Sihanouk 'Win/Win' strategy benefits only him, but not Cambodia
Introduction:
Sihanouk is well known for his ability to survive. But, what is less known is the reason why he was able to survive with the political upheavals in Cambodia during the last 30 years. The other question is while Sihanouk was able to survive but at what cost to the Cambodian people.
For instance, Sihanouk had allied himself with the murderous Khmer Rouge thus allowing these Cambodian communists to commit one of the worst atrocities in human history. Although he had always denied that he was the one who legitimized the Khmer Rouge by shifting the blame to others, especially to the United States bombing in Cambodia in the late 1960s, his collaboration with China on the one hand, and the Khmer Rouge close alliance with China on the other hand make it difficult to support Sihanouk's denial, as former US Congressman Steve Solarz has rightly pointed out that while the US bombing of Cambodia was a factor in the success of the Khmer Rouge in taking power in Cambodia, Sihanouk giving support to this group of mass murderers was a powerful signal to the rally of Cambodian peasants to the Khmer Rouge. Solarz namely said that:
"The fact that Sihanouk joined forces with the Khmer Rouge gave Pol Pot an opportunity to recruit much more effectively among the peasantry because he could recruit in the name of the prince. My guess is that had as much if not more to do with the ultimate success of the Khmer Rouge than the American bombing."
More recently, he again allied himself with another group of pro-Vietnamese communists under Hun Sen and the CPP, thereby legitimizing this Vietnamese-puppet regime and thereby allowing them to plunder the natural resources of Cambodia. This, in turn, makes Cambodians as one of the poorest people in the world, despite an enormous amount of assistance amounting to an average of US$ six hundreds millions per year generously given to Cambodia by the international community since 1991, and to open the door for Vietnamese illegal immigration with the collusion and support of Hun Sen and his CPP.
The question is why did Sihanouk act in this manner, which may have saved Sihanouk's prestige or political power, but at a high cost to the Cambodian people. The answer can be given by looking at Sihanouk's motivation behind these apparent contradictory alliances.
Sihanouk always thinks that he and he alone can protect Cambodia's interests and independence. At the same time, he never separates his personal interests and those of Cambodia. Because, he always considers Cambodia as his private domain.
In addition, from carefully studying Sihanouk's practice of political maneuvers, one can observe that Sihanouk always believes in his own ability to out-smart his opponents. In so doing, he believes that he has a "win/win" strategy. For instance, he did not hesitate to ally himself with his worst enemies like Pol Pot or Hun Sen, because he was certain that he would be able to out-maneuver them. However, if for some reason he could not out-maneuver them, Sihanouk had a back-up strategy, which was to make sure that no other politicians in power were allowed succeed.
By doing so, he thought he could show the Cambodian people and the world that he is the only one who could solve the Cambodian problem.
I hope the following excerpts from a selected group of experts in Cambodian affairs would explain what I was trying to analyze in this introduction Sihanouk's mercurial behavior and chameleon-like politics and its deadly impact on the life of the vast majority of the Cambodian people.
Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D.
Washington DC, 2005
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Comments on Sihanouk's revelations about his relations with the North Vietnamese, the Khmer Rouge, in his own words:
Sihanouk's recently written letter and a related article (posted below) reveals a number of important historical facts that could explain the endless tragic situation in Cambodia. This letter and a related article reveal among other things Sihanouk's:
- close alliance with the North Vietnamese
- close alliance with the Khmer Rouge
- close alliance with Hun Sen
These two sources of information reveal a number of important historical facts about Sihanouk's egotistic and egocentric behavior. First, Sihanouk proclaimed his pride in leading the fight against American imperialism during the "Cold War" by allying himself with Cambodia's worst and long time enemy, the Vietnamese. By doing so, Sihanouk totally and conveniently forgot one tragic and important lesson from the bad and disastrous behavior of the monarchy in the Cambodian history.
Throughout the Cambodian history, one can observe that whenever Cambodian kings quarreled with members of their family in pursuit of absolute power, which was often, they always went to ask for help from either the Thai or the Vietnamese. Of course, the Thai or the Vietnamese were always more than happy to come and "save" Cambodia. But, one must ask the next question that by requesting help from the perennial and mortal enemies of Cambodia, what was the cost to the Cambodian people?
Each time the Vietnamese or the Thai were requested to help the members of the Khmer royal family in their constant and deadly fight against each other, the Cambodian people always paid a high price in terms of loss of land and identity, worse even in terms of life itself, such as in the case of the Khmers from Kampuchea Krom.
This means that Sihanouk's alliance with the Vietnamese totally ignored this important and fatal historical mistake with disastrous consequences on the Cambodian people.
One should also ask the question whether the Khmer Rouge could have become a real political and military force without Sihanouk's collaboration and alliance. The answer is clearly, NO.
The next question to ask is who brought Hun Sen to power in Cambodia after the fall of the Khmer Rouge? The answer is the Vietnamese.
Any honest observer would also know that it is Hun Sen who has been allowing the Vietnamese colonists to practically walk freely into Cambodia by signing a number of unequal treaties with Vietnam beginning in 1979. These treaties are no more and no less a total capitulation surrender of Cambodia's sovereignty to Vietnam.
Was Sihanouk aware of the content of these treaties? The answer is yes. Then he should not have be allying himself with Hun Sen while claiming at the same his desire to defend Cambodia's national borders?
Is this really honest and sincere vis-á-vis the Cambodian people for Sihanouk to claim that he is a true patriot by defending Cambodia's national sovereignty while at the same allying himself with Hun Sen, a well-known creation of Vietnam?
Now, let's look at Sihanouk's recurrent claim that he had to fight against American imperialism in order to save Cambodia. To understand this important issue, one needs to place it in the historical context of the "Cold War". In this historical context, one can observe that the communist countries, especially the former Soviet Union and their allies were as imperialistic and perhaps more destructive than the US. (For a good discussion on different interpretations of American imperialism see; G. John Ikenberry; Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order; Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004, posted under heading entitled "G.W. Bush Foreign Policy in Asia" in this site)
However, one should also ask which of the two kinds of imperialism had collapsed so badly from implosion due to internal contradictions?
The answer is clear. It was the Soviet type of imperialism that totally collapsed after 1989 resulting in enormous misery and hardship for the majority of people living in those countries. I know something about these countries from personal experience, as an IMF in charge of providing assistance in institutional building. I have worked in almost all these countries to help them make the transition from a communist system to a market system.
That is why the Central and Eastern European countries are all now adopting a free market system and a democratic government. So are the countries of the members of the former Soviet Union, such as the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Islamic countries such as Uzbekistan, Kazakstan etc. More importantly, these countries slowly started to recover from the economic and social chaos resulting from false pretense, misconception, and mismanagement under communist philosophy and regime. The many crimes perpetrated by Communist regimes and parties in the world were well captured by a group of former French Communist intellectuals as follows:
"The history of Communist regimes and parties, their policies, and their relations with their own national societies and with the international community are of course not purely synonymous with criminal behavior, let alone with terror and repression. In the USSR, and in the "the People's Democracies" after Stalin's death, as well as in China after Mao, terror became less pronounced, and society began to recover something of its old normalcy, and "peaceful coexistence" - if only as "the pursuit of the class struggle by other means" - had become an international fact of life. Nevertheless, many archives and witnesses prove conclusively that terror has always been one of the basic ingredients of modern communism. Let us abandon once and for all the idea that the execution of hostages by firing squads, the slaughter of rebellious workers, and the forced starvation of the peasantry were only short-term "accidents" peculiar to specific country or era. Our approach well encompass all geographic areas and focus on crime as a defining characteristic of the Communist system throughout its existence." (For additional information on the crimes committed under the name of humanity by the Communists see: Stephane Courtois, (editor); The Black Book of Communism; Crimes, Terror, and Repression,; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999)
Cambodia and Laos, unfortunately, have remained in practice, communist, and are still under the tacit control of Vietnamese imperialism and communism, with the support of Hun Sen/Sihanouk.
It is generally agreed among honest scholars in Asian affairs, that before defecting to the Vietnamese, Hun Sen was an officer in the Khmer Rouge army with the rank of regiment commander in the Eastern Zone of Cambodia.
Yet, Sihanouk, despite the existence of these historical records, recently claimed that Hun Sen and his wife did not join the Khmer Rouge but instead had joined his own movement of liberation, when he wrote
"Samdech Hun Sen and Lok Chumteav Bun Rany Hun Sen when they were young decided to flee to the jungle after listening to my message." (See an article entitled "Retired King: 'Lon Nolist' Should Face Tribunal and defended Hun Sen as not a communist, but one of his faithful followers" , posted below)
According to this statement, Sihanouk clearly implied that Hun Sen was neither a communist nor a Khmer Rouge. This just could not be any further from the truth according to the existing historical records, as mentioned earlier (See BBC's profile of Hun Sen posted below).
While America may not be totally innocent in its intervention in Cambodia (including its carpet bombing of the Eastern zone in that country) during the "Cold War", one can safely say that the danger for Cambodia did not come mainly from far away America as Sihanouk had often claimed, but from next door Vietnam, as explained earlier.
If my observations on these historical events are correct, then one should ask the fundamental question about Sihanouk's claims that the reason why he allied himself with the Vietnamese, with Khmer Rouge and now with Hun Sen was for the pure sake of his love for Cambodia and the Cambodian people.
Please, read this letter and article carefully, and make up your mind as to whether or not what I wrote here is correct or not correct.
I wish you all good reading!
Washington DC. September 11, 2005
Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D.
The Sihanouk Paradox:
Introduction:
It is not an easy task to assess Sihanouk as a person and as a political leader. He is the most important, enduring, and dominant political leader in post independent modern Cambodia. But, judging him we must, as he has been the only Cambodian leader that has had full control of Cambodia for nearly sixty years. Cambodia has been going through a number of fatal crises under his long tenure of power. Yet, Sihanouk always claimed that whatever he did, it was always in the interests of preserving Cambodia's independence. For instance, he said that he had never joined the Khmer Rouge in the 1970's. But, it was the Khmer Rouge who joined him. He totally and conveniently forgot to say that it was he who allowed the Khmer Rouge to use his name to attract new recruits among Cambodian peasants to join their army and party. Ultimately, Sihanouk will do whatever is best for his interest and survival, regardless of what happens to Cambodia and the Cambodian people. (See two book reviews posted below titled "A brilliant Sort of Madness." amd also "Dancing in Shadows," (See an article posted below titled "Debating Responsibility for Khmer Rouge").
Even today, although less powerful, he still has a tremendous influence in all aspects of Cambodian life; unfortunately, mostly in a negative and disastrous way for the Cambodian people. He is always the one that creates problems, and then positions himself to be the sole person who can solve that problem. In this context, as recently as in February 2005, he suggested a "solution" to settle the political dispute between Sam Rainsy and Hun Sen/Ranariddh regarding a lawsuit that Sam Rainsy made against the great Cambodian dictator and his shadow puppet, the president of the National Assembly.
What did Sihanouk do in that proposal was to suggest a status quo, that Sam Rainsy should drop his lawsuit and that Hun Sen/Ranariddh should also drop their lawsuit against Sam Rainsy. In other words, Hun Sen and Ranariddh can continue to ignore the law and to loot and plunder the country, at will (See an analysis posted below titled "Once More, Sihanouk's Deceitfulness is revealed".
Sihanouk is a contradiction personified. He is bright and yet narrow minded, affable and yet vindictive, International and yet very Cambodian to the core. I think the Australian historian, Milton Osborne, has come up with the best and most fitting description of Sihanouk which is also the title of one of his books:
"The Prince Light and the Prince of Darkness"
Perhaps, the most devastating trait of Sihanouk's character is his suppression of the potential of all Cambodians not belonging to the royal family to be fully successful in any fields of endeavor. Like his ancestors, Sihanouk would interpret any achievement by a Cambodian commoner as a threat to his fame and absolute power. The following excerpt from a manuscript written by Sihanouk entitled "From the Cup to the Dregs" perfectly illustrated how Sihanouk's complete monopoly of achievement and power could make or break any common Cambodian at will, as follows:
"I could not understand how the "grandees of the Kingdom", who owed everything, not to their merit or their talent, but to my protection, and that of the monarchy, could dare to do without me to help their fragile bark navigate amongst the mortal reefs of the American-Vietnamese war (while awaiting the conclusion of an agreement which would, I was firmly convinced, put an end to this war)."
(Norodom Sihanouk; From the Cup to the Dregs; Undated memoirs given to me by Sihanouk with his dedication)
The suppression of the identity of the vast majority of Cambodian people is well reflected in an excerpt from a book entitled "Civilization of Angkor" written by an English Archeologist, Charles Highman, as follows:
"It is very difficult to pin down the status of the workers. Some could be bought and sold, some were war captives, while others may well have been in the service of the noble family for generations and were assigned to develop a new foundation. Tied labour is not unusual in South-East Asia. As recently as the Ayutthaya period in Thailand, which ended in the eighteenth century, workers were tattooed to record their assigned place of work and to maintain a stable workforce. There are reminders of this in the inscription from Phnom Kanva, Battambang, which describes how Viruna, a worker who had escaped from the estate where he was born, had his eyes gouged out and his nose cut off. It was also customary in listing workers to include their children and even grandchildren. Workers are often listed as being responsible for either the fifteen dark or the fifteen light days of each month on a rota system, and could work on land assigned to them, according to one text, in their own time."
The loss of identity, in turn, has suppressed any development of future leaders outside the royal family in sufficient number from which Cambodia must and can rely upon to better defend itself and to allow it to survive, especially in time of major crises, as Cambodia has been facing since the 1960's.
(For the negative legacy of history on the present day Cambodia, please see An Uncertain Legacy: the Khmer Paradox by B P Groslier in "Special articles section") Naranhkiri Tith
A Brilliant Sort of Madness
My War with the CIA
http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/sihanouk.htm
The Memoirs of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as related to Wilfred Burchett
Pantheon Books, 1972, 1973
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War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia
Norodom Sihanouk
Pantheon Books, 1980
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(Comments: this review of Sihanouk’s books titled, “My War with the CIA,” and "War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia," is one of the most accurate and comprehensive look at Sihanouk’s disastrous role for more than 50 years, as an unchallenged leader of Cambodia’s destiny.
This review also provides a very important assessment of the mentality of the Khmer Rouge leaders, namely, Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot, and their role in the Cambodian tragedy. In this context, it confirms my suspicion about how the Khmer Rouge leaders were so far away from reality that they believed they could beat the Chinese in becoming the first pure Communist society in the world, and in the shortest time.
It is important to note that this Khmer Rouge’s rush to become the first pure Communist society in the world, provides an explanation as to why they were committing mass murder against the Cambodian people. As Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot were purported to have said that it is better to have only one million of pure Cambodian Communists than seven million Cambodians, the majority of which is made up of impure bourgeois, capitalists, and reactionaries.
Communism is now considered by many scholars, including who were members of the Communist party, to be a utopia. But, the Khmer Rouge has brought this utopia to even a higher level, some says surrealist.
This utopia stems from the fact that the Khmer Rouge believe in the Cambodian conventional wisdom, which says that “if Cambodians can build Angkor, they can do anything in this world, better and faster than anybody else.”
For the Cambodian people, this Khmer Rouge dementia is a major contribution to their endless tragedy, and may be to their disappearance from the face of the earth, sooner rather than later.
The other main piece of formation from this book review is the confirmation about how the late US president Richard Nixon had callously and deliberately used Cambodia as a terrain to push the Viet Cong deep into Cambodia, so as to minimize the casualties for the American troop withdrawal from Vietnam. That, in turn, shows how naive and uninformed Lon Nol and Sarik Matak were, when they believed in Nixon’s words, that America came to save the Cambodian people. Perhaps more devastating for the future of Cambodia, the coup by Lon Nol/Sarik Matak had allowed Sihanouk to get away from the self made trap as he was cornered by his pro-Chinese policy, and annegative implication for Cambodia in this review is the fact that, unlike Vietnam, Cambodia always anti-American policy. Sihanouk went on the lend his name to the Khmer Rouge to recruit new members, among the Cambodian peasants. Although the American bombing also contributed to the Khmer Rouge increased ability to get new recruits, from the Cambodian peasants.
The most debilitating aspect of this review is the fact that unlike the vietnamese who never ask foreigners for help; the Cambodian leaders always asked foreigners for help, including from the Vietnamese, thier worst enemies. Unless Cambodia can produce good leaders who would stop its independency on foreign "help," Cambodia cannot expect to defend itself against a well-conceived, well-managed, well-motivated and well-implemented "Nam Tien," the most deadly form of all colonialism.
Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. May 24, 2010)
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For more than half a century, King Norodom Sihanouk has preened, postured, and pouted across the stage of Cambodian politics. He is perpetually described as "mercurial" and "unpredictable." For years he was central to Cambodia's survival. And he was just as surely central to her near-destruction.
To give him due credit: It is beyond question that Sihanouk deeply loved the Cambodian people. None of his successors has ever matched his genuine affection for his people. But Sihanouk had one critical flaw: as much as he loved the Cambodian people, he loved himself just slightly more. At a pivotal moment in Cambodian history, he chose his own interests above those of Cambodia, and millions of people paid with their lives.
Born on October 31, 1922, Norodom Sihanouk was appointed to the Cambodian throne by the country's French colonial masters at the age of 18. The French probably chose Sihanouk for at least two reasons: first, he was descended from both of Cambodia's two competing royal families; and second, they believed that the young playboy would be easily manipulated. This second belief turned out to be very wrong: Sihanouk quickly demonstrated surprising political savvy, and by 1953 he had skillfully orchestrated his country's independence from France. In 1955, he shrewdly abdicated in favor of his father, then ran for the office of Prime Minister as the head of his own political party. Against the backdrop of a widening war in Indochina, Sihanouk remained the unquestioned leader of the country for the next fifteen years. In 1970, however, Sihanouk was overthrown in a coup led by two of his lieutenants, General Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak.
It is hard to imagine how different history might have been if Sihanouk had responded differently to the coup. Perhaps it would not have mattered; perhaps the forces at war in Indochina would have devastated Cambodia, with or without Sihanouk. But we will never know, for at that critical moment, Sihanouk chose to support the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk's support was the engine that sparked the explosive growth of the Khmer Rouge. And it would be the Khmer Rouge who would drive Cambodia to the brink of annihilation.
Sihanouk wrote two books which allow us to glimpse history from his perspective. Both books are flawed and sometimes frustrating, but they are worth reading nonetheless.
My War with the CIA is Sihanouk's first memoir. It is essentially a propaganda tract. At times, Sihanouk's disingenuousness is almost embarrassingly transparent, as when he refers to the repression of the left during his own regime as the work of "Lon Nol's raiding expeditions." He is similarly unconvincing when he attempts to explain away his public statements regarding the leftists: "To throw my own dissenters - rightists such as Lon Nol - off the track, I occasionally made speeches attacking the Vietminh, Vietcong and Khmers Rouges. The first two realized that the main thing was my unswerving political, diplomatic and material support of their resistance struggle. But I did not know at the time that the Khmers Rouges had also understood this. The proof was their immediate acceptance of the alliance for resistance in 1970."
Clearly, the real reason the Khmer Rouge immediately accepted his "alliance" was that they, like the Prince, understood the value of a marriage of expediency. The Prince's name gave their movement a legitimacy that it would otherwise have lacked.
Still, although My War is very obviously a book with an agenda, there are times when Sihanouk's comments seem precisely on-target, as when he discusses Richard Nixon's comments on the invasion of Cambodia:
"President Nixon has explained that the 341 million dollars spent annually in the officially-approved slaughter of Cambodians is 'the best investment in foreign assistance that the United States has made in my political life'. Because of the 'success' of the Cambodian operation, 'US casualties have been cut by two thirds, a hundred thousand Americans have come home and more are doing so'. In other words, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, by allowing Nixon to export the fighting from South Vietnam to Cambodia - to substitute Cambodian for American and South Vietnamese corpses - have rendered a valuable service, for which 341 million dollars is a reasonable annual reimbursement!"
Sihanouk goes on to quote George McGovern's rather astute assessment of the so-called "Nixon Doctrine": "We pay them for killing each other while we reduce our own forces."
From time to time there are telling glimpses into Sihanouk's true beliefs. Sihanouk notes that during the early Fifties he feared that "the Vietminh were fighting only to replace the French as masters in Cambodia." Having aligned himself with the Communists at the time of the book's publication, he naturally disavows this belief. That fear that would resurface in his second book.
There is disappointingly little of the Prince's personality in the bland prose of this book. It is as though the demands of ideology have smothered his very spirit. There is, however, one very memorable passage, in which the Prince relates an incident during the ceremony which marked the Cambodia's independence from the French:
"When it came to the formal handing-over of powers, it was with my respected former cavalry instructor, General de Langlade, that I had to deal.
'Sire,' he said, 'You have whipped me.'
'Mon general, it is not true,' I replied. 'But I had to show myself worthy of General de Langlade's education. My success is yours, as it is you who taught me what I know of military science.'
'You are not very kind to your professor,' he continued.
'Mon general,' I said, 'I had to prove myself, as one of your pupils. I could not lose so vital a battle, with my country at stake.'
On the eve of the French departure, one of his staff officers whispered to de Langlade: 'The King is mad! He expels us from Cambodia, but without us he will be crushed by the Vietminh!'
De Langlade turned to him and other officers and replied: 'Gentlemen, the King may be mad, but it is a brilliant sort of madness!'"
Brilliant madness: a wily monarch, tragically flawed. An undercurrent of Sihanouk's critical failing - his vanity - shows through on many occasions. One comes away from My War with the sense that Sihanouk was obsessed with his own stature. Again and again he rails against "humiliating discourtesies" (p. 86), "bad manners" (p.87), "humiliations that had lasted so long" (p. 128), "shame and frustration" (p. 129), "being punished, humiliated, and prepared for the chopping block" (p. 130), "national humiliation" (p.133), "indignities and humiliations" (p. 148), "the humiliation" (p. 222) "We have suffered too much; we have been humiliated too long." (p. 234).
With the disastrous reign of the Khmer Rouge long ago relegated to "the ash heap of history", it is almost painful to review the book's final chapter. Its title is "The Future," and it outlines the supposed future policies of rebel regime. To read these words today is to feel a horrible sadness. One can only imagine how it must feel to be the person who wrote them.
"In its relations with the outside world, Cambodia will thus remain much as it was before; friendly with all countries that respect our independence and sovereignty...
"Our internal policy will be socialist and progressive, but not communist. State, state-private, and private enterprise will coexist..."
"I do not know about Europe, with its own traditions and concepts, but I feel that, for Asia, the commune is a real discovery..."
These and other similar statements leave the reader longing for the safety of the old, familiar delusions about the utopian future. The true nature of Khmer Rouge policies - the xenophobia, the extremism, the labor brigades, the executions, the starvation - would soon be beyond dispute.
In My War Sihanouk reminds us of a statement that he made in 1955, at the time of his abdication: "I categorically refuse to return to the throne no matter what the turn of events." This statement, like so many of Sihanouk's pronouncements, would be reversed by time and fate and whim. What the Khmer Rouge called "the Wheel of History" would soon crush Lon Nol. Then, just as surely, it crushed the Khmer Rouge as well. And yet Sihanouk himself somehow escaped. Effectively imprisoned in his palace throughout most the Khmer Rouge reign, Sihanouk was spirited out of the country just ahead of the Vietnamese invasion. Written in the aftermath of disaster, Sihanouk's second memoir, War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia bears little resemblance to its predecessor. By 1979, when the book was written, Cambodia was in ruins.
It would be a stretch to describe War and Hope as a completely honest memoir, but it is at least more realistic than the volume that preceded it. One wonders if Sihanouk's experience with the Khmer Rouge left him somewhat chastised. It's doubtful if he ever believed the Khmer Rouge propaganda about their aims, and with the benefit of hindsight he seems to have come to understand the futility of his earlier charade. "Time will inevitably uncover dishonesty and lies; history has no place for them," he writes.
It is in the name of this honesty that Sihanouk discusses the role of the Vietnamese in fighting the Lon Nol regime. The Vietnamese, he notes, were the architects of some of the most spectacular acts of sabotage that crippled the Khmer Republic: the destruction of much of Pochentong airport, the oil refinery at Kompong Som, and the Chroy Chungwa bridge in Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge, by contrast, had no effective artillery at all; they relied heavily on rockets, and "they did not hit one of their military objectives. Instead, residential neighborhoods of no military interest were bombed, markets and schools were destroyed, children and innocent adults were killed or hideously wounded - all for nothing." Still, Sihanouk notes, the Khmer Rouge did in fact assemble a fierce and formidable army. He notes in particular their use of children, ideal fodder for the Khmer Rouge, given the relative ease with which they could be indoctrinated. These young soldiers, Sihanouk claims, were trained in "cruel games" with the goal that "they would end up as soldiers with a love of killing and consequently of war... During the three years I spent with the Khmer Rouge under house arrest in Phnom Penh, I saw the yotheas in charge of guarding my 'camp' constantly take pleasure in tormenting animals (dogs, cats, monkeys, geckos)."
Sihanouk's analyses of the factors that determined the outcome of the civil war seems generally accurate, but there is one notable omission. In a chapter called "Why Did the U.S. Lose the War in Cambodia?" Sihanouk elaborates several reasons, among them: the US underestimated support for Sihanouk himself, and underestimated the determination of the Vietnamese to maintain a presence in Cambodia; they underestimated the effects of corruption in the Lon Nol regime; and the US overestimated the effectiveness of the bombing campaign. But Sihanouk does not mention what is arguably one of the most important reasons for Lon Nol's defeat: sheer American indifference. The fate of Cambodia was always a secondary concern to US policymakers. Vietnam was the real arena. Behind most American decisions, one senses that the real question was not, "How will this affect our allies in Cambodia?" but rather "How will this affect our ability to get out of Vietnam?" It is doubtful that any US action - even a massive US ground force - could have altered the outcome once the full fury of Cambodia's civil war had been unleashed. But American indifference to the fate of the Cambodians made it a foregone conclusion that no dramatic initiatives would ever be undertaken.
At times, Sihanouk demonstrates a very convenient blindness. Or perhaps he is demonstrating pragmatism. One notes that Sihanouk compares Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to Hitler and Goebbels... but never to Mao, which would be a much more accurate comparison. Perhaps this is recognition of the fact that Cambodia in 1979 needed the Chinese if they were to avoid being swallowed whole by Vietnam.
This, in fact, is one factor that distinguished Sihanouk from Lon Nol and Pol Pot. Only Sihanouk seemed to view the Vietnamese realistically. Both Lon Nol and Pol Pot believed that they could, if necessary, physically overpower the more numerous, better-armed Vietnamese. It was an absurd belief, and it doomed both regimes.
For his own part, Sihanouk notes that during his rule he "...closed his eyes to the installation of Viet 'rest camps,' hospitals, provision centers in Cambodia. Secondly, he authorized the Chinese, Russians, Czechoslovakians, etc., to use the port of Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) as an unloading point for the military and other supplies to the Vietminh and Vietcong." It was all part of the delicate balancing act: Sihanouk himself may not have liked the communists, but he believed that they were destined to win the war in Vietnam, and when the war was over, it would be better to be regarded as an ally, rather than an enemy.
Such pragmatism was entirely alien to the Khmer Rouge. They had unquestioning faith in their own destiny. The doctrinaire belief that sheer will, would overcome lack of education and training, for instance, sometimes led to surreal incidents. Sihanouk notes in particular an anecdote relating to American helicopters that the Khmer Rouge had inherited:
"Shortly after the April, 1975 victory, the Khmer Rouge army decided to try out a few of the American helicopters Lon Nol had abandoned in Phnom Penh. They reasoned that if they had been able to teach themselves to drive, they would be able to figure out helicopters, too. A group of young yotheas told Mme. Penn Nouth (wife of the former GRUNK Prime Minister) that one mechanically gifted comrade of theirs had indeed been able to get a helicopter off the ground, but he could not manage to land it. The would-be pilot finally met a far-from-heroic death when his craft ran out of fuel and crashed.
After this bizarre accident, the high command was forced to call on Capt. Pech Lim Khuon, a former pilot in Lon Nol's army who had joined the resistance movement at the beginning of the 1970-1975 war. The captain had no trouble getting airborne, and proceeded to make a happy landing in Thailand. He was subsequently granted asylum in France."
Sihanouk cites other interesting examples of the twisted world view of the Khmer Rouge. Khieu Samphan was fond of telling Sihanouk that the North Koreans were on "the wrong track". "'Now," Samphan told Sihanouk, "'the North Koreans have fine houses and cars, nice cities. The people are too attached to their new life.' he said. 'They will never want to start or even fight in a new war, their only hope of liberating South Korea and reuniting their country.'" Even more telling was Samphan's reaction to advice from the ailing Zhou Enlai, who advised the Khieu Samphan not to try to achieve Communism too quickly:
"The great Chinese statesman counseled the Khmer Rouge leaders: 'Don't follow the bad example of our "great leap forward." Take things slowly: that is the best way to guide Kampuchea and its people to growth, prosperity, and happiness.' By way of response to this splendid and moving piece of almost fatherly advice, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Thirith just smiled an incredulous and superior smile...
"Not long after we got back to Phnom Penh, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen told me that their Kampuchea was going to show the world that pure communism could indeed be achieved at one fell swoop. This was no doubt their indirect reply to Zhou Enlai. 'Our country's place in history will be assured,' they said. 'We will be the first nation to create a completely communist society without wasting time on intermediate steps.'"
Still, the Khmer Rouge belief in the communist cause did not create any fraternal affection for their Vietnamese communist neighbors. The Vietnamese were scorned with a hatred previously reserved for the Americans. Sihanouk asked Khieu Samphan to explain the Khmer Rouge's hatred of Vietnam. "He unabashedly told me that 'to unite our compatriots through the party, to bring our workers up to their highest level of productivity, and to make the yotheas' ardor and valor in combat even greater, the best thing we could do was to incite them to hate the Yuons more and more every day.' Khieu Samphan added: 'Our bang-phaaun [literally, older and younger brothers and sisters] are willing to make any sacrifice the minute we wave the 'Hate Vietnam' flag in front of them.'"
Samphan was wrong. However much the Khmer mistrusted and despised the Vietnamese, they hated the Khmer Rouge even more. The anti-Viet stance of the Khmer Rouge did not increase the regime's popularity; instead, it set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy. Goaded by a series of brutal border attacks, the Vietnamese finally invaded Cambodia, toppled the Khmer Rouge, and installed their own puppet government. The Khmer Rouge retreated into the mountains, where they continued to wage a guerrilla struggle against the Vietnamese.
After the Vietnamese invasion, many activists denounced the role of the Thais in "resurrecting" the battered remnants of the Khmer Rouge. Discussing his meetings with Deng Xiaoping in 1979, Sihanouk addresses this issue, with what seems like ambivalence: "It remained to be seen how China would make arms shipments to Pol Pot's guerrilla fighters. Deng told me it was 'no problem, Thailand is helping us.' When I asked Thailand's leaders about this, they called me a liar and said I was trying to compromise Thailand's 'strict neutrality' in the Vietnam-Kampuchea dispute. My guess is that the whole matter will be settled privately, without the Thai government being implicated..."
Still, despite his anger and fear over the Vietnamese invasion of his country, Sihanouk gives them their due: "History may judge me as it sees fit for asserting that no matter how distasteful and humiliating we Khmer find the current Vietnamese presence in our country, it is the people's only protection against being massacred by the Khmer Rouge (and inadequate protection at that)."
At the time the book was published, a few meager forces had taken up the royalist banner, vowing to fight the Vietnamese occupation. They were no match for the Vietnamese, and Sihanouk quickly came under pressure to align his forces in a coalition to fight against the Vietnamese. In War and Hope he describes this proposal as "tantamount to putting a starving and bloodthirsty wolf in with a lamb." But here, too, the Prince would later reverse himself, and he ultimately joined an uneasy triumvirate with the Khmer Rouge and another faction led by Son Sann.
With a keen understanding of the difficult decisions faced by the Khmer, Sihanouk reserves his highest praise not for his comrades-in-arms, but for those displaced by the continuing conflicts: "The common people of Cambodia have given us a magnificent example of farsightedness and genuine patriotism: they go along neither with the Khmer Rouge nor the outsiders. They prefer to flee to Thailand, exposing themselves to the greatest dangers in the process, or else hide deep in Cambodia's forests, risking death from starvation, sickness, snakebite - or being eaten by tigers and wolves. That is what I call real courage and patriotism."
Surrounded by warring combatants, at risk from death and disease; in a sense, the choices faced by the Khmer people were akin to the choices faced by the country itself. Whatever one's opinion of Sihanouk, one must recognize this: By 1970, in a game of global politics, Cambodia was dealt an almost impossible hand. Bordered by stronger, hostile neighbors, trod upon by an uncaring superpower, violated by foreign armies, mired in poverty; there were no good options: there were only differing degrees of bad ones.
Book Launch: " Dancing in shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations in Cambodia" |
http://www.csis.or.id/events_past_view.asp?id=351&tab=0 (Comments: Benny Wydiono (whom I know) is an Indonesian diplomat who was a member of part of the United Nations Transitional Authority on Cambodia (UNTAC). I had corresponded with hi by email, on this book as he had asked me to put the review of this book in my web site. Wydiono’s writing is in general, accurate with one exception; as typical of all Indonesian politicians since Sukarno’s time, by tradition of common stand on anti colonialism, are sympathetic to Vietnam, and Wydiono is no exception. Having said that his description and observation on Sihanouk’s behavior “Dancing in Shadows” is very real and true. However, the most interesting part of his book is in this observation about Sihanouk role in the Cambodian affairs and his relation with his son Ranariddh and Hun Sen. But, he did not know that Sihanouk switched his support form his Coalition government to Hun Sen since 1987, when Sihanouk met with Hun Sen at village near Paris named Fère-en-Tardenois. (See article posted below titled “The Sihanouk-Hun Sen Meeting.”) CSIS hosted the launching of a book on Cambodian politics by Benny Widyono, entitled “Dancing in Shadows”. The book is a memoir of his five years in Cambodia. From 1992 until 1993 he was member of UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority on Cambodia) and from 1994 until 1997 he served as the United Nations Secretary-General’s Representative in Cambodia. Wydiono’s description of this collusion between Hun Sen, Ranariddh, and Sihanouk was well captured by this sentence from this review: “Sihanouk wanted to be the King that rules, not just reigns. Sihanouk had no faith in Ranariddh’s capacity and Hun Sen’s presence is a threat to him, until Khmer Rouge came. He saw Khmer Rouge’s attack to the capital as an opportunity to deal with the pebbles in his shoes. Then a coup d’état happened when Khmer Rouge was declared as outlaws.” Sihanouk is known for his ability to survive. But, one can ask the next question, in maneuvering the situation and by switching sides, he was always able to survive, but, at the great expense of the majority of the Cambodian people. Sihanouk, according to many objective observers, is main person responsible for the endless tragedy of Cambodia and its people. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. May 25, 2010) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The author started his speech by reminiscing King Sihanouk’s comment about his own country as a country stuck between crocodile (Vietnam) and tiger (Thailand). The author continued by explaining the reason behind the title of the book. He saw King Sihanouk, Khmer Rouge and the United Nations (UN) were dancing in the shadows and prolonging the sufferings of the Cambodian people. Cambodia had due to its geopolitical location, seen itself subjugated to the ongoing power struggles for hegemony in Southeast Asia. As a result, prior to the arrival of UNTAC in March 1992 Cambodia was, for more than twenty two years, plunged into chaos, turmoil, civil war and deep despair. Khmer Rouge during its reign from April 17 1975 to January 7 1979 has massacred an estimated 1.7 million people or one third of the population. Khmer Rouge also effectively abolished private property, family life, religion, money, and urban life. He described Sihanouk’s role as King that helped the meteoric rise of the Khmer Rouge from a small communist movement to a formidable force which ruled the country from 1975 to 1979. Such support was appreciated by China and aid was poured in. Khmer Rouge was cruel throughout the period, torturing and killing people, enforcing child soldiers from the poorest of the poor. When Cambodia was liberated by Hun Sen with the help of the Vietnamese army in 1979, the UN still acknowledged the Khmer Rouge as the government. China and U.S. conspired to continue recognizing the genocidal regime because they were anti-Vietnam. Situation continued for 11 more years until 1991 when the Paris Agreements were signed. In New York where the author served in the United Nations, the flag of the Khmer Rouge continued to fly for eleven more years which was an insult to the Cambodian people who have suffered so much. Meanwhile in Phnom Penh, the PRK under Hun Sen, though de facto ruling the country, went unrecognized, received no aid and was politically isolated, thereby prolonging the suffering of the Cambodian people for eleven years after the Khmer Rouge was ousted. The book differs from others in that it argues that the dancing in shadows among the three actors, Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations continued during the UNTAC period. He contended that the Paris Agreements carried original sins because it did not put Khmer Rouge as the enemy but the legitimate ruler or the country. Reference to “genocide” or any term related to the cruelty was taken out and changed to “situations in the past”. The first of the coalition, pressed by the United States, China and their allies, was that the Democratic Kampuchean "faction" was to play a legitimate role in Cambodian politics as one of four factions with whom UNTAC had to deal. The other three factions were the FUNCINPEC (Royalist party), the KPNLF (anti communist pro US faction) and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) headed by Premier Hun Sen which had ruled the country for eleven years. UNTAC was given executive governance powers by the Supreme National Council, headed by Sihanouk, a symbolic entity consisting of the four factions with no real power. Although the UN did not recognize the PRK under Hun Sen, he was de facto the only real government. One can imagine the chaos which this caused for the UNTAC operations. The Paris Agreements placed some heavy burdens on the UNTAC operation. UNTAC failed to disarm the four factional armies because the Khmer Rouge refused to be disarmed. The Bamboo pole incident is when UNTAC failed to control the four “existing “administrative structures”. However UNTAC is not without successes. 360,000 refugees were returned from the Thai border and participated in the elections. UNTAC’s elections in 1993 were successful with more than 90% eligible voters participating. A new government was established with two prime ministers Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen. Sihanouk wanted to be the King that rules, not just reigns. Sihanouk had no faith in Ranariddh’s capacity and Hun Sen’s presence is a threat to him, until Khmer Rouge came. He saw Khmer Rouge’s attack to the capital as an opportunity to deal with the pebbles in his shoes. Then a coup d’état happened when Khmer Rouge was declared as outlaws. Sihanouk continued to manipulate Cambodian politics, engaging in dancing in shadows with Hun Sen, gradually losing power until he abdicated in 2004 leaving Hun Sen as the new dominant power in the country or what the author called the salami approach. When Hun Sen and Ranariddh finally cooperated, they were named “whispering government” because though Ranariddh do the public speaking, Hun Sen did the whispering on the back telling him what to do. Coalition continued until Hun Sen kicked Ranariddh out of his seat. Hun Sen amended the Constitution that guaranteed his party’s position without having to continue with any coalition. Many blamed the UN for not allowing Ranariddh to rule after he won in the election. “How do you allow Ranariddh to rule when the whole country is controlled by Hun Sen, who held the whole military?” The story in the book ended in 1979 and Hadi Soesastro added the more recent history of Cambodia, surrounding the event of Cambodia being refused as member of ASEAN. All in all, especially for the last 10 years or so, Cambodia has actually consolidated its position as an autocratic regime with the dictatorship of Hun Sen. With regard to the Khmer Rouge’s international tribunal, the author compared the trial with the Nuremberg trial. It will take long time and it will be different from the Serbian or other recent trials. Hun Sen insisted to have a Cambodian Court and have very little trust to UN after being manipulated in the past. The author maintains that such manipulation still continues. He mentioned the US’ refusal to contribute financially to the trial until all Khmer Rouge was put on trial. But it is complicated because King Sihanouk and Hun Sen were also Khmer Rouge. Ali Alatas added some notes. After the Paris Agreement, the Khmer Rouge was excluded though not disarmed by the forces. At the behest of the negotiator, Ali Alatas had a secret meeting in Bangkok with Khmer Rouge leadership and asked them whether they were serious in their last minute refusal to join the Paris Accord. They said yes and Ali Alatas said that if they did not join, no one will support them including China. Khmer Rouge said they will take that risk. They were in pockets near borders and Phnom Penh, only UN troops can talk to them. Ali Alatas agreed that there are two problems. When they were about to join ASEAN, they were supposed to enter together with Myanmar and Laos. But one week before or so, there was a coup d’état by Hun Sen. ASEAN after a lot of debates, decided to postpone. Ali Alatas together with two other ASEAN member countries representatives were sent to solve the problem. Hun Sen was furious and refused to join ASEAN because ASEAN was seen to be interfering. Ali Alatas tried to be patient and explained that they do not want to interfere. But because Hun Sen wanted to join ASEAN, therefore they have the desire to talk to Hun Sen regarding the coup. The solution was that Ranariddh became Chairman of the Parliament and Hun Sen remain the sole Prime Minister. Ali Alatas referred to the humanitarian intervention and mentioned the rejection of the Third countries. The first reason is the sovereignty issue. Second is that it was patently clear, that it could only be applied to smaller countries. Chechnya was still a problem, but nobody talked about it because Russia is so big. This was patent discriminatory, that’s why the non-alliance countries refused to accept.
The Sihanouk-Hun Sen Meeting Russell R. Ross, ed. Cambodia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987. http://countrystudies.us/cambodia/86.htm
Cambodia Table of Contents Hun Sen's April 1987 proposal for a talk with Sihanouk was resurrected in August when the prince sent a message to Hun Sen through the Palestine Liberation Organization's ambassador in Pyongyang. Sihanouk was hopeful that his encounter with Hun Sen would lead to another UN-sponsored Geneva conference on Indochina, which, he believed, would assure a political settlement that would allow Vietnam and the Soviet Union to save face. Such a conference, Sihanouk maintained, should include the UN secretary general, representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Laos, Vietnam, and the four Cambodian factions. He also suggested the inclusion of ASEAN countries, members of the defunct International Control Commission (India, Canada, and Poland), and other concerned parties. The Heng Samrin regime had apparently envisioned a meeting between Sihanouk and Hun Sen when it announced on August 27 a "policy on national reconciliation." While artfully avoiding the mention of Vietnam, the policy statement called for talks with the three resistance leaders but not with "Pol Pot and his close associates." An appeal to overseas Cambodians to support Phnom Penh's economic and national defense efforts and assurances that Cambodians who had served the insurgent factions would be welcomed home and would be assisted in resuming a normal life and in participating in the political process were key features of the policy. The regime also expressed for the first time its readiness to negotiate the issue of Cambodian refugees in Thailand. The offer to negotiate undercut the resistance factions, which, Phnom Penh contended, were exploiting displaced Cambodians by using them against the Heng Samrin regime for military and political purposes. Resistance leaders questioned Phnom Penh's sincerity in promulgating its policy of reconciliation and were uncertain how to respond. At their annual consultation in Beijing, they and their Chinese hosts predictably called for a Vietnamese pullout as a precondition to a negotiated settlement. Sihanouk, however, launching a gambit of his own through Cambodian émigrés in Paris, called for reconciliation émigrés among all Khmer factions. The initiative met with a favorable, but qualified, response from PRK Prime Minister Hun Sen and, in early October, the Phnom Penh government unveiled its own five-point plan for a political settlement. The PRK proposals envisioned peace talks between the rival Cambodian camps and "a high position [for Sihanouk] in the leading state organ" of the PRK, Vietnamese withdrawal in conjunction with the cutoff of outside aid to the resistance, general elections (organized by the Heng Samrin regime) held after the Vietnamese withdrawal, and the formation of a new four-party coalition. The October 8 plan also proposed negotiations with Thailand for the creation of a zone of peace and friendship along the Cambodian-Thai border, for discussions on an "orderly repatriation" of Cambodian refugees from Thailand, and for the convening of an international conference. The conference was to be attended by the rival Cambodian camps, the Indochinese states, the ASEAN states, the Soviet Union, China, India, France, Britain, the United States, and other interested countries. The CGDK, however, rejected the plan as an attempt to control the dynamics of national reconciliation while Cambodia was still occupied by Vietnam. Sihanouk and the PRK continued their exploratory moves. On October 19, Hun Sen agreed to meet with Sihanouk, even though Sihanouk had cancelled similar meetings scheduled for late 1984 and for June 1987. At the end of October, Hun Sen flew to Moscow for diplomatic coordination. The CGDK announced on October 31 that a "clarification on national reconciliation policy" had been signed by all three resistance leaders. It was likely that the two main goals of the clarification, which was dated October 1, were to restate the CGDK's position on peace talks and to underline the unity among the resistance leaders. The statement said that "the first phase" of Vietnamese withdrawal must be completed before a four-party coalition government could be set up, not within the framework of the PRK but under the premises of a "neutral and noncommunist" Cambodia. Sihanouk was clearly in the spotlight at this point. It was possible that his personal diplomacy would stir suspicion among his coalition partners, as well as among Chinese and ASEAN leaders. It was also possible that he might strike a deal with Phnom Penh and Hanoi and exclude the Khmer Rouge faction and its patron, China. Mindful of such potential misgivings, Sihanouk went to great lengths to clarify his own stand. He said that he would not accept any "high position" in the illegal PRK regime, that he would disclose fully the minutes of his talks with Hun Sen, and that he would not waver from his commitment to a "neutral and noncommunist" Cambodia free of Vietnamese troops. Sihanouk and Hun Sen met at Fère-en-Tardenois, a village northeast of Paris, from December 2 to December 4, 1987. The communiqué they issued at the end of their talks mentioned their agreement to work for a political solution to the nine-year-old conflict and to call for an international conference. The conference, to be convened only after all Cambodian factions reached an agreement on a coalition arrangement, would support the new coalition accord and would guarantee the country's independence, neutrality, and nonalignment. The two leaders also agreed to meet again at Fère-en-Tardenois in January 1988 and in Pyongyang at a later date. The communiqué ended with a plea to the other Cambodian parties--Sihanouk's coalition partners--to join the next rounds of talks. The communiqué offered no practical solution. In fact, it did not mention Vietnam, despite Sihanouk's demand that the communiqué include a clause on Vietnamese withdrawal. At a December 4 press conference, Hun Sen disclosed an understanding with Sihanouk that "concrete questions" would be discussed at later meetings. Included in the concrete questions were "the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, Cambodia's future government, and Norodom Sihanouk's position." Hun Sen also revealed that during the meeting Sihanouk had told him that "the future political regime of Cambodia" should be a French-style democracy with a multiparty system and free radio and television. In an official commentary the following day, Hanoi was deliberately vague on Hun Sen's concrete questions, which, it said, would be dealt with "at the next meetings." In foreign capitals, there were mixed reactions to what Hun Sen called the "historic meeting." Officials in Phnom Penh, Hanoi, Vientiane, and Moscow were enthusiastic. Thai officials, however, were cautious, if not disappointed, and they stressed the need for Vietnamese withdrawal and for Thailand's participation in peace talks with the Cambodians. Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta both welcomed the unofficial, or indirect, talks as a promising start toward a political solution. They agreed with Bangkok on the necessity of Vietnamese withdrawal. Officials in Pyongyang said the meeting was "a good thing," but declined to accept the suggestion of Hun Sen and Sihanouk that they mediate between China and the Soviet Union on the Cambodian issue. China stressed that it supported Sihanouk's efforts to seek "a fair and reasonable political settlement of the Kampuchean question." Such a settlement was said to be possible only when Vietnam withdrew all its troops from Cambodia. On December 10, Sihanouk abruptly announced the cancellation of the second meeting with Hun Sen. He said that such a meeting would be useless because Son Sann and Khieu Samphan refused to participate in it and because they also refused to support the joint communiqué. He added that--out of fear that the governments in Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and Moscow might realize an unwarranted propaganda advantage from the meeting--he would not meet Hun Sen. But on December 15, Sihanouk announced abruptly that he would resume talks with Hun Sen because ASEAN members saw the cancellation as "a new complication" in their efforts to pressure the Vietnamese into leaving Cambodia. By December 20, Sihanouk and Hun Sen had agreed to resume talks on January 27, 1988. On December 21, Son Sann expressed his readiness to join the talks in a personal capacity, provided that Vietnam agreed to attend the talks or, if this was not possible, provided that Vietnam informed the UN secretary general and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council of its plan to vacate Cambodia as quickly as possible after all Cambodian factions had embarked on the process of internal reconciliation. As 1987 drew to a close, talking and fighting continued amid hopes and uncertainties about the future of Cambodia. It was equally clear that progress toward a political settlement hinged chiefly on the credibility of Vietnam's announced intention to withdraw from Cambodia by 1990 and that this withdrawal alone was insufficient to guarantee a peaceful solution to Cambodia's problems. At least three more critical issues were at stake: an equitable power-sharing arrangement among these four warring factions, an agreement among the factions to disarm in order to ensure that civil war would not recur, and an effective international guarantee of supervision for the implementation of any agreements reached by the Cambodian factions. Still another critical question was whether or not an eventual political settlement was sufficient to assure a new Cambodia that was neutral, nonaligned, and noncommunist. More about the Government and Politics of Cambodia |
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Once More, Sihanouk’s deceitfulness is revealed
February 20, 2005
(Comments: I am sending this email to let you see how the so-called Sihanouk's "solution" to the recent Sam Rainsy' s stripping of his parliamentary immunity by Hun Sen and Ranariddh, compared to the solution proposed by the international community comprising resolutions by the US Senate, the Australian Senate, and a motion by the European Parliament.
It is clear that the so-called Sihanouk's "solution" is to favor a status quo that is to allow Hun Sen and Ranariddh to continue to plunder the Cambodian people and to suppress the opposition with impunity. Sihanouk's proposal for this crisis is the same as those he had proposed for the Khmer Rouge trial. That is not to have any trial at all. He first invoked the reason that the trial is a waste of money. Then, he came up with the idea that the trial will push to remnant of the Khmer Rouge to go back into the jungle to start a war against the government of Cambodia. This is what Sihanouk is all about. He has no respect for any law or moral principle. His only interest is to save himself and his family.
Below are the documents to backed up for what I have just analyzed.
Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. )
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The International Community Response to Hun Sen and Ranariddh’s Persecution of Sam Rainsy and his party
I. US Senate Resolution on Cambodia (1)
On 17 February 2005, Senators Sam Brownback and Mitch McConnel introduced a Resolution on Cambodia (S. Res. 65) "Calling for the Government of Cambodia to release Cheam Channy from prison, and for other purposes".
The Resolution also - "Calls upon the Cambodian National Assembly to reverse its recent action to strip the immunity of opposition parliamentarians Sam Rainsy, Cheam Channy, and Chea Poch; - Urges the Secretary of State, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, international financial institutions, and democracies around the world to continue to publicly and forcefully condemn the Cambodian National Assembly vote;
- Urges international donors to consider imposing appropriate sanctions against the National Assembly and the Government of Cambodia unless and until it reverses its recent action;
- Calls upon the Secretary of State to impose visa restrictions on members of the Cambodian National Assembly and their families who voted to strip the immunity of Sam Rainsy, Cheam Channy, and Chea Pok, consistent with the President's Proclamation of January 12, 2004, regarding the denial of visas to corrupt public officials and their families; and
- Calls upon Prime Minister Hun Sen and Cambodian National Assembly President Norodom Ranariddh to cease and desist their efforts to undermine democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Cambodia."
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II. European Union expresses concern about lifting of parliamentary immunity (1)
On 10 February 2005, the Presidency of the European Union – Luxemburg on behalf of 25 European nations – issued the following Declaration:
"The European Union, friend and partner of the Kingdom of Cambodia, expresses concern about the actual political situation characterised notably by the multiplication of actions brought before justice by the political leaders against each other, by the recent suspension of the parliamentarian immunity of three opposition members and the arrest of one of these parliamentarians.
This situation does not seem favourable to a balanced functioning of the institutions, to the respect of the democratic opposition's rights, to the national reconciliation and to the recovery of the country engaged in the construction of a state of law.
The European Union makes an appeal to the leaders of all political parties to work together in a spirit of responsibility and concord in the interest of all Cambodian people. The European Union will continue to follow the situation."
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15 February 2005
III. Australian Senate adopts Resolution on
(1) Cambodia
On 10 February 2005 the Australian Senate unanimously adopted the following Resolution on Cambodia:
"The Senate
(a) notes
(i) that a closed session of the Cambodian National Assembly, under the direction of Prime Minister Hun Sen, has removed the rightful parliamentary immunity of leading opposition figures, including Sam Rainsy, and
(ii) the subsequent arrest of Sam Rainsy Party Member of Parliament, Cheam Channy; therefore
(b) calls on the Australian Government to immediately make representations to the Cambodian Government to:
(i) have parliamentary immunity reinstated, and
(ii) ensure the safety of Mr. Rainsy and his colleagues and the release of Mr. Cheam Channy without condition."
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11 February 2005
IV. King-Father proposes a 5-point solution to the current crisis (1)
In a February 10 open letter written in French from Beijing to National Assembly President Norodom Ranariddh and Prime Minister Hun Sen, King-Father Norodom Sihanouk proposes a 5-point plan to solve the current "political drama":
1- Ranariddh and Hun Sen, as "good Buddhists and wise statesmen" declare that they grant their "pardon to those who have hurt [them]".
2- The parliamentary immunity of Sam Rainsy, Cheam Channy and Chea Poch are to be immediately reinstated.
3- All lawsuits filed by political leaders against each other are dropped.
4- King Norodom Sihamoni, who is also the Supreme Commander of the Army, officially grants his pardon to Cheam Channy, who is to be released [from jail] and to become again a full-fledged member of the National Assembly.
5- With the implementation of this National Reconciliation scheme, the SRP will remain an opposition party.
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