinion leaves the reader hoping for a more comprehensive opinion survey.
In keeping with a primary theme of the volume – that a Khmer Rouge tribunal must respond to the needs of the Cambodian people – editor Jaya Ramji-Nogales contributes a chapter on the importance of reparations. Ramji-Nogales criticizes the law establishing the ECCC for failing to provide for any form of reparation for victims and offers an insightful analysis of the types of reparations that might be appropriate in the Cambodian context. In drafting the tribunal’s Internal Rules, the ECCC heeded Ramji-Nogales’ call and included a provision allowing civil parties to participate in the proceedings and be awarded damages. The draft Internal Rules, circulated for comments in November 2006, provided that civil parties “may be compensated by awarding [proportionate] damages,” and that the ECCC could also award “collective or symbolic reparations.” The comments submitted in response to this draft questioned the wisdom and feasibility of awarding damages and suggested the rules clarify the meaning of “collective or symbolic reparations.” Commentators also criticized the draft rules’ requirement that the civil party’s injury “continue to subsist at the time of the proceedings.” After receiving these comments, the ECCC revised the civil party rule to allow only “collective and moral reparations” and specified that such awards may take the following forms:
a) An order to publish the judgment in any appropriate news or other media at the convicted person’s expense; b) An order to fund any non-profit activity or service that is intended for the benefit of Victims; or c) Other appropriate and comparable forms of reparation. Like many aspects of the ECCC, the rule is not ideal. It does not include “all five internationally recognized forms of reparation” as Amnesty International advocated. Nor was it based on a comprehensive survey of Cambodian views as Ramji-Nogales suggests in her chapter. Nonetheless, the rule allows the ECCC to provide some form of reparation to victims. Furthermore, the ECCC’s responsiveness to comments on the draft Internal Rules demonstrates the tribunal is making an effort to adhere to international standards and speaks to the importance of continued national and international participation in the proceedings.
The book’s analysis concludes with Steve Heder’s critique of the “top-down” paradigm that has increasingly come to dominate legal and historical approaches to mass atrocities. Heder points out that while Nuremberg itself was addressed to trying Nazi leadership, over a million people were put on trial in various fora for the horrors of World War II. In contrast, the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC is limited to “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible” for the crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction. The ECCC’s charging decisions to date indicate the tribunal will adopt a narrow interpretation of this mandate. Heder draws on Stalinism and Nazism literature to explain why this focus on leaders is unjustified as a matter of historical and political theory. He also provides an incisive analysis of Khmer Rouge policies that demonstrates the leader paradigm fails to reflect the practical reality of Khmer Rouge crimes. Lower level Khmer Rouge cadre exercised considerable discretion to identify and eliminate “enemies” of the regime.
Having made a compelling case that substantial culpability resides at the lower levels, Heder spends little more than a page discussing the implications of this conclusion for efforts at justice and accountability in Cambodia. He notes that a “proper legal and historical accounting” would require broadening the judicial lens to include “small fish” but does not engage in the debate surrounding how this accounting might be accomplished in light of the ECCC’s financial and political limitations. Numerous commentators have suggested that some mechanism in addition to the Extraordinary Chambers is necessary to address the culpability of the thousands of perpetrators who will not be tried before that body and to support Cambodia’s broader quest for reconciliation. Although a group of United Nations experts recommended in 1999 that Cambodians engage in a process of reflection such as a truth commission, the recommendation has not been implemented for reasons of domestic Cambodian politics. Fortunately, DC-Cam and others are already carrying out the truth seeking and historical record creation functions of such a body. Also, a few domestic trials of Khmer Rouge members have taken place. Although those proceedings were widely criticized, they nonetheless demonstrated that the Cambodian government is willing and able to bring Khmer Rouge to justice under some circumstances.
As the Extraordinary Chambers approaches the third year of its three-year mandate, it remains uncertain what contribution the tribunal will make to justice and reconciliation for Cambodians, as well as to the future of democratic governance in Cambodia. On the one hand, there are worrying indications that many of the concerns raised in this volume are proving justified. Independent observers have found evidence of widespread corruption, political interference, and lack of capacity and training at the ECCC. At the same time, the generally hopeful note that resonates throughout many of the contributions finds expression in the indictments that have been filed, the arrest of powerful defendants, and the participation of highly regarded international judges and attorneys. The Cambodian people and the international community now await the verdict on this long-anticipated tribunal: will it help heal Cambodian society and strengthen the rule of law or instead compound the injustices of the past and solidify the culture of impunity? Ramji-Nogales and Van Schaack’s book provides an excellent primer for those interested in the quest for justice in Cambodia and those engaged in international efforts at accountability for mass atrocities.
Open Society Justice Initiative, Progress and Challenges at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 9, June 2007, available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ij/krt.
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