Vietnam Sino-Centric Tributary System with a Deadly Twist:  "Nam Tien" or Vietnamese Colonialism against its weaker Neighbors

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To fully understand the deep hole in which Cambodia is finding itself now, which mostly come from the the inability of the Cambodian people and their so-called leaders to really understand and underestimate the ability of the Vietnamese to conceive and and successfully organized a full proof strategy known as "Nam Tien" or "Southward March," based on an extremely well-planned, well-thought out, and well organized and executed long term plan to take over their weaker neighbors, starting with Champa which was obliterated by the 17th century, then Kampuchea Krom, by the 19th centruy, and now Cambodia and Laos proper. This deadly strategy, which is no more no less a the practice of genocide by Vietnam (See defintion of genocide from the 1948 United Nations Covenant on Genocide, and the exceprt from Bernard Fall's book titled "The two Viet-Nams," posted below) must be understood within both the ideological and historical perspectives (Please, see a map of 'Nam tien' posted just below). 

While, the ideological perspective is represented by the doctrine of Communism, which had collapsed due internal contradictions, and Vietnam is a self-declared Communist country (More on this please, go to the 'Home page.' While the historical perspective must be placed within the long history of Vietnam as an imperialist country, since it had liberated itself from the Chinese empire in 938 AD (Please, an enlightening and important excerpt from a book written by Bernard Fall, an American military affairs historian, titled 'The Two Viet-Nams, a Political and Military Analysis,' also an excerpt from a book titled "Vietnam’s External Expansion and Colonial Diasporas (1471 - 1859), authored Bauer College, the University of Houston, Texas, and an artilce titled "Nam Tien from Vietnamese Texts," by Nguyen The Anh, a Vietnamese-French scholar, posted below in this page.

Therefore, this page is an attempt to frame this imperialist strategy and policy of Vietnam within the historical context, and more specifically within the so-called "Sino-centric Tributary System" based on the Chinese tributary model with a deadly Vietnamese twist. Please, read an article by Nguyen The Anh, artilce titled "Nam Tien from Vietnamese Texts," posted below.

Below, are some suggested reading to better understand this historical perspective of Vietnam imperialism based on a modified 'Sino-centric tributary System' with a well-conceived, well-organized, well-planned, and well-implemented strategy of taking over Cambodia and Laos. On the other hand, the Cambodian society is based on a top-down political and social relationship, disorganized, traumatized, and especially trapped in the 'dependence mentality' (Since the fall of Angkor, Cambodian leaders always ask for foreign intervention - Vietnamese, Thai, and French, - when they are fighting each other - for more details on these issues click on this link 'Who is Khmer? Some Selected Thoughts'), without any chance for changes in the near future, because its inability of producing good, courageous, honest, and capable leadership, which is essential for Cambodia to have any chance to counter the well-conceived, well-oiled and well-executed Vietnamese imperialism and colonialism known as "Nam Tien." Please, go to this page for a suggested roadmap to freedom for the Cambodian people titled (A suggested Roadmap to Freedom for Cambodians).

However, this strategy known as "Nam Tien," could not have been easily and sucessfully executed, without the concurrent and support of the Cham, Cambodian, and Lao leaders. Unless the Cambodian and Laotian peoples can produce courageous, honest, and above all capable of formulating and conceptualizing a sound counter-strategy and soon, the future for these two remaining neighboring peoples is very somber indeed.  Naranhkri Tith Ph.D.  Washington DC. November 14, 2009) 

The 1948 Genocide Covenant

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948 as General Assembly Resolution 260. The Convention came into effect in January 1951. It defines genocide in legal terms, and is the culmination of years of campaigning by lawyer Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term by reference to the Simele massacre, the Holocaust, and the Armenian Genocide^[2]. All participating countries are advised to prevent and punish actions of genocide in war and in peacetime. The number of states that have ratified the convention is currently 140

Article 2 of the Convention defines genocide as

...any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

– Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2^[3]

Article 3 defines the crimes that can be punished under the convention:

 : (a) Genocide;

(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;

(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;

(d) Attempt to commit genocide;

(e) Complicity in genocide.

– Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 3^[3]

The convention was passed to outlaw actions similar to the Holocaust by Nazi Germany during World War II. The first draft of the Convention included political killings, but the USSR^[4] along with some other nations would not accept that actions against groups identified as holding similar political opinions or social status would constitute genocide, ^[5] so these stipulations were subsequently removed in a political and diplomatic compromise

Vietnam Imperial March and Nationalism

From “The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis”, Chapter 2: A Glimpse of the Past

By Bernard B. Fall   (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971), pp 10-19

In 111 B.C., the victorious Han crushed the young Vietnamese state, and save for a few brief but glorious rebellions, it remained a Chinese colony for more than 1,000 years.

 Viet-Nam became a Chinese protectorate ruled by a governor and subdivided into military districts. By the beginning of the first century A.D., the country had absorbed along with many Chinese settlers – a great many of them the refugees from the Han dynasty – much of what was worthwhile in the culture of the occupying power: the difficult art of rice planting in artificially irrigated areas, Chinese writing skills, Chinese philosophy, and even Chinese social customs and beliefs. But – and in this the Vietnamese are unique – they succeeded in maintaining their national identity in spite of the fact that everything else about them had become “Chinese.” Opposition to the Chinese rule built up as the Chinese presence became more ubiquitous and brutal. Finally, what could be called a routine “occupation incident,” the execution of a minor feudal lord, brought about a configuration. In 39 A.D., Trung Trac, the wife of the slain lord, and her sister Trung Nhi raised an army that, in a series of swift sieges, overwhelmed the Chinese garrisons, which had grown careless over the years. In 40 A.D., the Vietnamese, much to their surprise, found themselves free from foreign domination for the first time in 150 years and the Trung sisters were proclaimed queens of the country.

 Naturally in so large an empire, Chinese reaction was slow, but when it came, it was effective. Old general Ma Yuan began his counterattack in 43 A.D., and the Vietnamese troops of the two queens made a fatal error: They chose to make a stand in the open field against the experienced Chinese regulars, with their backs against the limestone cliffs at the edge of the river Day – not far from the place where General Vo Nguyen Giap was to pit his green regulars against French Marshal de Lattre’s elite troops 1,908 years later.

The result was the same in both cases: The more experienced regulars destroyed the raw Vietnamese levies. The two queens, rather than surrender to the enemy, chose suicide by drowning in the nearby river. “Sinization” now began in earnest, with Chinese administration taking the place of traditional leaders. Two more rebellions took place. One in 248 A.D., also led by woman, Trieu Au, collapsed almost immediately, and like the Trung sisters, Trieu Au committed suicide. The second led by Ly Bon lasted from 544 to 547 and was also crushed. With the rise of the strong Tang dynasty in China after 618, resistance became hopeless: Viet-Nam became the Chinese Protectorate General of the "Pacified South" ("An-Nam" in Chinese). It was under the name "Annam," a symbol of humiliation and defeat that the region was to become best known to the outside world.

With the decline of the Tangs, Viet-Nam’s chances for freedom rose again. A rash of rebellions in 938 led to the defeat of the Chinese the following year. By 940, the Vietnamese were in full control of their country from the foothills of Yunnan to the 17th parallel Although they retained formal suzerainty ties with China throughout most of their history until French domination became complete in 1883, their northern neighbor, despite sporadic threats, never quite succeeded in controlling the country again, save for the brief period from 1407 to 1427. Having secured their rear areas, the Vietnamese now could address themselves to their major historical mission - securing Lebensraum for their teeming agricultural population in the relatively empty deltas to the south of their boundary. But to the south lay the Indianized kingdom of Champa.

VIETNAMESE COLONIALISM

 What happened next was as thorough a job of genocide as any modern totalitarian state could have devised. Founded in 192 AD., the Champa kingdom, whose beautiful capital, Indrapura, was located near present-day Faifo on the Central Viet-Nam coast, prospered for several centuries through its flourishing seaborne trade and its powerful battle fleets, one of which sailed up the Mekong and across the Great Lake (Tonic Sap) of Cambodia to capture and sack Angkor in 1177. Like their near contemporaries in Europe the Norsemen, the Chams were mostly seaborne raiders with all the advantages and drawbacks, of the concomitant social and political organization. They were the scourge of the area as long as they were strong and capable of carrying the war to their neighbors in their swift ships, but having neglected agriculture and the penetration of their own hinterland, they were incapable of resisting the slow but steady gnawing-away process with which the peasant-based Vietnamese state faced them. Thus, after  several successful Cham raids into the Red River Delta, the Vietnamese finally beat them off, and the Chams were pushed onto the defensive. 

Slowly, Vietnamese rice farmers peacefully occupied the unfilled northern plains of the Champa kingdom, very often with the consent of the Chams, who felt that this process would serve their own enrichment. But as the settlements of the Vietnamese grew so grew the willingness and ability of the neighboring Vietnamese state to protect its own citizens. Slice by slice, delta by delta, the process was repeated. There were a few temporary setbacks in the process but by the end of the eleventh century, all the coastal provinces north of Hue had been conquered. The next important slice, including Hue later Viet-Nam's imperial capital, became Vietnamese in the course of the mid-fifteenth century, thanks to a marriage between he sister of the Vietnamese king and the king of Champa. But in 147l, after renewed bitter warfare, in the course of which the Vietnamese conquered the Chams' second capital, Vijaya-Indrapura having been lost earlier-the once-flourishing Champa kingdom was near collapse. It lost more than 300 miles of shore line and in fact became little more than a beachhead stretching precariously over the small deltas of Khanh-Hoa, Phan-Rang, and Phan-Thiet

 One and a half centuries later, the Champa kingdom had simply disappeared. Today, all that is left of it is a series of watchtower ruins at the landward edge of the Central Vietnamese coastal plains and a small group of perhaps 30,000 handsome Indian-featured people eking out livings as fishermen and artisans around the Vietnamese cities of Phan-Rang and Phan-Ri.

 In the course of this successful venture into colonialism (for it was nothing else), the Vietnamese state decided to institutionalize the process, and in 1481, the don-dien were created. Like the Roman coloniae 1500 years earlier or the Israeli nakhal settlements 500 years later (or the Austro-German Wehrbauern in the 1700's) the don-dien were agricultural settlements given to farmers who were for the most part army veterans and who, in return for free land, defended the new frontier. The members of the don-dien were a tough hardy lot, not only willing to defend what they already had, but usually not loath to push the border farther west-this time at the expense of the decaying Khmer (Cambodian) state. It was obvious such a situation was fertile in border incidents, which were further exploited to round out the Vietnamese domain. In 1658, all of South Viet-Nam north of Saigon (then that the fishing village of Prey Kor) was in Vietnamese hands; Saigon itself fell in 1672.

 The next step in colonial conquest was also typical. A Chinese merchant, Mac-Cuu, had established himself in southwestern Cambodia and, like the well-known European trading companies of the time, had taken physical possession of several provinces stretching from Kampot to Camau. When the Cambodians and their Siamese allies threatened Mac-Cuu's "state within a state," he appealed for help to the neighboring Vietnamese, who were only too happy to oblige. By 1757, Viet-Nam had occupied the rest of the Mekong Delta and the swamp-infested Camau Peninsula. Vietnamese settlers began to pour into the empty provinces, which became a vast "Far West" for the Vietnamese state. To this day, the areas on the western side of the Mekong are known to the Vietnamese as "Mien-Tay" ("the New West"). By the end of the eighteenth century, Viet-Nam had expanded to the full extent of its present shore line.

 Vietnamese intervention in Cambodian affairs had begun in 1623 when Chey Chettha II, a king of Cambodia who had married a Vietnamese princess, attempted to shake Siam's overlordship with the help of the Nguyen. In exchange for that help, the Hue government requested Cambodia's authorization to send settlers to Prey Kor, and a Vietnamese general was sent with a security detachment to protect the new settlers. In 1658, a Vietnamese expeditionary force again had to intervene in the endless internecine struggles of the various pretenders to the Cambodian throne, and in 1660, Cambodia began to pay a regular tribute to the Vietnamese court.'

But the Vietnamese yoke on Cambodia was to take a shape far more direct than the highly theoretical suzerainty China still exercised over Viet-Nam. The declining Khmer state was split into three Vietnamese "residences" under the control of a Vietnamese Chief Resident at the Cambodian court at Oudong. The Vietnamese began an acculturation process that, as in the neighboring provinces and in the case of the Chams, amounted to veritable genocide: destruction of the Buddhist temples and shrines, compulsory wearing of Vietnamese clothing and hairdress, Vietnamization of city and provincial names, and, finally, abolition of the royal title of the Cambodian sovereigns. By the early nineteenth century, the queen, Ang Mey (1834-41), held a virtual prisoner in her palace, was officially referred to as merely "chief of the territory of My-Lam."3

 From 1841, Cambodia was purely and simply incorporated into Viet-Nam, but after a Cambodian rebellion encouraged by Siam and a brief war in which Siam and Viet-Nam fought each other to a standoff, both countries agreed in 1845 to a condominium that ended only when France's protectorate was established, in June, 1863. A similar condominium policy in northern Laos also had brought the important Tran-Ninh Plateau—now better known as the Plaine des Jarres—under intermittent Vietnamese control beginning in the sixteenth century.

 It is interesting to compare the Vietnamese colonization process with the corresponding process of state-building going on in Europe at that time; for too many well-intentioned writers (particularly those in the United States who feel that Europe must continually make amends for her colonial performance) tend to gloss over the non-European colonial processes that were going on simultaneously. In Europe, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed what could be called a national "regroupment" process: Spain left the Low Countries; non-German states lost their influence in Germany; and the Turks, after a high tide that had brought them to the gates of Vienna in 1529 and 1683, returned to the lower reaches of the Balkans. In Europe outside Russia, only Austria-Hungary was to survive as a major multinational state until 1918, and no new state rose to power by ethnic assimilation of alien areas. Viet-Nam was obviously doing exactly the opposite: It carved out its territory through military conquest over states whose level of indigenous culture was at least equal, if not superior, to its own. In other words, it did not invoke the moralistic rationale of "Manifest Destiny," "la Mission Civilisatrice," or "the White Man's Burden"; its action, like the German Drang nach Osten, was simply a manifestation of the vitality of its people. It was simply and purely a process of colonial conquest for material gains, no more, no less. The fact that it took place on contiguous territory does not make it any more respectable than, say, the Russian conquest of Hungary.

 But what makes the Vietnamese colonial process unique in Asia is that it took place in competition with that of several European powers—and the Vietnamese beat them to the punch on several occasions! By 1750, nearly all the later European colonial powers had appeared on the scene: the Dutch and Spaniards in the Spice Islands, the French and British in India, and the Portuguese through-out Southeast Asia, even as far inland as Laos. All of them, at one time or another or simultaneously, had trading stations in Viet-Nam. Whether through superciliousness or plain ignorance, none of the "traditional" colonial powers consciously reacted to the Vietnamese colonial process. But it was not without reason that the French consolidated their position in South Viet-Nam first when they set out to conquer the country one century later; after all, it had been Vietnamese for so short a time that its conquest proved easiest, for its inhabitants were the least secure in their social structure and institutions. This assertion appears to be borne out by the fact that the South appeared more “pro-French” (or simply “French”) than central and North Viet-Nam and that the French colonial penetration became more difficult as it advanced farther North.

Thus much of what today is the Republic of Viet-Nam south of the 17^th parallel has been "Vietnamese" for a shorter span of time than the Eastern seaboard of the United States has been American" This is a reality that cannot be simply talked away, for it affects the very fabric of the nation in times of stress and crisis, as in the 1960’s.

Having consolidated their hold on the lowlands, the Vietnamese committed virtually the same error as their Cham predecessors. They failed to give their country sufficient depth, Literally, teeming in their narrow delta, few Vietnamese had any particular desire to face the inhospitable forests and primitive tribes of the highlands, and save for a few government-sponsored settlements in the mountain areas of both zones, 95 per cent of all those who are Vietnamese ethnically rather than by political fiat, live at an altitude of less than 900 feet (300 meters).

In the highlands, the fierce Thai, Muong, or Tho tribes tolerated Vietnamese overlordship with about as much good grace as the latter to tolerated their own submission to the Chinese. Tribute in ivory, precious woods, and spices was exacted by Vietnamese mandarins who otherwise left the tribes to their traditional leaders and Vietnamese annals are full of mountaineer uprisings. In fact, the tribal Thai were left almost entirely to themselves from the middle of the eighteenth century until the arrival of the French in 1893. The primitive southern tribesmen presented a problem of their own. The Vietnamese kings sagely recognized that they constituted a buffer zone against the still dangerous Khmer empire, and simply left them to their own devices, after the tribal chieftains had made their formal submission and paid a symbolical tribute. That direct relationship between Vietnamese-crown and the mountain tribes continued until 1955. 

 Nevertheless, the failure to integrate the mountain minorities into the Vietnamese national community has remained a serious problem to this day and is unlikely to be resolved satisfactorily in the near future.

The Vietnamese themselves, for all their cultural and social homogeneity suffered politically from their own over rapid growth and their separation from the Tonkinese homeland. With the means of communication then in existence, the government in the Red River plain was simply incapable of exercising effective control over 1,400 miles of deltas. Divisions occurred, with local feudal lords taking matters into their own hands. In the north, the exhausted Le dynasty had been overthrown by the Governor of Hanoi, Mac Dang Dung, who had, in Buttinger's words, "built himself a staircase of lordly and royal corpses right up to the throne," which he reached in 1527. In the south, another feudal lord, Nguyen Kim had set up a Vietnamese government-in-exile in Laos, built around a descend-ant of the Le. When Nguyen Kim died in 1545, murdered by supporters of the Mac clan, the struggle degenerated into a long civil war that, save for some brief spells of unity, lasted almost two centuries—with both sides claiming to represent the interests of the hapless legitimate Vietnamese kings while, in fact, merely watching over their own privileges. In the apt words of one French historian, the Vietnamese kings "were reduced to reigning over all Viet-Nam while being incapable of ruling over even the smallest district."4

 In this indecisive struggle, the south remained largely on the defensive. In the 1630's, the Nguyen rulers built two huge walls across the Vietnamese plain of Quang-Tri near its narrow waist at Dong-Hoi— barely a few miles to the north of the present dividing line at the 17th parallel—and for 150 years the country remained divided on that line, just as it now has been since 1954. A de facto truce existed between the north and the south from 1673 to 1774, although the feudal Trinh lords (who, in the north, had succeeded the Mac as protectors" of the Le kings) still demanded the surrender of the southern "rebels," and the Nguyen in the south refused to agree to reunification as long as the Le kings were helpless puppets of the Trinh. It is apparent that the Vietnamese people have had abundant experience in the kind of bitter internal division that was to rend it again 180 years later, after a brief period of independence and unity. There has been much debate over why the Trinh, with four-fifths of Viet-Nam's population in their area, never succeeded in breaking the hold of the Nguyen over the south, especially since the Nguyen not only had to hold the line against their northern foes, but also had to fight several bitter wars on their own southern frontiers with Cambodia, where Vietnamese settlers were advancing into the Mekong Delta. Economic and social reasons have been invoked by some historians who accept the Marxist interpretation of history as the only valid one, but that interpretation does not quite hold here for the economic and social organization of the Nguyen area was a carbon copy of that of the north. Militarily, also, both sides operated along similar lines, and both sides received "foreign aid" (a situation not unknown today). The Dutch backed the northern regime, while the Portuguese backed the Nguyen by providing modern artillery and military advisers. Since neither side was willing to consider a flanking maneuver through the inhospitable jungles to the west of the Wall of Dong-Hoi, a military stand-off resulted, which left the way open to a politico-ideological struggle. It was in the ideological sphere that the Nguyen side had the overwhelming advantage, for in the eyes or their own population, the Trinh lords had lost the mandate of heaven " In an explanation of that important aspect of the attitude of the Vietnamese toward his government, a Vietnamese nationalist wrote in 1948:

“If the sovereign oppressed the people, he no longer deserved to be treated as the sovereign. His person was no longer sacred, and to kill him was no longer a crime. Revolt against such tyranny not only was reasonable but was a meritorious act and conferred upon its author the right to take over the powers of the sovereign.”5

 In the name of this right to revolution, the Nguyen were eventually victorious over the decadent Le and Trinh; Ho Chi MM. defeated the French- Ngo Dinh Diem overthrew the discredited Nguyen ruler, Bao-Dai; and the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam has sought to gather a popular following first against the stagnant Ngo Dinh Diem regime and then against its successors.

 But an unforeseen event was to change for a brief moment the course of Vietnamese history. This was the rebellion of the three brothers from Tay-Son, a small village not far from Ankhe on the northeastern edge of the PMS. The uprising began in 1772; by 1777, the Nguyen had been defeated and the last surviving prince of the family Nguyen Anh, had been driven into the inhospitable swamps of the Mekong Delta. The Trinh, who had thought the moment ripe to settle their accounts with the southern regime  became the next victims of the victorious Tay-Son. By 1786, most of North Viet-Nam had fallen into the hands of the Tay-Son, who officially abolished the moribund Le dynasty in 1787,   although the youngest of the Tay Son brothers, Hue, took care to marry the daughter of the last Le king.

 Between1789 and 1792, Vietnam was once more united under a single ruler, but the reunification brought in its wake a bitter civil war waged BV the Nguven, the Tay-Son, and the Trinh, which left Viet-Nam more devastated than had 150 years of division. Present-day Marxist sources like to describe the Tay-Son as "progressive" rulers who lost their "mandate of Heaven" because they failed to solve the "social contradictions" then prevailing in Viet-Nam. The actuality seems to be less poetic: They were simply the first Vietnamese rulers to try to attempt to establish a military dictatorship in a country where the military were regarded with somewhat less than high admiration.

 Thus, when Nguyen Anh began his campaigns of re-conquest with the help of a French force of Katanga-type adventurers, the populace, mindful of the relatively efficient administration built up through competitive examinations under the Nguyen, began to flock again to the tatter's banners. The fact that, thanks to his experienced French cadre and its better artillery, he outclassed the Tay-Son, militarily, also had a great deal to do with the renewed enthusiasm for the Nguyen. But the final victory of Nguyen Anh over the Tay-Son was also the beginning of a new era: that of European political and military intervention in Vietnamese affairs.

A map showing Vietnam's "Southward March or Nam Tien" From bernard Fall's book titled 'The Two Viet-Nams'

Rebecca Sommer, a German civil rights advocate and a film maker, produced a set of horrendous and tragic videos revealing the naked truth on the ongoing genocide being committed by The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) , against the Khmer Krom people. Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. Washington DC. December 6, 2009

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Please, click these links, pasted below, to watch Rebecca Sommer set of  videos titled "Eliminated Without Bleeding," on how the SRV is conducting genocide against the Khmer Krom People 

http://www.sommerfilms.org/documentaries/Khmer-Krom/index.php

Please, click this link to see Rebecca Sommer bio

http://www.sommerfilms.org/

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES REPORT: Rebecca Sommer: Khmer Krom in Southern Vietnam Face Oppression from Hanoi Regime
 
By David M. Kinchen
Editor, Huntington News Network; March 17, 2007
http://www.huntingtonnews.net/local/070317-kinchen-kk.html

 
The Khmer Krom are an indigenous people in southern Vietnam, hanging on to their culture, language, Buddhist religion and way of life as a distinct, differentiated people, against all obstacles they endure since Vietnam became a communist country says rights advocate and documentary filmmaker Rebecca Sommer.
 
The New York City-based German citizen -- a frequent contributor to Huntington News Network -- says international human rights organizations have become increasingly alarmed about Vietnam's oppression of the freedom of speech and religion of the Khmer Krom. Numerous reports on severe human rights violations have been reported, but little has been done by the international community.  

The Khmer Krom, who originated as the "first peoples" in the Mekong River Delta, usually live in villages surrounded by rice fields. The majority of the deeply religious Khmer Krom population sustain themselves with farming, fishing and hunting.
 
Since ancient times, the social and spiritual center of each Khmer Krom village is the community owned and maintained Buddhist temple. Together with the circle of village Elders, the Khmer Krom Buddhists are the religious leaders of their communities, guiding their communities in accordance to the teachings of "peace, nonviolence and harmony with all living beings."
 
Sommer said that Vietnam’s communist leaders in Hanoi continue to forcefully "Vietnamize" the Khmer Krom people in a way that will inevitably deprive them of their traditional land, culture, language, way of life, and their religion.
 
“Once a prosperous people, the Khmer Krom are by now one of the poorest of the poor, in Vietnam,” Sommer added.
 
"For my documentary ‘Eliminated Without Bleeding’ in 2005 various I visited Buddhist temples which were clearly invaded by ethic Vietnamese,” Sommer told HNN. “They build houses in the sacred Temple grounds against the consent of the Khmer Krom community. Schools use the Vietnamese language, and the Khmer Krom have great difficulties finding access to bilingual education. Numerous monks get arrested for teaching in their temples the Khmer Krom language to the village children."
 
Sommer, a representative of the NGO Society for Threatened Peoples International, added: "I investigated especially the situation of the oppression of their religion, and I can tell you, it looked pretty bad. Monks who teach in the temples to their communities historical facts on their peoples get swiftly arrested, disrobed, imprisoned, beaten, even tortured and sometimes killed.”
 
Sommer explained that the Buddhist religion is fully controlled by the Vietnamese authorities, and infiltrated by force and intimidation with communist doctrines. Monks who teach young monks must mix religion with communist propaganda. If they don’t, Sommer said, “they are arrested and disrobed as traitors. Everyone lives in fear, the villagers, the monks, it was extremely depressing to realize, how oppressed these people live, it was terrible. So many Khmer Krom fled Vietnam, and are in limbo as refugees, not recognized by the international community to need serious help."
 
On Feb. 8, 2007, about 200 Khmer Krom Buddhist Monks took part in a peaceful protest in Province Soc Trang, to publicly endorse the Khmer Krom’s plight to the Vietnamese government to be allowed to fully practice their Buddhist religion.
 
"I heard and saw so many examples on how the Vietnamese government is restricting everything they can,” Sommer told HNN. “Buddhist ceremonies are limited, or even banned completely; imagine if your government prohibits you from celebrating Christmas, or tells you that you can only celebrate Christmas in summer! That's how the Khmer Krom feel," said Sommer.
 
Reacting to the peaceful demonstration of the monks, on the first day the local Vietnamese police forces entered the Khmer Krom villages, surrounded their temples and arrested approximately 60 Buddhist Monks, while the rest of the monks escaped and went into hiding.
 
"We got warned, if we even get out of our houses to show solidarity, we would get arrested too," said one Khmer Krom elder who wishes to stay anonymous. " We honor our monks, they are the heart of our Khmer Krom peoples; to see them treated like criminals while they just represent our collective voice and wish to be allowed our religion, is devastating and very humiliating, not only for the monks, for all of us Khmer Krom."
 
The NGO Khmer Krom Federation reports that Vietnamese authorities launched operations on an unprecedented scale, aiming to identify and punish those responsible for the demonstration, hoping consequently to subdue once and for all the emerging human rights movement within the Khmer Krom community.
 
The four temples which where mainly involved with the protest continue to this day to be surrounded by heavily armed police and military units.
 
U.S. Ambassador Michael Marine on March 14, 2007 went to visit one of the surrounded temples in Soc Trang to intervene with the local police and military. RFA told Sommers on March 15 that the ambassador has been told by the Vietnamese authorities to not interfere with Vietnam’s internal affairs.
 
Six Buddhist Monks are currently in prison and were disrobed -- a common practice used by authorities to hold religious people in prison as civilians.
 
"We fear for their lives, we are sure they get tortured at this moment," said Sereivuth Prak, vice president of KKF.
 
The other monks are under house arrest and are not allowed to leave the Temple complex.
 
We hear that they are not even getting food or water," said Prak. "The Khmer Krom communities are under harassment and individuals, especially the families of missing monks are interviewed on a regular basis with intimidating practices in the pursuit of information about organizers and participants of the demonstration."
 
"The Vietnamese military and police forces want to find, detain and punish those monks which they feel are responsible for the protest," said Giap Tran, another representative of the KKF. "We get numerous reports from our frightened communities, all equally disturbing, which we reported to the United Nations."
 
“Vietnam has a well documented history of detaining Khmer Krom monks and village leaders for prolonged periods without charge or trial, as well as the routine and systematic use of torture,” Sommer told HNN.
 
Reacting to the bullying of the demonstrating monks in Vietnam, numerous other monks and Khmer Krom in Cambodia, and those living in exile in the U.S., Canada, France and Australia showed their solidarity and also demonstrated peacefully at Vietnamese embassies, Sommer said.
 
Sadly, one monk, Eang Sok Thoeun, who fled Vietnam and lived in Cambodia may have been murdered after returning from a demonstration of solidarity on Feb. 27, 2007 at the Vietnamese Embassy in Phnom Phen, Cambodia the next day.
 
He was found dead on Feb. 28, 2007, with his throat slit, and Cambodian authorities claim that he was a drug addict and committed suicide.
 
"This is absurd, they do not even have money to buy food as refugees in Cambodia, imagine a Buddhist monk being on drugs, that is just an outrageous claim," said Giap Tran, from KKF.
 
"I fled together with Eang Sok Thoeun, and lived with him in our refugee hiding place -- for sure I would know if he used drugs, and he did not,” Giap Tran added. “He was a devoted monk, and wanted to promote human rights, nothing else, and that's why he was killed," said a Khmer Krom monk, who wishes to stay anonymous.

Vietnam’s Expansion & Colonial Diaspora (1471-1859)

Bauer College; University of Houston, Texas; Filed Under 2008

Vietnam’s External Expansion and Colonial Diasporas (1471 -1859)

http://blogs.bauer.uh.edu/vietDiaspora/2008/vietnam%e2%80%99s-external-expansion-and-colonial-diasporas-1471-1859/

(Comments: this article titled “Vietnam’s Expansionism and colonial Diaspora” is a real and complete analysis of how the Vietnamese have been successful in conquering the territories namely that of Champa and now Cambodia. Vietnam could have not succeeded so easily without the help of the incomeptent and corrupt leaders of those conquered countries namely Champa and now Cambodia and Laos. The most accurate description of this strategy comes from Kang Pol, a Cambodian historian, who had described this process of Vietnamization of Cambodia by using the local leaders to Vietnam's advantage, as follows:

“Some signs show that Vietnam contemplates the desire to change the leadership in Cambodia in order to take a new pace of development under the ASEAN+3 economic bloc. When will they replace Hun Sen and his supporters? They did that with King Sihanouk, with the Khmer Rouge leaders and with Pen Sovann. After the amending of the UN drafted 1993 Cambodian constitution, Vietnamese strategists may still need the Hun Sen team to consolidate their foothold in Cambodia. Hun Sen has the required capacity to install a party-state system in Cambodia and no other CPP leader seems more capable than him. So the Hun Sen premiership employment contract may possibly continue until the celebration of the one party-state system installation in Cambodia that has been scheduled, a Socialist Republic of Cambodia, after the 2008 general elections”

Source: Kang Pol; Vietnam’s Expansionism in Indochina:Strategies and Consequences on the Regional Security Order; Wikibooks, 208 

To read the full article by Kang Pol, please click on the link posted jsut below;

                                Vietnam; expansionaism in Indochina by Kang Pol.docx

What Kang Pol has described is exactly what is going on in Cambodia at this very moment. As I said so often before, don’t blame the Vietnamese alone in this human tragedy. The so-called leaders of these conquered countries are much more to be blamed for the tragic fate of their people. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. November 17, 2009)

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§ The External Expansion of Dai Viet

§ The Nguyen’s Colonial Diaspora

§ Different Versions of Being Vietnamese: A Southern, Nationalist/Anti-Communist Perspective

§ Further Reading

§ Online Reading and Questions

In Vietnamese history, a theme that transcends across time and space is the advance or the march to the south (“nam tien”).  The southern advancement, as noted by Michael Cotter, is unique in that “it transcends the different periods of Vietnamese history – pre-Chinese, Chinese, independent, colonial, and contemporary” in which each has “its own theme.” ^[1]

As discussed in earlier blogs, Chinese colonial diasporas had both indirect and direct effects on the southern advancement. 

For Vietnamese, they have been “victims” of Chinese colonial diasporas – being physically, psychologically, culturally, and intellectually displaced.  However, as noted by other scholars, the “Vietnamese will to dependence was too strong,” there must have been “a special Vietnamese collective identity of some sort,” ^[2] and the “harmony between the Vietnamese . . . and their environmental conditions has proved to be so deep that no race has been able to resist their advance.” ^[3]  

Simply, Vietnamese have always maintained their relationships with the collective memory and myth about their birth place and never more passionately than when displacement and disunity was imposed by foreign rule. 

However, Vietnamese collective will to resist had to be modified because of Chinese military power in which resistance had to include strategic form of borrowing and localizing ideas of foreign powers in order to make and strengthen local cultural statements about its “Vietnamese cultural core.” 

Cultural borrowing came from both north and south.  And until late in the 14th century, Buddhism had acted as a common ground between Vietnam and southern states of the Cham and Khmer, during times of both peace and war; for instance, Vietnamese prince who married Cham princess and the Vietnamese Buddhist monk who practiced Indian asceticism. ^[4]

Vietnamese, on the one hand, were successful in localizing external influences in which what were borrowed were considered essential and integral to the culture at that particular time.  But such situation sometimes was inevitably imperfect and had led to tension and stress within the society on the other. ^[5] 

This was the case, when after repelling the Ming invasion (1407-1427), the Le emperors began to adapt the Ming Chinese model and began to transform ideologically, bureaucratically, and militarily.  

This transformation enabled the Vietnamese state (Dai Viet) under the Le dynasty (1428-1524) to stabilize its southern and western frontiers.  But in doing so, the conviction in the essential unity of their territory and people and cultural relativity began to take dual form or multiple forms (or even change character).

The External Expansion of Dai Viet

The transformation of Dai Viet was, in part, the result of its population becoming a specialist in wet-rice cultivation, which fostered “the trade, population growth, and resource concentration that promote state power and societal expansion.” ^[6]

Importantly, the state began to adapt the Ming Chinese model.  

For example, it took on the Chinese ideals of bringing ‘civilization’ to the ‘uncivilized,’ which were applied to its relations with Champa and the Khmers.  It also adapted Chinese meritocratic civil service examinations as the method of recruiting educated talent to service the government. ^[7] Moreover, Dai Viet had acquired gunpowder technology from China, although Vietnamese also had contributed to Chinese gunpowder technology by locally producing better techniques such as the wooden wad and possibly a new ignition, which was then exported to China. ^[8]  Arming itself with new gunpowder technology, Dai Viet’s large and well-organized military force was able to achieve its military ends more easily than before. ^[9]

Indeed, under the Le dynasty, the Vietnamese state began to transcend its displacement and, according to one opinion, gradually developed into “a bigger hegemonist,” conceiving themselves as superior to all other peoples in Southeast Asia. ^[10]

But probably more accurate is that the transformation of Dai Viet changed the balance of power in mainland Southeast Asia.  Yet, that balance was tenuous and was hampered by the eventual rise of two separate entities with two different representations of “what was a good Vietnamese.”

Notwithstanding, as a result of the above transformation, Dai Viet, on the one hand, were able for the first time, since independence, to stabilize its southern and western frontiers.  But Dai Viet also took advantage of its new capabilities to end its conflicts with Champa over areas (that of Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien) where the two mingled since the fifth century. 

Between 1361 and 1390, Champa, under Che Bong Nga’s rule, conducted an interrupted series of victories against Vietnam, including the sacking of Vietnam’s capital of Thang Long several times and were able to retrieve Champa’s old northern provinces that it lost earlier in 1301 through a marriage alliance that did not endure.  But after Che Bong Nga’s assassination in 1390, Champa had to hand back the provinces to Vietnam, yet these areas were still contested until the fifteenth century. However, in 1471, the Dai Viet’s military force appeared to have overwhelmed the Chams. One thousand Dai Viet warships and 70,000 troops captured Champa’s capital of Vijaya.  According to Vietnamese source, more than 30,000 Chams were captured and over 40,000 were killed.  In part, the fall of Champa in 1471 was due to the fact that it did not have access to firearms. ^[11] Thus, the year 1471 marked the rise of Dai Viet.

Vietnamese had by then conquered the northern part of Cham country, as far as the southern border of today’s Binh Dinh province.  However, Cham kings continued to rule from this region, although less autonomous then earlier Cham kings.  In addition, however, there were southern Champ polities, including a fourth Cham region (Kauthara) located near present day Nha Trang, which had been a part of Cham country since the beginning of Cham history. 

On Vietnam’s western borders, Tai peoples were actively crossing Vietnam’s western borders, causing a series of conflicts between the two.  But by the late 1470s, Dai Viet was able to claim Tai hill territories, bringing the Tai ethnic groups in modern Vietnam. ^[12] Taking advantage of its military technology, Dai Viet also pursued aggressive actions against Thai and Laos principalities.  Its armies marched as far as the Irawaddy River in modern Burma. ^[13] As a result, by the early 1480s, kingdoms of northwestern mainland Southeast Asia, such as the Laotian kingdom of Lan Ch’ang and Thai principality of Ai Lao sent tributes to the Vietnamese capital.

In sum, the purpose and scope of Dai Viet’s external expansion was initially to stabilize its southern and western frontiers, of which had been militarily contested throughout the centuries without a clear winner, at least until 1471.  Its external expansion was dynastic in nature, which was clearly reflected by the reign of Le Thang Tong (1460-1497) who sought to stabilize his state by securing its borders to prevent any repeat of foreign invasions, such as the Ming invasion of 1407-1427.   The degree of success in stabilizing its borders, as well as going beyond its borders, was, in large part, due to the unilateral-monopolistic timing, as put forward by Frank Darling. ^[14] That is, Dai Viet’s external expansion occurred because of a “power vacuum” in which Dai Viet with the new gunpowder technology and under a more bureaucratic state were able to exert power in the region, limited by the available resources and the stability of the Le court.

Vietnam, however, did not develop a permanent colonial phase or colonial diaspora until the beginning of the sixteenth century.  Even though Vietnam was active in acquisitioning Cham lands, it occurred at long intervals.  In occupying Cham lands, the Le emperors would appoint frontier military governors with the rank of viceroy (kinh-luoc), but would also retained Cham officials in the administration in some regions.  The purpose and scope of Vietnamese military and penal colonies were to consolidate their gains, to provide support for expeditions, and to relieve population pressures. ^[15] 

During this period, Vietnamese rulers did not pay much attention to the specific matter of expansion into Champa, until the arrival of the Nguyen lords who eventually sought a southern autonomous state, separate from the northern state under the Trinh lords. 

The Nguyen’s Colonial Diaspora

Vietnamese southern expansion or colonial diaspora under the Nguyen family can be described as a frontier movement, originating because of political and military unrest and conflicts at home; and expanding through military conquests, treaties, and “most difficult to document, colonization by transfrontiersmen.” ^[16]

In 1524, when the Le emperors were usurped by the Mac family, the Trinh family and Nguyen family both professed their loyalty to and attempted to restore the Le emperors.  However, after the restoration of Le in 1592, the Trinh family gradually acquired all the important posts at the Le court so that the Le emperors were reduced to being “nominal” rulers. ^[17] Meanwhile, the Nguyen family saw the Trinh as usurpers and decided to officially break with the Trinh in 1600 and return to Thuan Hoa (modern Hue), where years earlier they were emplaced by the Trinh to establish control over the southernmost frontiers. Between 1627 and 1672, the Nguyen lords were able to defend Trinh’s expeditions, as well as defending Cham’s reacquisition of its former territories.  By 1672, Trinh lords, whose militarily failures to defeat the Nguyen left them weakened, agreed to a division of the two states at the boundary of the Linh River.  This resulted in a relatively stable coexistence of “two Dai Viets” for a little more than one hundred years. 

The Nguyen, despite having a smaller population with a smaller number of trained officials, accordingly adjusted their organizational structure and localized themselves to their new geographical terrains and frontier influences, including redeveloping trading centers, absorbing local populations, and interacting with foreign merchants. 

For example, in the former Cham territories, one of the key characteristics of the Nguyen administration was the use of Chams and of lower-class Vietnamese.  It also redeveloped the commercially oriented society center in Hoi An, which had been pioneered by the local Cham population who still constituted a key component in the labor and basic patterns of the region’s trading center after the Vietnamese takeover. ^[18] Unlike the traditional northern economy, the Nguyen’s economy had a “fundamental basis in foreign trade.” ^[19]  This attracted Vietnamese immigrants, as well as Chinese refugees who fled from the Manchu dynasty, arriving at various times in present day areas of Hue after 1636, further transforming the Hoi An region “into its now recognizably Vietnamese form.” ^[20]  Moreover, from its contacts with foreign merchants, the Nguyen state was able to arm itself with modern weapons provided by Portuguese merchants, which assisted them to defend the Trinh expeditions as well as to continue the expansion of its control farther south.

As noted by recent works in Vietnamese historiography, in the Nguyen, we see a new version of being Vietnamese.  Although these works tend to describe the Nguyen as breaking or escaping from the past and from the ancestors in order to create ways of being Vietnamese, ^[21] it is probably more accurate to say that the Nguyen was not rigid in conforming with the traditional culture in the north, which led to a more open, multiethnic society with emphasis on foreign trade. 

This was true for both the central areas and the Mekong Delta areas.  In the latter, Vietnamese had moved into southern plains by the early 1620s, due the political and military vacuum left by the declining Khmer kings.  By this time, the Khmer court based in Phnom Penh was faction ridden and was subservient to Siamese (Tai) influence.  This allowed the Nguyen to exert its influence in the Khmer court, including the marriage of a Vietnamese princess to a Khmer king in 1620.  Three years later, the Khmer king granted permission for Vietnamese immigrants and traders to move into the areas, culminating in 1689 the establishment of a viceroyalty over the provinces around Saigon (Cotter254). ^[22]

Compared to the central areas, the Nguyen saw the Mekong Delta as more extensive and fertile for growing rice.  It also used this area to utilize captured Trinh soldiers and lower class immigrants from the north to settle and develop this area. Chinese immigrants also had important role in redeveloping this region’s trading center.  As a result, this region was ethnically pluralistic.  From one perspective, these individuals and groups found southern Vietnam as a land of promise, where they could make a fresh start. ^[23] For instance, captured soldiers were expected to clear the land in which they were given farm implements and food to eat.  So in several years “they could produce enough for their own needs,” and after twenty years after “their children can be soldiers of the country.” ^[24]

To be sure, however, the Nguyen’s colonial did displace the local populations of the Chams and the Khmers, whose “displacement but not replacement” is still today not assured.

A common perception is that the institutional weakness of Cham society, “a weakly institutionalized state system that depended upon personal alliance networks to integrate a fragmented population,” had sealed its fate. ^[25] Yet, the Chams were never easily conquered. In fact, it may be the same decentralized system that allowed the Chams for centuries to contest and stir rebellion against the Vietnamese.  Despite the Nguyen’s presence in the Cham territories since the 1550s, it was until 1611 that Cham territory of Kauthara (modern Nha Trang) disintegrated and not until 1771 that Panduranga-Champa (modern Phan Rang) fell.   However, over the centuries Cham society could not withstand the Vietnamese advancement, sometimes in “massive convulsions or in fits and starts.” ^[26]

It is thought that the majority of Chams were killed, driven off, or assimilated by the Vietnamese. ^[27]  Chams still exist today as an ethnic minority in Vietnam – though its number is relatively small (about 40,000) in comparison to the 30,000 Cham families in the eleventh century.  To some degree, because the Nguyen’s purpose and scope of its colonial diaspora were of political and economic domination “with less concern about Cham social and religious life,” Chams were able to retain some of their culture, including their language, religious beliefs, matrilineal kinship patterns, and the practice of non-intensive rice growing. ^[28] And often overlooked or discredited is the contribution of Chams in the Hoi An region as international trade center.  It is very likely that “Vietnamese immigrants encountered the well-established patterns of behavior of the peoples who preceded them and very likely continued to live alongside them.” ^[29] For instance, Vietnamese had been shaped by the Cham maritime logic in rebuilding Hoi An, learned to grow rice in terraced land, adopted local Cham deities such as Po Nagar, took up a form of Siva worship, lived in Malayic-style stilt houses, traveled in Cham-style boats, tilled with Cham plows, buried their dead in Cham-style graves, and practiced piracy and barter in slaves. ^[30] 

Similarly, since the early 1620s Khmers were gradually displaced and were pushed out of their villages into Cambodia or into marginal lands near the sea; ^[31] and by 1780, the Vietnamese controlled most of the southern territories that comprise present Vietnam.  During the 18th century, military colonies were used to expand in this region, which settled disputes between Khmers and encroaching Vietnamese, although in the favor of Vietnamese settlers. ^[32]  In the 1978 border war with Cambodia, the new socialist government of Vietnam used the Khmers as an advance column in their invasion into Cambodia.  Like the Chams, the Khmers were also “discredited” of their role in developing the commercial areas near Saigon.  Their contribution to the Vietnamese vocabulary and phrases is often overlooked.  This is also true regarding their religious practices, which the Vietnamese have adopted, including elements of Theravada Buddhism.  Other cultural borrowing from the Khmers includes agricultural implements and foods, medicines, and different areas of arts. ^[33]

Also to be sure, there were a number of schisms that developed over the course of the Nguyen’s colonial diaspora – those between the various socioeconomic groups and the separate geopolitical entities.  This culminated in the Tay Son rebellion (1772-1801), uprising against both the Trinh and Nguyen forces and unifying the country for the first time in 1788.  Although the events of the Tay Son defy easy classification, peasant grievances were central and, yet, the “momentum that had carried the [Tay Son] brothers to a series of military triumphs disappeared as their respective regimes could not resolve the troubles facing them.” ^[34] 

The equally multiethnic alliance that Nguyen Anh created in the Mekong Delta, who also got support from French mercenaries, defeated the Tay Son brothers and reunified the country in 1802.  According to George Dutton, the Nguyen dynasty (1802-1945) did little to resolve the conflicts that had been stirred up by the Tay Son wars.  These conflicts “even accelerated” under the new regime that was able to tax more effectively than their predecessors, which peasants complained loudly about these further exactions and hundreds of peasant and other uprisings challenged the new emperor in the early decades of his reign. ^[35]

Perhaps, because of the fact that the reunified Vietnam was sill a highly divided territory, emperor Gia Long (formerly Nguyen Anh) sought to address this situation through “expedient of effectively ruling the country as three different regions” in which his dynasty controlled more directly at the center and his governor generals governed the northern and southern parts of Vietnam. ^[36] But by the reign of Ming Mang (1820-1840), the governor general and his associates (including Christians, Chinese settlers, and ex-convicts) in the south were seen “as a force that threatened to undermine the unity of Vietnam.” ^[37] He, thus, initiated a program to “cultivate” and “assimilate” southerners, particularly the latter disregard of the central government and royal authority (Choi, 194); but Ming Mang respected private land ownership and offered incentives for southern landlords to become part of the government hierarchy. ^[38]  While the southern Vietnamese state was much more “Southeast Asian” than its northern rival, Vietnamese and Confucian manners did gain ground but “only very slowly over the variety of cultures which had existed in the southern regions for centuries.” ^[39] 

Such process, on the one hand, sparked widespread insurrections by ethnic groups, but in the longer run led “southerners to stand with the Hue’s authority.” ^[40]  For example, in 1833 a revolt of southerners, popularly called the Le Van Khoi revolt, broke out, declaring independent rule for southern Vietnam and lasting for two years before being crushed.  But later in 1859, when the French landed in this region, the strong loyalist sentiments toward the Hue court fueled the southerner’s anti-French movement.

Importantly, the above ruptures which, nonetheless, coincided with unification/reunification shaped the political and social contours of a Vietnam that ultimately and unavoidably confronted the French colonial power in the mid-19th century.  This confrontation again ruptured but also reunified Vietnam.  But again a reunified Vietnam also sparked another wave of the country’s historical roots in refugee-exile circumstances beginning with:

§  the Nguyen family under Nguyen Kim fled to Laos after the Mac’s usurpation of the Le dynasty in 1524;

§  the Mac family fled to northern China when the Le dynasty was restored in 1592;

§  the Nguyen family under Nguyen Hoang left northern Vietnam to the Cham territories after breaking official ties with the Trinh in 1600;

§  the Nguyen family under Nguyen Anh fled to Siam (Thailand) in 1775 after its capital fell to the Tay Son brothers;

§  the Vietnam Nationalist Party (or the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang) fled to China when the Viet Minh in 1946 began to purge non-communist groups in order to create a communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 

§  and the leaders and members of the former Republic of South Vietnam evacuated and escaped to western countries after the fall of Saigon to communist rule in 1975.

SOKIMEX GROUP CO., LTD.

Prior 1990, Oknha Sok Kong, the founder of Sokimex honed his business acumen producing rubber tires and specialized in rubber processing for Cambodia’s then major export industry.

And then in 1990 when Cambodia returned to the free market system, Oknha Sok Kong modestly started an import & export company primarily exporting agricultural produce and importing foreign goods to meet the local market demand, Sok Kong Import Export Co., Ltd (Sokimex). From then onwards, Sokimex has never looked back and is today one of the leading corporate players in shaping Cambodia’s economic future.

The main success venture that propelled Sokimex to what she is today is petroleum. As Cambodia’s set out on the path of development, fuel supply became ever more vital.

Oknha Sok Kong’s visionary mind coupled with his optimistic courage led him to dive into the petroleum industry without much hesitation. In the process Sokemex has not only establish a strong fuel distribution network across the country but invested in building petroleum storage facilities, warehousing and  petrol stations. Today, Sokimex is the largest petroleum company with her own jetty with a capacity to handle oil carriers up to 46,000 tons, 5 storage terminals, 184 petrol stations and a complex petroleum transport systems to meet the nation’s demand.

Always in tandem with the government’s policy, Sokimex took off with the Royal Governments privatization policy by purchasing the state-owned oil company CKC in May 1996. The deal included taking over CKC company’s headquarter, Russey Keo Oil Storage and Sihanouk Ville Oil Storage facilities.  

  Sokimex has always endeavor to maintain high standards for her products and management system. That is why Sokimex sought to import only high quality fuel products from countries with established refinery facilities like Singapore and Thailand. Sokimex’s runway success in the petroleum division was not easy due to strong competition from both local and abroad. Organizational strength and prudent financial management were vital prerequisites that Sokimex excelled in. The same success formula has been applied to all companies under the Sokimex Group of Companies. Today, Sokimex has diversified its business scope with affiliate companies that complement its core business. Companies who are by itself leader in their own industry.

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Sokimex in line for black rewards

By Geoffrey Cain

Asia times; Southeast Asia; Feb 6, 2009

PHNOM PENH - If Cambodia's much touted oil and gas finds in the past few years comes to fruition, Sokimex Group, the country's largest business conglomerate, is expected to be one of the bigger local winners. With top level political connections and a firm grip on local oil and gas distribution, the historically opaque and often controversial company will also face more pressure to publicly disclose its accounts and practices.

The World Bank earlier estimated the fuel find, made and managed by US oil giant Chevron, could entail 2 billion barrels of oil and 10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Chevron has remained tightlipped about its in-house estimates and plans, and some industry analysts have deflated earlier high-end estimates, contending the fuel actually lies in hard-to-reach and scattered pockets rather than in one concentrated area.

Exploitation is nonetheless expected to commence in either 2010 or 2011, though a recent tax dispute between the government and Chevron could delay drilling indefinitely, one analyst says. It's also unclear how the collapse in global oil prices - from a high of US$147 per barrel in July last year to its current level of around $41 - might have impacted on the project's economics and projected profitability.

None of that has so far dampened Sokimex's outlook. One Sokimex representative, who spoke with Asia Times Online and requested anonymity, said the company expects to benefit from a proposed scheme to export and re-import oil from the find. He said Sokimex also had plans to build an oil refinery to process the fuel. The representative would not divulge any further details about those plans and its not clear if the government is pressuring Chevron to process the fuel in Cambodia rather than at established modern refineries in Thailand or Singapore.

Yet the lack of disclosure is par for Sokimex's course: the company, which spans businesses as diverse as energy, tourism, aviation and property development, does not publicly release annual profit and loss statements. The homegrown company was founded in 1990 by rubber baron and ethnic Chinese entrepreneur Sok Kong, coinciding with the country's transition towards a free-market economy in line with the United Nations-sponsored Paris Peace Accords.

Sok Kong laid the foundations for the company in 1980s, when he supplied rubber tires to the Vietnamese army after Hanoi seized power over the country. He also exported the product throughout that era. Yet the domestic deals have sparked allegations the company remains close to perceived Vietnamese allies in the government, including Prime Minister Hun Sen.

Sokimex entered the petroleum business in May 1996 through its purchase of state-owned oil company, Compagnie Kampuchea des Carburants, which was then tasked with the import, storage and distribution of petroleum in Cambodia. The deal was part of the government's market-oriented privatization program, but raised further speculation of Sok Kong's close ties to Hun Sen's now dominant Cambodian People's Party.

According to the company's website, Sokimex is Cambodia's largest petroleum company with a market share of 40%. It boasts a US$15 million oil jetty with the capacity to handle oil carriers of up to 46,000 tons, five storage terminals, 184 petrol stations and a complex petroleum transport system that serves as the country's power "lifeline".

The site also says that "the main success venture that propelled Sokimex ... is petroleum" and that "Sok Kong's visionary mind coupled with his optimistic courage led him to dive into the petroleum industry without much hesitation." The site, however, fails to disclose Sokimex's recent profits, losses or average return on investments nor those of its various subsidiaries.

Privileged position

With its money-spinning oil assets and top government contacts, Sokimex has reached into a wide range of businesses, including garments, hotels, property development and even an exclusive contract to supply the Cambodian military with clothing and fuel. Sokimex is among Cambodia's big five oil and gas distributors, alongside international oil giants Total, Shell, and Caltex, as well as the country's other main local distributor, Tela Petroleum Group.

Industry analysts note that Sokimex has a proven knack for securing lucrative government contracts and believe that based on that track record the company could receive special treatment if and when the spoils of the Chevron oil find are realized.

Critics point in particular to the murky circumstances surrounding the concession Sokimex won to manage ticket sales to Angkor Wat, one of the preeminent tourist destinations in Southeast Asia, and its comparative ease in starting new businesses while foreign investors often have their new ventures ensnared in bureaucratic tape. The company also won government permission in 2006 to launch a domestic airline, Sarika Air.

Sokimex's lack of transparency, some contend, could ground future fund raising, particularly if the conglomerate does not substantially change its practices before listing shares on the country's new stock exchange, which is scheduled to commence trading in December despite the global economic downturn. Cambodia's economy is losing steam after years of breakneck growth, with gross domestic product projected to expand just 4.75% this year, the lowest level since 1998.

Sokimex representatives declined to provide this correspondent with basic revenue and profit figures for its oil and gas operations. Company executives who previously agreed to meet requested later that questions be sent via e-mail but failed to respond to queries. Follow-up inquiries made by telephone were met with one-word "yes", "no", or "I don't know" replies.

Cambodia's general lack of disclosure has raised concerns the country could go the way of Venezuela, Nigeria and Iraq, where major fuel resources have been squandered and pilfered by corrupt governments. The World Bank recently ranked Cambodia in the bottom 15% of countries on commitment to the rule of law and the bottom 10% for overall control of corruption. Transparency International downgraded Cambodia further in its 2008 Corruption Perception Index, ranking it the 14th most corrupt.

It's unclear, analysts say, if the government is trying to convince Chevron to process all or part of the fuel find in-country to help build up Sokimex's capabilities. The same analysts question Sokimex's ability to handle an energy bonanza, given that it has never run a refinery, lacks a pool of home-grown energy experts, and has no prior experience working with a find of this magnitude.

"The crude will probably be shipped to Singapore to be refined," said Michael McWalter, the Asian Development Bank's oil and gas adviser to the Cambodian National Petroleum Authority. "Any attempt to build pipelines, a refinery, or sell the oil in Cambodia will probably mean local companies will gouge prices."

Ou Virak, an economist by training and activist by profession, said: "They say they're planning to build a refinery in Cambodia, but they lack all expertise to do so unless they can hire expensive foreign advisors. It's political connections that keep them afloat, as they've demonstrated in their previous contracts that have operated without regard for the market."

Others see signs that Hun Sen's government, particularly after it consolidated power at last year's general elections, has started to put more pressure on Cambodian companies, including Sokimex, to operate with more transparency. They point in particular to Hun Sen's recent call to Sokimex and other oil distributors to sharply lower their prices in line with global trends or be summoned to a personal meeting at his offices.

Those concerns are widely shared. The United Nations Development Program held a petroleum conference last year to address how the government should best manage expected future oil and gas revenues. Delegates from the Cambodian National Petroleum Authority, Supreme National Economic Council, and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate discussed the possibility of establishing a sovereign fund to manage future oil revenues ethically and transparently for the national interest.

They also discussed the possibility of creating a professional, market-oriented national oil company, potentially modeled after Malaysia's Petronas. One year later, with questions and criticisms still swirling about the company's accounts and technical capabilities, it's not clear to most that Sokimex will emerge any time soon as an outward-looking and modern regional energy player.

Geoffrey Cain is based in Phnom Penh and a contributor to the Far Eastern Economic Review and Integrated Regional Information Networks, a United Nations-run news wire service. He may be reached at geoffrey.cain@gmail.com.

(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.) 

Sok Kong is he or is he not a Veitnamese born Cambodian?
Translated from Vietnamese by Wanna
Cambodian Information Center; 20 March 2008
Originally posted at: http://www.xwanna.com

Original article in Vietnamese: “Tôi là người Việt Nam!"

(Comments: Asia Times in an article titled “In line for black reward,” posted above was wrong for attributing the origin of Oknha Sok Kong to be a Chinese, instead of Vietnamese as this interview has clearly shown. It is not because he is a Vietnamese that is wrong, it is what he is doing with Hun Sen on behalf of the Vietnamese, which to control the Cambodian economy from within through Hun Sen and his CPP, that is really wrong. Naranhkiri Tith, Washington DC. December 3, 2009)

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Maybe some people are still skeptical about who is Sok Kong? Now, believe me and believe him (Sok Kong)!

Oknha Sok Kong said...

Tôi sinh ra ở Prey Veng. Ba mẹ tôi là người VN, tôi được sinh ra ở CPC. Năm 1975 sang VN làm ruộng ở Đồng Tháp. Lúc đó tôi 23 tuổi. Năm 1979 tôi trở lại CPC

Translation: I was born in Prey Veng. My parents are Vietnamese, I was born in Cambodia. In 1975, I backed to VN and do farming at Don Thap province. I was then 23. In 1979, I returned to Cambodia

Tôi giàu con lắm, có đến sáu đứa: ba trai, ba gái. Con trai đầu làm việc ở TP.HCM, con trai thứ hai quản lý khách sạn và xí nghiệp may số 1, con trai thứ ba quản lý xí nghiệp may 2, ba đứa con gái còn đi học ở Úc.

Translation: I have many children, including 6: 3 sons, 3 daughters. My eldest son works at HCM (Ho Chi Minh) city; My second son is a manager of a hotel and garment factory Number 01; My third son is a manager of garment factory Number 02; My three daughters are all studying in Australia.

Trước đây vì một số lý do tôi không muốn ai biết mình là người VN. Còn bây giờ thì không. Tôi là người VN. Tôi vinh dự về điều đó!

Translation: In the past, from some reasons, I don't want anyone to know that I am a Vietnamese. Now, it's NOT. I am a Vietnamese. I'm proud of that.

Learn more about Sok Kong via Cambodian Information Center - Search

                                                Nam Tien from the Vietnamese texts

                                                                NGUYEN THE ANH

Pierre Bernard Lafont (editeur); Les Frontieres du Vietnam, (Edition Harmattan, Paris, France, 1989) pp.121-27)

(Comments: The importance of this article is the fact that it is based on the Vietnamese textx. The language then is very crude and raw, which represents the true feeling of the Vietnamese towards the Cambodian people and other neighboring people. For instance, in this article, the Cambodians and the Chams are referred to as "Barbarians." although in today world, because of there is more sensitivity to racial discrimination in the world in general regarding the kind of language used, the Vietnamese have stopped using the word 'barbarians' to designinate their immediate weaker neighbors; but they still consider themselves superior and assign themsleves the role of  big brothers (anh), while they consider the Cambodians and Laotinas as little brothers 'em.'

 The Vietnamese are clever and smart in adjusting their language to be politically correct, while the Cambodians are stuck to the word "youn" especially when they use it in writng or speaking in other languages than Khmer. However, I must add that when speaking in Khmer, there is no other word to refer to a Vietnamese but the word 'youn.' 

In this context, it is improtant to note that some ignorant foreigners such as the former UN Head of UNTAC, Mr. Akash,i who had the audacity and the arrogance of preventing Cambodians from using of the word 'youn' even when they are speaking in their own language. 

I hope Cambodians can see how clever the Vietnamese are and how adaptable they are to the new environment and use it to their full advantage, while the Cambodians are stuck to their emotion, and not using their reason or logic, and therefore make themselves much more like a victimizer than a victim. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. November 29, 2009)

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In the south of the delta of the Red River, new regional territories had been gradually added, through the ages, to the kingdom of Dai-Viet. Beyond the gate of Annam, the border had been moving in direction of the south with the territorial expansion of Vietnam at the expense of the old indianized kingdoms of Campa and Chenla. But one must speak less of border, and more of a border movement, materializing by a slow gliding towards the south, to such a degree that this phenomenon of “Nam-Tien” (progression towards the south), which had been held over several centuries, was regarded as one of the constants of the history of Vietnam.

The extension had taken this clear direction, because in north and western are full of natural and political obstacles and they are almost impassible, whereas in the south which is sparsely populated and accessible land were available for rice growers. The conditions being revealed favorable to the encroachment, the Vietnamese Monarchy had ended up by giving up its policy of “Confucian persuasion” based only on the prestige of the royal “virtue” (duc), in favor of an action resolutely imperialist, by imposing its administrative and cultural practice on the recently controlled areas, in order to better integrate them into the Vietnamese space.

Assimilation of Campa

Campa, which extended to north to the height at the Annam gate (Hoanh-son), had to, due to lack of a strong economic base, to be able to nourish and to encourage an abundant population, to move back little by little in front of the Vietnamese pressure. The Vietnamese expansion had been done in various forms: military conquest, diplomatic arrangement, but also peaceful infiltration by an avant-garde of colonists who came to clear the land that Campa had abandoned. But each stage of expansion called a new one, because in front of the political and military void which is now available, the Vietnamese border seemed to offer an unlimited horizon to move.

The push seemed to have started in the Xe century, after the Vietnamese society was able to develop sufficient resources to allow a demographic growth, which stimulated the emigration and supported the expansion. Various causes had it started: initially the political instability that resulting from the escape from the Chinese domination and the civil wars which followed, and which provoked the uprooting of families and whole villages, then the need for establishing colonies of defense along the border with Campa, which had been carrying out major incursions into the delta of the Red River. The relations between Vietnam and Campa are well-known with regard to the dates of armed conflicts. It exists however, only vague indications on the way with which the push along the Vietnamese coastal plains of the China Sea, was affected, to finally absorbing completely the kingdom of Campa.

During the first century of Nam-Tien, the Vietnamese intended expansion, had been challenged for a long time by the rejuvenation of the cam people, seemed to have been done only by spurts. Long intervals separated the dates of acquisition of territories:

- 1069, transfer of the three chau of Dia-ly, My-linh and Bo-chinh (Quang-binh and north of Quang-tri) by Rudravarman III (Che Cu) has Ly Thanh-tong.

- 1306, transfer of both chau of O and Li (districts in the north of the Collar of the Clouds, i.e. southern IE of Quang-tri, and current IE Thua-thien) by Jaya Simhavarman III (Che Man) has Tran Anh Tong, in exchange of the hand of the princess Huyen- Tran.

- 1471, annexation of any IE territory in the north of the course Varella, which became IE Quang-nam.

- 1611, annexation of the area of Phu-yen.

- 1653, annexation of any IE territory aut our of Phan-row.

- 1693, absorption of all that remained Campa (province deBinh-thu~n).

Nevertheless, the will of expansion of the sovereigns of Dai-Viet was not revealed until the end of XVe century.  It took the form of requiring the kings of Campa only of the formal acceptance marks of vassalage (tribute, request of nomination), but did not try , in spite of several victorious expeditions, to impose a narrow subjugation to which, they were conscious of it, besides, the cam were resisting1.  A “civilizing” intention was certainly proclaimed in 1307, during the change of name of the districts of O and of Li en chau of Thuan (tender) and Hoa (transformation~, March it was followed of no effect. Even after the erection of Quang-nam in regional administration (thua tuyen) in 1471, the territories taken away from Campa were placed under the command of border military governors, but cam civil servants were maintained at the stations of dung tri chau and thiem tri chau for the administration of certain areas ". The taking possession of the territories recently attached to the kingdom, in fact, was carried out by military colonies consisting of soldier-farmers who supplied their own subsistence, either by themselves, or with the assistance of the condemned put at their service, and while toiling the land and defending against the returns of old the owners.

It is in XVIe century, with the appointment of Nguyen to the government of Thuan-hoa and their secession with Ia court of Hà-noi which truly the active phase of the expansion began: in order to reinforce their State, Nguyen were supporting with great favor the push toward the south, and with a constant effort to move even further their southernmost borders. It was then done by the kingdom of Campa. Nguyen did not have great difficulty in absorbing, little by little, the districts which were still inhabited by an adversary without resources and in order “to propagate order, peace and the wealth” (such was the significance of the names given by Nguyen in their acquired territories).

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1. Vietnamese soldier his thong giam cudng million u.a. Hanoi, 1958, T. 4, p. 365 ; Dai Viet soldier sti Ky Toan ThZ/, VI. Hanoi, (967, T. 2, p. 89.' . .

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From the annexation of Binh-thuan in 1693, and although a cam kinglet was maintained thereafter, the Vietnamese became really the Masters of the country to which they imposed their mode of political and social organization. The cam, dominated by the subjects of the Nguyen, overburdened by tax, was so mistreated, that their ethnic group barely missed being completely destroyed. And if the survivors (some 40.000 people in the middle of the XXe century) had been able to preserve some aspects of their culture (religious beliefs, matriarchy), the Nam-tien had had as a consequence for the cam in the form of a political and economic assimilation without any consideration for their socio-cultural specificities.  

The “kingdoms’ of Thuy-xà and Hoa-xà

One of the measures taken by Lê Thanh-tong after its victory of 1471, in order to destroy the power of Campa, had been to divide it into three vassal principalities of Dai-Viet; Chiêm-thanh (what remained of Campa itself), Hoa-anh and Nam-ban. The last two countries corresponded to, in all probability, to the hinterland of the southernmost provinces of Vietnam of the current central region (Quang-nam, Quang-ngai, Binh-dinh, Phu-yen, Khanh-hoa, Binh-thuan), vast area of hills reaching the Boloven foothills in the west. But the Suzerainty rights which the Dai Viet sovereign claimed to impose to them  would have been only theoretical, since the tribes and their inhabitants were not going to have steady administrative relations with the authorities of the Vietnamese provinces, and that even in 1819, emperor Gia-Long of Nguyen had to build the “wall of pacification of the barbarians” (Tinh Man truong tuy), stretching from the prefecture of ha-dong (Quang-nam) to that of Bong-song (Binh-dinh), to be used as line of demarcation with the territory of the mountain tribes.

However, annals of the Nguyen mention two State of Thuy-xà (Kingdom of Water) and of Hoa-xà (Kingdom of Fire), tributaries and vassal of the Nguyen lords since 1558, and including seem the plates of Darlac and Kontum, country of the Jarai tribes, Rhade, Bahnar, Sedang. The chiefs of these tribes, to which were give the titles of King of Fire (Patao Ngoc) and of King of Water (Patao Youh), would have received royal dynasty camwood, before its extinction, of the royal badges (a sword crowns, a bronze bowl and an always green cane) which conferred to a moral influence idiot siderable to them has cause of the extraordinary virtues that one allotted to them 3.

The Nguyen regarded  Thuy-xà and  Hoa-xà as belonging to the “dependent kingdoms” on Vietnam (Tu du' thuôc quôc) 4.  In fact, until the end of the XIXe century, their chiefs sent regularly, every three years, their tribute A Hué through Phu-yen. They received in 1841 from the Thieu-Tri king the military badges of mandarins at the 4th degree. The authority exerts by the monarchy of the Nguyen on Thuy-xà and IE Hoa-xà was however only formal: by raising them to the rank of distinct tributary kingdoms, it sought less to control their territory than to allot a role to be played to them in the construction of its vision of the world, according to which the more there were the vassals to offer him the tribute, the more the Vietnamese sovereign could with reason regard himself as the agent of the mandate of the Haven.

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2. D (Li Vietnamese soldier sJ Kj Toan Thu', XII, T. 3, p. 237.

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The royal administration knew these areas badly besides, which explains why in 1888 an adventurer, David de Mayrena, had been able to join together the tribes which lived there in a kind of confederation and to proclaim king of Sedang 5, It is only in 1904-1905 that the French administration colonial, after having organized the provinces moi of Darlac and of Pleiku Derr, finally integrated them in the territories of Annam 6.

The territorial expansion at the expense of Cambodia

The elimination of Campa put the Vietnamese in direct contact with the Khmers, whose possessions included all the southernmost part of present-day Vietnam. Nam-Tien had been going to continue at the expense of the Khmer empire, in decline since the xv e century under the blows which the Siamese kings of Ayuthya inflicted to it. The reasons behind the Vietnamese penetration into the plains of the Mekong delta differed according to the levels of interest. The Nguyens viewed it as an area of rice growing land wider and more fertile than the narrow plains along the coast of Central Vietnam; they saw there also as a clean zone to be used to resettle the captured soldiers and the refugees from the wars with the Trinh, as well as the poor people in their State.  As to the peasants, they considered these lands in the south as a promised country, where they could make a new start. From the political point of view, the vacuum of power which was worsening to Cambodia, torn by constant domestic discords, was to encourage the Nguyen lords to observe a less and less hopeful attitude.

Whereas pioneers, attracted by the land which has been abandoned by a sparse Khmer population, had come to found two Vietnamese colonies, Mô-xoai (Baria) and Dongnai (Bien-hoa), The lord Nguyen Phuc Nguyen planted in 1620, the first stake of the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodian affairs: with king Chey Chetta II, who sought a support to escape `from the Siamese grip, it granted the hand of his daughter Ngoc Van 7. The presence of a Vietnamese princess  - and that of many civil servants, as well as    tradesmen included in her entourage  - at the Kampuchean court was a  determining factor for the development of the Vietnamese influence. And when a dynastic crisis burst in 1658, the arbitration of the Nguyen lord was requested. The chua Hien-vuong did not hesitate to send a body of 3.000 men to occupy the region of Bien-hoa officially and to impose its choice for the Cambodian throne, at the same time, its suzerainty. A new occasion to intervene was offered to Nguyen in 1674, when an applicant with the throne of Kampuchea made come from the Siamese troops to fight his rival, who called again Hien vuong to the rescue. After the Vietnamese troops  had seized the forts in Saigon, Kampot and Phnom Penh, Hien-vuong establishes two kings, the first with residence in Oudong, the second in Saigon; one and the other had to pay tribute with the lord of Hué.

Since then, the Vietnamese Armies started to involve themselves regularly in Cambodian politics, in 1699, 1705, 1714, 1747, 1753-1755, and 1771-; 1772. In the majority of the cases, these interventions had for pretext to bring a military help to the candidate supported by the Vietnamese for the Cambodian throne in his fight against a competitor supported by Siam. Cambodia became thus, the zone of confrontation, of the establishment of the relative military strength between Vietnam and Siam. Antagonism between these two countries, which competed for the suzerainty on Cambodia, has however created a chronic state of disorder, which the Vietnamese have taken advantage of to gradually swallow, “like the worms and silk”, Cambodian territories of the Mekong delta. With the death of prince of Saigon Ang Non in 1691, the Nguyen annexed his country and transformed it into the provinces of Tran-bien (Bien-boa) and Phien-tran (Gia-dinh). Then, helped actively by Chinese emigrants (“men of Length-my”) 8, they intensified Vietnamese colonization and extended their reach into the Mekong basin. They ended up controlling, around 1780, the majority of the territories, which form the six provinces of Present-day Cochinchina.

At the XIXe century, Cambodia continued to be a place of intervention for the ambitions of its neighbors. While the Cambodian court remained divided into pro-Vietnamese and pro-Siamese factions, Nguyen and Chakri, and having professed of friendship in intermittent exchanges of embassies, found itself more and more implicated in a fight of influence whose result had led to a situation, in which there is some similarity to present-day Kampuchea. Indeed, the sending of the tribute in 1806 by the Cambodian king Nak Ong Chan at the same time to Hué and Bangkok, did not leave his country in peace, for a long time. The arguments between NAK Ong Chan and his/her brothers brought back there in 1813, the Siamese and the Vietnamese, called by one or the other parties involved  in the clashes. The Siamese occupied the provinces of Tonlé Repou, Stung Treng and Mlu Prey, but the Vietnamese, by restoring NAK Ong Chan on Its throne, were repaid for their assistance by the official recognition of their protectorate. The relations were more critical, however, between Vietnam and Siam in the following years; they were brought about the question related to the support of the Vietnamese given to the Laotian prince Chao Anu in revolt against its suzerain, Rama III. The conflict burst in 1833, the Siamese pushed their forces against the Vietnamese on five fronts, from Laos to Cambodia. The Siamese attack was repulsed, and the Vietnamese protectorate on Cambodia was transformed into a real annexation. In 1834, the Vietnamese emperor Minh-Menh called Cambodia the province of “the pacified West” (Tran-tay thanh), divided into 32 prefectures. The policy of assimilation started at once: appointment of Vietnamese civil servants, establishment of the land register, introduction of the Vietnamese system of perception of the taxes, the conscription of the Cambodian peasants for public works, etc This mode of direct control provoked a sharp resentment against the invaders. Revolts everywhere, prince Nak Ong Duang took the head of resistance with the' assistance of Siam and carried out hard a guerilla. These revolts had led the Vietnamese emperor Thien- Tri has to evacuate Phnom Penh in 1841.

It was then with the turn of Siamese to exploit the Cambodians, who asked again for help from the Vietnamese. The engagements started again in 1845, but exhaustion has finally affected the adversaries. Peace talks took place which seemed to bring a durable stability to the Cambodian throne. Cambodia became tributary at the same time of Hué and Bangkok, which recognized officially this double vassalage. This situation was to last until 1863, when the French, become masters of Saigon, established to them proper protectorate on IE Kampuchea in order to better control IE basin of Mekong.

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3. Deposit of the Files of Overseas, Admirals, file 26504.

4. Nhu Vien… , t.I, pp. 133-229.

5. Public records, Section Overseas, Indo-China A.F., paperboard 19, file A 30 (77).

6. Deposit of the Files of Overseas, Admirals, file 26504; Public records, Section Overseas, Indo-China N.F., paperboard 52, file 616.

7. Phan Khoang, Vietnamese soldier sJ, Xu' Trang Bang. Saigon, 1969, p. 401.

8. See: P. Boudet, the conquere of Cochinchine by NguyEn and IE role of the Chinese emigrants. B.E.F.E.G., 1942, p. 115-132. Chingho A. Chen, “the immigration of the partisans of Cheng in the South Vietnam (in Chinese)”, New Asia Newspaper, flight. 5, p. 430-459; flight. 8 (1968), p. 413-485.Chingho A. Chen, “Mac Thien TO' and Phraya Taksin. With survey one to their political stand, conflicts and background”, Proceedings, Seventh fAHA Conference, Bangkok, Chulalongkorn U.P., 1979, p. 1534-1575.

Vietnam did not come into Cambodia in 1979 to save it as the it Claimed, according to a Russian Scholar

Please, read this excerpt from a soviet Scholar on the relationss bewtten the Khmer rouge and the Veitnamese Communists. It is a rare documents as seen from an insider, sucha the then Soviet Union leaders and thier discussions with tehVeitnamese counterpart. It is clear that the Vietnamese did not invade Cambodia to save it from Pol Pot murderous regime. But rather to bring the Khmer Rouge under their control, so as to create Ho Chi Minh's dream of the "Greater Vietnam" or the "commuist Indochina" under Vietnam's control, by bringing both Cambodia and Loas under their direct orbit to read the whole article by Dmitry Mosyacov, titled "The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists; the history of their relations." please, click on the link posted just below, to read the whole very unique article on how Vietnam did not come into Cambodia in 1979 to save it as the Vietnamese had publicly claimed.

Mosyakov dmitri the KR and the Veitnamese.pdf

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(Comments: Please, also and good article by an Australian-Cambodian scholar Maya Mary Kong titled "Hun Sen-Taksin Shinawatra; A Political Game" on how the Vietnamese came to "save" Cambodia in 1979 only after they had no more hope to control the Khmer Rouge; and how the Vietnamese were able to exploit the Bush administration's weakness and fear of China rising power in the region and in the world, to get the USA to become a closer ally to Hun Sen and his CPP. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. November 24, 2009)

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Hun Sen – Thaksin Shinawatra: A Political Game?

Maya Mary Kong1

Cambodian Perspectives Review – November 2009

The press covers these last few days Hun Sen's stunning declarations of support for Thaksin. He appeared as a defender of the latter, even offering him a post of economic advisor. At his arrival at the airport in Thailand for the summit of ASEAN, he continues by saying that Thaksin is a « political victim 2» and compares him with Aung San Suu Kyi, the key figure of democracy and Burmese opposition. He adds that his « concerns » are also humanitarian3. While Cambodia risks of being in one big humanitarian misery due to the growing poverty of the Cambodian population.

Hun Sen's attitude irritated not only Bangkok but also caused questions to many observers, why a Prime Minister - whose political party has ruled the country for thirty years without sharing real power within the National Assembly - worries about the democracy and the humanitarian issues in the neighbouring country, Thailand.

While his CPP party - installed to power in Phnom Penh in January 1979 and supported by Viet-Nam until this day - did not cease, since its landslide victory in July 2008 with the legislative elections, Hun Sen strengthened his clamp to suffocate all opposition voice while keeping the vast majority of the Khmer population in an extreme poverty in order to control it for political purpose.

Obviously, these declarations - emanating from such a high ranking official of Phnom Penh regime where nothing can be decided without Hanoi agreement 4 - are not certainly unplanned. These declarations are found to be a double political game of Hanoi which fits clearly in a renewed geopolitical context in order to push the Vietnamese expansionism even farther.

This is the thesis that we want to defend in this short present article. Its goal is to bring some of elements to reduce information asymmetry, which is systematically perpetrated to the Cambodian people. The consequences of such an asymmetry were dramatic as well as devastating for Cambodia.

1 – Geopolitical Context of South East Asia

For this part, a focus will be made only on few main points to illustrate the changes of geopolitical context in South East Asia, the effects of which will directly shape the future of Cambodia.

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1  Ph.D candidate in political science, Canada. Born in 1985 from a Cambodia father and an Australian mother, I wish

to express my gratitude to my parents for their love, support during all these years and for transmitting to me their

love for Cambodia. A particular thank is also expressed to the worldwide Cambodian community for its help and

strong encouragement. I also wish pay homage to Khmer people who have lost their life for the country, and all those

who dedicate a part of their life to lead actions for Cambodia. And finally, a special thoughts for people who suffer

and die because of the extreme poverty.

2 Thailand-Cambodia spar over hospitality to Thaksin, The China Post October 22, 2009.

3 Querelle à l'Asean entre le Cambodge et la Thaïlande sur Thaksin, Le Monde 23 Octobre 2009.

4 Philippe Taylor : Cambodge, l’invasion viêtnamienne continue, Altermedia.info, 1er juillet 2005.

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The South East Asia - emerging today with its regional organization known under the name of ASEAN - represents overall more than 520 million inhabitants, who are predominantly constituted of Indonesians (40%), Vietnamese (15%), Filipinos (15%) and Thais (12%). The member countries of the ASEAN are characterized by their deep differences of size, level of development, wealth, culture and historical experiments. On one hand, there is the city-State of Singapore, already an old small island of the Capitalism, whose income per capita is of 30,000 US dollars. On the other hand, there is Viet-Nam, a country always communist and still poor, but which has succeeded in extending its sphere of domination in Cambodia and Laos primarily

by means of demographic and military establishment 5.

ASEAN members with their respective demographic weight

Brunei

0%

Cambodia

3%

Indonesia

40%

Laos

1%

Malaisia

4%

Burma

9%

Philippines

15%

Singapore

1%

Thailand

12%

Vietnam

15%

source: statistics compiled by the author, data 2004.

Given its demographic and economic weight, South East Asia became an important regional and even global stake for a certain number of great powers. It is even becoming a place by excellence for “The Clash of Civilizations” as described by Huntington 6.  

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5 R. Emmers : Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in South East Asia, a study of Indonesia and Vietnam,

Asian Survey, vol. XLV, n°4, July/August 2005.

6 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remarking of World Order, 1996.

Firstly, a place of confrontation between the East-West, respectively represented by the ex Soviet Union and the United States of America, South East Asia is a space of today rivalry between China and the United States, which try to spread their sphere of influence in this region.

These two great powers initially concluded in the 80’s a kind of temporary alliance to fight against the Soviet expansionism which reinforced in South East Asia through the Vietnamese invasion in Cambodia. Parallel to this temporary alliance of circumstance, China and the United States have actively used “Cambodian conflict” for their respective strategic interests. The so-called resolution of Cambodian conflict has been used as a basis for their rapprochement and the constitution of their strategic alliances, which are visible today in the international arena.

On the one hand, China put pressure on the ex Soviet Union to cease helping Viêtnam in its strategy of conquest of Cambodia while guaranteeing her in exchange a major axis for strategic alliances. It was therefore the first step of the constitution of Shanghai Cooperation organization, the members of which are today China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Other countries like Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia have observer status.

On the other hand, the United States seek to reinforce its position in South East Asia while stretching its hand to Viet Nam which has been viewed a strategic partner for their rivalry against the rise of China. The United States begin - towards the end of 80's - by giving up Cambodian resistance - to whom they brought their financial, diplomatic, and military support - to get closer to Hanoi at the very beginning of 90’s7. The most visible sign at that time was an adoption in 1988 of a resolution anti-Khmer Rouge by the United Nations8. This resolution had a strategic objective to prevent the Khmer Rouge from coming back to power during future elections which will be organized at that time under the supervision of the international community in 1993. Being one of the deterrent forces of Cambodian resistance, the Khmer Rouge represented one of real threats to Hanoi. This eviction of this Cambodian faction reassured Hanoi in her strategy of maintaining itself in Cambodia through its “political arm” CPP, which also got a favour from Washington 9.

The strategic change of Washington was materialized by the financial assistance to Hanoi for $1 million 10.

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7 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN : U.S. SHIFTS CAMBODIA POLICY; ENDS RECOGNITION OF REBELS; AGREES TO

TALKS WITH HANOI The New York Times July 19, 1990

8 PAUL LEWIS: U.N. Adopts Anti-Khmer Rouge Policy, The New York Times November 4, 1988

9 CLIFFORD

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The rapprochement between Washington and Hanoi was boosted after the Asian financial crisis which started in July 1997. This crisis affected many countries, especially Thailand, formerly ally of the United States. Washington has signed military cooperation agreements with Hanoi to establish a new area in their relationships11.

Facing with these strategic maneuvers of the United States to reshape their geopolitical space in Asia, China seeks to preserve its space of influence in South East Asia. Assistance about one billion US dollars granted to Thailand at the time of the financial crisis in 1997 was a part of this counter-attack strategy. This assistance was used primarily through Thaksin’s “network” in the financing of the projects consisting in helping the majority of people who were severely affected by the crisis and suddenly threw into the streets. These people represent the main electoral pool for the political party Thai Rak Thai of Thaksin. Regarding the military aspects, China has developed strong cooperation with Thailand under the way paved by the Defense Minister of Thaksin, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. This latter was a high commander of Thai Royal Army who developed – in the context of assistance to Cambodian resistance in the struggle against Vietnamese expansionism in Cambodia – close relations with the Chinese Defense minister, General Chi Haotian.

China and Thailand had instituted from June 2001, with the arrival of Thaksin in power, annual talks on military subjects and of strategic defense. In September 20005, the Popular Army of China is spreading out in partnership with the Thai army within the framework of a mission of mine clearance along the Cambodian-Thai borders. In December of the same year, a bilateral military exercise known under the name of “China - Thailand Friendship 2005” took place in the golf of Thaïland12.

The successive victories of Thaksin in the legislative elections in Thailand and the military rapprochement between Beijing and Bangkok worried the United States and the Thai aristocracy, for who Thaksin became the “man to be pulled down”. The political career of Thaksin was interrupted by the coup d'état in September 19th, 2006. The shape took by the coup d’état brought P. Preab to title his article “the coup d’état in Thailand, who benefit the crime ?” 13  and Gilles Ji Ungpakorn to it as “A Coup for the Rich” 14. While others like Shawn W. Crispin, one of the journalists of Asia Times, explicitly said that this coup d'état served for several reasons the regional interests of the United States 15.

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11 Colonel Al Swanda : MILITARY-TO- MILITARY COOPERATION WITH VIETNAM, paper of Master of Strategic Studies  Degree, U.S. Army War College 18 MAR 2005.

Rumsfeld, Visiting Vietnam, Seals Accord to Deepen Military Cooperation,  The New York Times June 6, 2006.

12. Ian Storey : Thai massage for China's military muscle, Asia Times Jul 11, 2008.

13 P. Preab : Le Coup d’Etat en Thaïlande, à qui profite le crime ? », Note de reflexion got from the internet on the

20th Septembre 2006.

11 Colonel Al Swanda : MILITARY-TO- MILITARY COOPERATION WITH VIETNAM, paper of Master of Strategic

Studies Degree, U.S. Army War College 18 MAR 2005.

Rumsfeld, Visiting Vietnam, Seals Accord to Deepen Military Cooperation, The New York Times June 6, 2006.

12

Ian Storey : Thai massage for China's military muscle, Asia Times Jul 11, 2008.

13 P. Preab : Le Coup d’Etat en Thaïlande, à qui profite le crime ? », Note de reflexion got from the internet on the

20th Septembre 2006.

14 Giles

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This coup d'état clearly created an internal tension which is extremely important opposing the “Red shirts”, the supporters of Thaksin, to the “Yellow shirts”, the partisans of Bangkok aristocracy led by the fantastically wealthy businessman Sondhi Limthongkul and Abhisit Vejajjiva.

This internal tension is reinforced additionally by the stunning declaration made by Hillary Clinton in Bangkok - after having reaffirmed with force in Tokyo and Seoul the alliances which bind the United States with Japan and South Korea - at the ASEAN Regional Forum held on July 22nd 2009 in Phuket, that the United States are back in South East Asia 16. This declaration is obviously made at the attention of Beijing with a strong political signal.

2. Hun Sen and the Political game of Hanoi

In view of the internal situation of Thailand and the political intentions of the United States regarding South East Asia, Hanoi considers Thai "ground" as ready enough for its political game. The communist leaders of Hanoi search, as in the past, to extend their expansionist policies beyond Cambodia.

A short glance at the recent geopolitical context of Vietnam and political and social situation of Cambodia is necessary to fully understand the strategic direction of Hanoi political games.

The recent geopolitical context of the Vietnam is marked by strong tensions influenced by China. Because of the close relationship between Washington and Hanoi, Beijing develops a backbone of strategic deterrence. Submarines facilities have been developed at Hainan, an island not far from Hanoi. Additionally, China also reinforced its military presence at Spratley and Paracel to reaffirm its sovereignty claim over these two islands, and its military capacities of fishing boats 17, which spreading along the Vietnamese coastline.

In March 2009, this maritime area witnessed a highly strong tensions when the United States US Navy ship, USNS Impeccable, approached the Chinese submarines base, at 75 miles (120 km) from Hainan Island. This maneuver triggered a countermovement from Chinese ships to prevent the US Navy Ship from approaching so close the Chinese island. According to Beijing, if the USNS Impeccable was loitering off the coast of Hainan, it was not by coincidence. But officially according to Washington, the USNS Impeccable did nothing but carry out its normal surveillance mission out of international water.

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16 DPA, US is back in southeast Asia: Clinton, 22 July, 2009.

This context of tension highly strong since many years already has led Hanoi to order 6 Russian submarines of the class Kilo project 636 for 1,8 billions of US dollars18. After this order, the Vietnamese air force also got, in September 2009, from Moscow 12 military planes Sukhoi Su - 30MK2 for about 400 millions of Euros.

The Vietnamese pilots already trained for several months in Russia. Since 2005, Vietnam invests important money in its army for technological upgrading. All this money surpasses all investments made during over the last 30 years 19.

Additionally to this tension, Hanoi also faced since 2006-2007 with a strong deterioration of social situation in Cambodia. A general dissatisfaction from the population because of the growing impoverishment which affects the majority of the Khmer population and the generalized systemic corruption caused a great concern among political high ranking officials in Hanoi to keep their “political arm”, the CPP, in power in Phnom Penh.

The number of individuals in situation of food insecurity has been increased, according to the new director of Cambodia of World Food Program (WFP), Jean-Pierre de Margerie, to 64% between 2007 and 2008. The raising of prices in 2008 forced 98% of these poor families to get into debt more and 50% of them to reduce their consumption of food20. A big fear of an insecurity food is to come. According to the World Bank, Cambodia will be the most affected

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18 Greg Torode : Vietnam set to buy 6 Russian submarines, April 28, 2009, South China Morning Post.

19 Le Viêt-Nam achète 12 avions de chasse russes Sukhoi, http://trungdungvo.blog.lemonde.fr/2009/09/02/le-vietnam-

achete-12-avions-de-chasse-russes-sukhoi/

country by this food crisis in South East Asia 21.

The civil servants also saw their purchasing power being reduced according to the rhythm of the rampant inflation. Facing this context, the government did not take any concrete political measures to reduce poverty. The policy of deliberately maintaining the population in the extreme poverty became like a double sharp blade. The generalized dissatisfaction of the population might be “translated” in legislative elections planned in July, 2008, the results of which would be different from Hanoi’s expectation.

The first action of Hanoi was to dispatch Vietnamese military into Cambodia to supposedly “secure” the elections. This action enabled Hanoi to bring back its military force only in a small number because of its fear of worrying Khmer people about Hanoi’s new invasion. The second axis of its strategy is to bring back in large number its military force in Cambodia and to restore Hun Sen’s political image, the most representative of CPP. An image which is largely tarnished by the overwhelming plundering of patrimonial and natural resources of the country as reported by Global Witness, and the land grabbing from the people and farmers because of the land speculation.

The outbreak of “Preah Vihear Affair” happened timely and so strangely with Hanoi need to reinforce its military presence in Cambodia and to reshape Hun Sen political image as a figure highly patriotic. This latter could extensively benefit many advantages from this affair. One could notice that the tensions between Cambodia and Thailand occurred following the acceptance by the government of Samak Sundaravej, considered as pro-Thaksin, for the Khmer Temple of Preah Vihear to be registered on the list of World Heritage.

This acceptance was motivated by Hanoi in exchange of "economic concessions" promised during the negotiations between Viet Nam and Thailand as one of the conditions of ceasing of aid by Bangkok to the Cambodian resistance. The co-management by Cambodia and Thailand of the site of Preah Vihear would have been a part of these “secret concessions” approved by Hanoi in the late 80’s 22 . This affair has allowed Hanoi not only to fully pursue its expansionist policy in Cambodia but also to create even more tensions in Thailand that finally have caused the fall of the last pro-Thaksin group. The opponents and their supporters, the “yellow shirts” require the resignation of Samak Sundaravej's government for the reason of having approved for the Khmer temple of Preah Vihear to be registered on the list of World Heritage. This approval is considered as a renouncement of the sovereignty of Thailand over the Khmer temple.

After having sent in the early of 2008 its military troops to Phnom Penh and other

Cambodian provinces to supposedly "secure" the general elections in July 2008,

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21 IRIN Asia : CAMBODIA: Food security threat as economic crisis takes hold, 7 May 2009.

22 Khatharya Um: Cambodia in 1989: Still Talking but no Settlement, Asian Survey Jan 1990, Vol. 30, No

Hanoi has fully used the Preah Vihear affair as a strategic pretext to actively strengthen its military presence in Cambodia to allegedly defend against Thai “aggression”.

The coincidence between the outbreak of the Preah Vihear affair and its active exploitation by Hanoi to send its troops into Cambodia has led Prak Soeurn, Vong Chandara and Meas Chanthou to affirm their view that Hanoi was the instigator of this affair to mislead the Cambodian opinion for its expansionist purpose23. The large number of trucks carrying out Hanoi’s troops reached its peak in April 2009, which converged to Preah Vihear, Koh Kong and other Cambodian provinces. We count only one person who can speak Khmer, whose role is to buy food for the others and oil on the way to their destination. Such a large scale of troops movement is clearly a new invasion of Cambodia in violation of Paris Peace Agreements, for which Hanoi was one of the signatories.

After having organized the settlement of Vietnameses, who represent already in 2005 over 35% of the population of Cambodia24, Hanoi undertakes a military reoccupation of Cambodia by fully exploiting the Preah Vihear affair.

Additionally to its predominance over the Cambodian economy25, Hanoi is in the process to achieve its control over the political, administrative, social, and cultural institutions, even the religious structure26. Vietnamese students use Khmer names to attend the Western universities with scholarship which is normally granted to Khmer students. Some of them have returned to Cambodia and already occupy key positions in the Cambodian administration.

Regarding Hun Sen, reassured by the so-called support of Hanoi, he was very outspoken against Thailand's playing fully the game of Hanoi. Sometimes he reinforces troops in Preah Vihear, and sometimes he withdraws it. This backward and forward movement displays clearly Hanoi’s strategic calculation. The tensions between Cambodia and Thailand have enabled Hanoi to reinforce its military presence to “secure” its space of occupation. But due to the fact of allocating a part of its force in Cambodia, Hanoi is concerned about undermining its own “base” in the country. So the use of “double political game” through Hun Sen’s declarations to support Thaksin is clearly a strategic option of Hanoi. By doing so, Hanoi moves the point of tensions between Cambodia and Thailand on the military side to the diplomatic level to stabilize its troops in Cambodia, limiting thus the risk of depriving its “base” from the necessary deterrent force.

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23 Prak Soeurn, Vong Chandara et Meas Chanthou: l’Affaire de Preah Vihear et ses Enjeux Politiques, in Cambodian Strategic Studies, Décembre 2008.

24 Dy Kareth

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The objective of this axis of double game is to maintain the degree of rivalry between the U.S. and China at a high level, and also to practice an “appeasing” policy with Beijing by “using” Hun Sen. By encouraging Hun Sen to play the game of rapprochement with Beijing, Hanoi can get obvious proof to negotiate with Washington that China is progressing rapidly into Cambodia. This country – although relatively small - has gained a renewed interest from Washington on its geopolitical chessboard. Hillary Clinton has even made efforts to present greetings for the last Cambodian New Year to Hun Sen’s Cambodia. The game of Hanoi with Hun Sen has an obvious interest to get additional “power” in the negotiations with Washington.

The goal is to obtain “concessions” with a higher “strategic value” to face with the Chinese advance when time will be opportune for Hanoi.

Another facet of this double game strategy of Hanoi by using Hun Sen is to practice a policy of alignment with Beijing in order to get widely the essence of Chinese strategic actions. The apparent rapprochement between Beijing and Phnom Penh, under Vietnam’s strategic scrutiny, has enabled Hanoi’s regime in Phnom Penh to obtain very significant financial assistance from China.

Knowing well the intentions of China, Hanoi clearly seeks to get strategic advantages from Beijing thanks to its well established military presence in Cambodia. As recommended to Hun Sen, Hanoi - rather than fighting by reverse against Beijing - seems clearly to align with the Chinese strategy of making Cambodia a basis of Thaksin’s “come back”. The aim of Hanoi is to undermine Bangkok’s political context by maintaining Thai internal tensions at a high level to create even civil war which will facilitate its expansionism into Thailand. Already well established in Cambodia thanks to its demographic and military presence, Hanoi clearly wants to realize - in

parallel with the Chinese strategy - its expansionist movement into Thailand. Its strategic pattern

seems obviously similar to that one which was implemented in Cambodia during the 60’s and 70’s. At that time, China assured the coordination of the Khmer Rouge movement at the high level. And Hanoi controlled the base of the Khmer Rouge with its elements. As it is written by Dmitry Mosyakov – after observing that Moscow wanted to establish direct contact with Khmer Rouge – the Vietnamese tried to do their best to prevent direct contact between Moscow and the CPK authorities, wishing to avoid a situation in which someone else would take over

their monopoly of relations with the Khmer Rouge. Most of the Vietnamese Communist leaders have reassured their Soviet allies that Khmer Rouge leaders were under firm control. The intention of Hanoi was so clear. The Vietnamese leadership did not even hide the fact that the Cambodian Communist Party, in association with the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP), was given the role of the young brother, obliged to follow the directions of their elder brother. The secretary of the VWP, Hoang Anh, in his speech on the 20th VWP Central Committee meeting held in January 1971, declared as follows: “We should strengthen the revolutionary base in

Cambodia and guide this country along the path of Socialism”. Moreover, Soviet diplomats working in Hanoi noted that Vietnamese leaders raised also one of the clauses of the Indochina Communist Party program concerning the creation of the Socialist Federation of Indochina. The essence of the Federation is obviously in the unification of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in one State - after the victory of the Indochinese revolution - under the direction of Vietnamese communists 27.

Estimated about 3 000 men in the early of 70’s 28, the Khmer Rouge were brought to power in April 1975 by Hanoi in order to realize its Communist Indochinese Federation. Many tanks full of Viet Cong with Chinese weapons massively entered into the Cambodian territory, none of them could speak the Cambodian language.

They just pronounced the name of Sihanouk wherever they went for the Cambodian population let them continue their way inside Cambodia29. The next course of the Cambodian contemporary history is a real tragedy, which is now deeply engraved on the Cambodian collective memory.

Today, it is clear that Hanoi is trying to use with Thaksin the same strategy, which has already a precedent in Thailand. An attempt was undertaken in October 1976 which caused very bloody tragic events at the University of Thamassat. Testimonies, including those of Samak Sundaravej, revealed that Hanoi was the instigator of these events in order to overthrow the pro-US government in place30. After having established its Federation in Phnom Penh, in Vientiane and in Saigon in 1975, Hanoi wanted to extend its empire until Bangkok. Given the recent pattern of events, Hanoi does not seem to give up its expansionist ambitions in Southeast Asia. Once under its firm control, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand will witness the same fate as Champa and Kampuchea Krom that have no anymore visible physical marks on the world map.

The conquered populations find themselves uprooted from their millennium cultural base and can not speak almost anymore the language of their ancestors. The process of their “eradication” is on the way with time to come. Everywhere in the conquered territories, persecution, abuse, violations of basic rights were observed. The descendants of the people of Champa were almost eradicated. The Montagnards and Khmer of Kampuchea Krom are suffering in silence from the racial and cultural genocide.

Given these events highly particular, Bangkok should not enter into the game of Hanoi. The growing tensions between Cambodia and Thailand will only pave the way for Hanoi’s expansionism into Thailand. Bangkok should rather denounce with force the new Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and help Cambodians to recover their territorial and maritime integrity and political independence accordingly to Paris Peace Agreements.

Throughout the modern history, Hanoi has always been chronic disruptive element of peace in Southeast Asia. It has always exploited the rivalries between the great powers to install itself in the “target countries”. At the end - when one of the competing great powers faltered, like the former Soviet Union - Hanoi takes “roots” in countries affected by wars.

The international community has the duty of assistance to stop the “hemorrhage” in the name of peace and the preservation of these innocent people.

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27  Dmitry Mosyakov : The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists, a History of their relations as told in the

Soviet archives, in Russian journal Vostok n°3 August 2000, (version anglaise).

28 Bernard Hamel, Le surprenant parcours du prince Sihanouk, in Historia, n°391, Juin 1979.

29 F. Bizot, Le Portail, 2000.

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The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists:

A history of their relations as told in the Soviet archives

Dmitry Mosyakov

The Russian Journal Vostok n°3 August 2000

To this day, the real history of relations between the Khmer communists and their Vietnamese colleagues is enclosed in a veil of secrecy. Despite extensive research on this theme in Russia and abroad, there are still no reliable answers to many key questions. The history of relations between Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge is construed in Vietnam in a way which sometimes has nothing to do with the story told in the West. Statements of some Khmer Rouge leaders like Khieu Samphan or Ieng Sari, who have recently defected to the governmental camp in Phnom Penh and say what people want to hear, are not to be trusted either. All this supports the assumption that analysis of relations between Hanoi and the Khmer Rouge is not only a historical problem. There is still a political component, which encumbers its objective study.

The author endeavours to tackle this problem and to present to the reader an objective and impartial picture of what was happening.· The research is based on a study of the former USSR’s archival materials (diaries of Soviet ambassadors in Vietnam, records of conversations with ranking members of the Vietnamese government, analytical notes, political letters of the Soviet embassy in the SRV, and other documents) deposited in the Russian State Archive of Modern History (RSAMH). Along with other sources, such as the French colonial archives and interviews with Vietnamese and Cambodian participants (see Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975, London, Verso, 1985), this work allows us to give objective and reasonably complete answers to the question at issue.

Relations between Khmer and Vietnamese communists have passed through some major periods of development. In the first period, which can be determined to span from 1930 to 1954, a small Khmer section of the Indochina Communist Party (ICP), was under full ideological and organizational control of the Vietnamese communists. During the years of struggle for liberation from the governance of France (1946-1954), the strength of this section grew continuously due to ICP recruitment of the most radical participants in the anti-colonial struggle. The Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party  (KPRP) was founded in June 1951 on this basis. The leaders of this party, Son Ngoc Minh, Sieu Heng, and Tou Samut, acted hand in hand in the anti-colonial war with the Vietnamese and were truly valid allies and strict executors of all the plans drafted by the ICP.

The 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina drastically changed relations between Khmer and Vietnamese communists. The Vietnamese withdrew their forces from Cambodia in accordance with the Agreements, but as distinct from Laos (where the so-called free zone in the region of Sam Neua was controlled by the communists), Hanoi could not ensure the same conditions for their Khmer allies. The Vietnamese, under pressure from the Sihanouk regime and its Western allies, did not even let the Khmer communists participate in the Geneva negotiations, and by the end of 1954 had withdrawn their combat forces from the regions of Cambodia which were under their control. Hereupon Khmer Royal Forces entered all zones that had been under KPRP authority, which forced the party underground. The consolation offered by Hanoi - granting two thousand of their allies the possibility of taking cover in the territory of North Vietnam (Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy, N.Y., 1986, p. 59)  - was obviously disproportionate to their contribution to a joint struggle. Therefore among the Khmer communists remaining in Cambodia the story gained currency that Hanoi had simply betrayed them, used them as hostages for the sake of reaching the agreement with the then leader of Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk. The evaluation of the Vietnamese operations of those days as an “unrighteous betrayal of the Cambodian revolution” (W. Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, N.Y., 1987, p. 238)  was later more than once reproduced in official documents of the Khmer Rouge. Pol Pot himself claimed it many times. Interestingly, Hanoi’s decision was remembered in Phnom Penh even in the eighties, when such a high-ranking official in the Phnom Penh hierarchy as the executive secretary of the pro-Vietnam United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea, Chan Ven, was of the opinion that in 1953, “the Vietnamese had acted incorrectly by leaving us alone to  face with the ruling regime” (conversation with Chan Ven, Phnom Penh, July 15, 1984).

The events in Indochina in 1954 marked the beginning of a new period in relations between the Khmer and Vietnamese communists. The close partnership of 1949-1953 promptly came to naught, and the KPRP, which had lost a considerable number of its members, went underground and fell out of the field of vision of Hanoi for many years. The North Vietnamese leaders who were preparing for a renewal of armed struggle in the South, found in Sihanouk, with his anti-imperialist and anti-American rhetoric, a far more important ally than the KPRP. Moreover, Sihanouk had real power. Hanoi placed its bets on the alliance with Sihanouk, who was not only critical of the United States but also granted North Vietnam the possibility to use his territory for creating rear bases on the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail and even to deliver ammunition and arms for the fighting in the South through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. (However, the Khmers retained approximately 10 % of all deliveries - see Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy, N.Y., 1986, pp. 61, 420). The Vietnamese did their best to strengthen this regime, and went out of their way to scrap any plans of the local communists to fight Sihanouk. Hanoi believed that “the armed struggle with the government of Sihanouk slackened it and opened a path to the intrigues of American imperialism against Kampuchea" (On the History of the Vietnamese-Kampuchean Conflict, Hanoi, 1979, p. 9). The Vietnamese even tried not to allow Khmer communists to leave Hanoi for Cambodia to carry out illegal work in their home country, and tried to have them keep different official positions in Vietnam (RSAMH, Fund 5, inventory 50, file 721: Document of the USSR embassy in the DRV, April 1, 1965, p. 142).

As to the communists, operating on the territory of Cambodia, their underground organization had broken up into rather isolated fractions under heavy pressure from the authorities, and its illegal leaders wandered through the country from one secret address to another at the end of their tether. Authentic documents of this epoch were not saved. However, according to the evidence of such an informed person as Tep Khen - a former ambassador of Heng Samrin’s regime in Phnom Penh, all documentation of the party fitted into a schoolbag, which general secretary Tou Samut and his two bodyguards carried while travelling through the country. (Conversation with  Tep Khen, Moscow,  March 10, 1985). The treachery of Sieu Heng - the second most important person in the KPRP - dealt a heavy blow against the underground organization.  This party leader, who had been in charge of KPRP work among peasants for several years, secretly cooperated with the special services of the ruling regime and during the period from 1955 to 1959 gave away practically all communist activists in the country to the  authorities.

The prevailing obvious chaos inside the party and the absence of serious control from the Vietnamese party presented Saloth Sar (later he took the revolutionary pseudonym Pol Pot) who arrived home from France, and his radical friends who had studied with him there, with huge possibilities for elevation to the highest positions in a semi-destroyed, isolated organization. The treachery of Sieu Heng did not affect them seriously, because they belonged to an urban wing of the party, headed by Tou Samut. The career growth of Pol Pot was vigorous: in 1953 he was secretary of a regional party cell, while in 1959 he made it to the post of  the secretary of Phnom Penh city committee of CPRP (Conversation with Chan Ven, Phnom Penh, July 15, 1984).

When in 1962, the Sihanouk secret police laid its hands on and killed Tou Samut at a secret hide-out in Phnom Penh (four years before - in 1958 - another prominent leader of the KPRP, editor of the party newspaper Nop Bophan had been shot and killed), Pol Pot and his friends got the unique chance to actually head the party or, more precisely, what was left of it. As early as 1960, Pol Pot had managed to assure that his evaluation of the situation in the country and his views on the tactics and strategy of political struggle were accepted as a basis for drafting a new program of the KPRP. It declared as the main cause of the party the realization of a national-democratic revolution, that is to say the struggle for the overthrow of the regime existing in the country, a policy that went counter to the interests of Hanoi. The congress approved a new Charter and formed a new Central Committee, where Pol Pot assumed the responsibilities of deputy chairman of the party.

The prevalence of new personnel was consolidated at the next Party congress which took place in January 1963. It was also held underground at a secret address and according to veteran communists there were not more than 20 persons at it (conversation with Chan Ven, Phnom Penh, July 14, 1984). During this meeting a new Central Committee, wherein young radicals held one third of all 12 posts, was elected. Pol Pot himself took up the post of the general secretary, and Ieng Sari became a member of the permanent bureau (To Kuyen, ‘The CPRP as avant-garde of the Kampuchean people’, Cong Shang, 1983, N11-12. Cited from the Russian translation, "Questions of the history of the CPSU," N10, 1984, p. 68). Unexpectedly for the Vietnamese, Pol Pot then renamed the party: from the People’s Revolutionary Party to the Communist Party of Kampuchea or CPK (conversation with Tep Khen, Moscow, March 10, 1985). Much later, explaining the reason for changing the name, Pol Pot claimed that "The Communist Party of Indochina and consequently its successor the KPRP was in due course created by the Vietnamese to occupy Cambodian and Lao lands" (Provotesat songkhep nei pak protiatyun padevoat Kampuchea – ‘A Brief history of the KPRP – The vanguard of the working class and all the people of Kampuchea,’ Phnom Penh, 1984, p. 7).

      Vietnamese Tributary System with a deadly twist; Vietnamese colonialism and  imperialism against Cambodia and other neighbors

Dancing with wolf; Sihanouk and his 'friend,' North Vietnamese Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong 

Sihanouk warmingly embracing Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of North Vietnam, during an Anti-US Imperialism  Meeting in Southern China, in 1971

Sihanouk addressing a meeting with Khmer Rouge Leaders (khieu Samphan and Hou Youn) in Northern Cambodia in 1973. Now, Sihanouk is unashamedly allied with Hun Sen. Now, Let us honestly ask the following question. Is Sihanouk a true Khmer Patriot and defender of the Khmer nation, as he often claimed? The answer is a resounding 'NO'.

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(Comments: This Memorandum from the Central Committee of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, dated September 1982, amd signed by Say Phuthang, legalizing The settlement of Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia.

These memoes are the most tangible proofs that the Vietnamization of Cambodia is real, and has resumed with a Vengence, after Vietnam invaded Cambodia, in 1979, and continues until today. That is why a few of friends of mine and I had decided to send a petition (signed by almost 10,000 Cambodians from all parts of the world) to President Bush requesting him to verify the problem settlement of illegal Vietnamese immigrants in Cambodia, based on the information provided by Ambassador Bindra, the former Chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC), which was set up by the major powers at the Geneve Conference, to supervise the agreements, signed in that Swiss city, in 1954. (For more details on this petition, please go to my web site address s 'http://mysite.verizon.net/vzeof03b/index.html', and FYI, a copy of the petition is opted below) 

Not unexpectedly, we received a non-committal answer, which in fact mentioned some diplomatic platitudes regarding our concern about the unlimited and unstoppable flow of illegal Vietnamese immigrants into Cambodia, since the invasion of Cambodia by the Vietnamese armed forces, in 1979. 

It should be reminded that once these illegal Vietnamese have entered Cambodia, they automatically received Cambodian citizenship thus benefitting Hun Sen in any elections to be held in Cambodian. Any census of population, cannot reveal neither the number nor the location of Vietnamese concentration in Cambodia, which is absolutely abnormal, to say the least.

Unfortunately, most NGOs have gone along with this insane policy, and even accused those who would dare to ask for such information on the illegal Vietnamese immigrants in Cambodia, are considered by them as racists. Here we are trapped inside and trapped outside. This was due to the fact that some Cambodian individuals and organizations have used their rage rather than reason to address the Vietnamization issue in Cambodia.  Again, don't blame only foreigners in this tragic story of the Vietnamization of Cambodia. Cambodians at all levels in the society have committed high treason in favoring the Vietnamese interests and grand design of imperialism in Cambodia, to fulfill their own selfish and short-term personal objectives.

This cavalier response was due, as you may know, to the fact that G W Bush is now totally committed to have Vietnam as America's best ally in Asia, in order to confront the rising power of China in Asia and to fight against terrorism. Knowing the closeness between Hun Sen and Vietnam, the Bush administration is now also backing Hun Sen 100 per cent as the reigning dictator of Cambodia. In so doing, the United States of America has given up for practical purposes, all supports for the promotion of democracy and human rights in Cambodia, as elsewhere in the world. 

In view of this tragic situation for Cambodia, Cambodian-Americans should not remain silent in front of this abandon of the basic principles upon which America was founded, and should use their voting rights and preveleges to ask the US Congress to reverse this insane, obtuse, and morally unjust foreign policy in Asia, by G W Bush. They should protest against this dangerous and immoral policy by intervening in the Congress to remind it of this failure to support these fundamental principles of all free and open societies, that the USA has been preaching so loudly to the rest of the world, and for a very long time. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC August 28, 2007)

For an excellent analysis of Vietnamese colonialism in Cambodia, please, read the article by clicking the link posted below:

                                            (/Documents/Vietnams_expansionism.pdf)

Documents on CPP asking Cambodian people to help Vietnamese colonists settled in Cambodia. This is the most deadly policy for Cambodia. This also shows how Hun Sen and his CPP are totally under Vietnamese control.

Source; Marie Alexandrine Martin; Cambodia: a Shattered Society; University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1994

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Memo I from Say Phuthang to Cambodian Officials to Help Vietnamese Civilians to Settle in Cambodia.

  Memo II From Chan Si to Cambodian Officials to Help Vietnamese Civilians to Settle in Cambodia

The Settlement of Vietnamese Civilians

Council of Ministers No. 38 SR

People's Republic of Kampuchea Independence, Peace, Liberty, Happiness

Phnom Penh, 9 October 1983

Memorandum

To the Honorable:

Comrade Ministers, Comrade Presidents of national institutions subordi­nate to the central committee, Comrade Presidents of people's revolutionary committees of all provinces and municipalities.

The secretariat of the central committee of the Cambodian People's Revolutionary party issued on 7 May 1982 memorandum no. 142 concern­ing measures to be taken in regard to Vietnamese civilians coming to settle and work in Cambodia. The secretariat of the central committee also issued on 13 September 1982 a notice to facilitate the application of the above­ named memorandum. The present Council of Ministers reminds all minis­ters and all the provinces and municipalities that the directives contained in the memorandum of the secretariat of the central committee concerning Vietnamese civilians coming to settle in Cambodia are to be literally applied.

Cambodia and Vietnam are two bordering, friendly countries whose peoples have had relations for many generations. Their geopolitical situation and history have welded the two peoples together in the cause of the resistance struggle against the common enemy to defend and construct their nations.

Before 1969, there were approximately 500,000 Vietnamese civilians living in Cambodia. They practiced various trades such as rice grower, fisherman, saltmaker, artisan, and petty merchant. They respected the laws in force in Cambodia as well as the Khmers' customs; they contributed to the revolutionary struggle of the Khmer people, who accepted, supported and helped them.

Under the Lon Nol and Pol Pot regimes and because of the unfriendly policy of these groups, Vietnamese living in Cambodia endured the same fate as Cambodians. They were tortured, executed, or repatriated to Viet­nam. Very few survived. After the total liberation of Cambodia, Vietnamese brothers returned to live and work in Cambodia.

In order to consolidate and develop the friendship and fighting solidarity between the peoples of the two countries, Cambodia and Vietnam; in order to ensure the political security and the social order, all the departments and institutions of state under the authority of the central committee and the people's revolutionary committees in all provinces and municipalities should fully understand the following principles and measures relating to Vietnamese civilians coming to reside and make their living in Cambodia.

1. Concerning Vietnamese civilians who previously lived in Cambodia and including those survivors of tortures and massacres by former regimes who have been helped and hidden by the Cambodian population or repatriated to Vietnam and have returned to live and work honestly in Cambodia, the government and the population of Cambodia bring them aid and support and create favorable conditions for their rapid integration in order to stabilize their lives.

2. As for Vietnamese civilians arriving in Cambodia just after the country's liberation, who are settled, who contribute to the restoration and the development of the economy as farmers, woodcutters, fishermen, salt­ makers, craftsmen, etc., and who have good relations with the local population and the local authorities, the public authorities of the province, cities, districts, regions, and communes, will create conditions useful for their settlement and for the practice of their trades.

3. Concerning Vietnamese nationals who are traitors to the revolution or who participate in illegal activities in the course of their work, violating the law, our authorities and the nearby Vietnamese services such as the [committee for the] organization of Vietnamese troops and [the committee of] Vietnamese experts must take concerted action to pass appropriate measures and render appropriate judgments.

4. As for Vietnamese civilians who have friends or close relatives who want them to come to Cambodia to settle or visit their families, the competent services in Cambodia and Vietnam should authorize them to do so.

5. Concerning the border provinces, the governments of the two countries will issue common instructions for a long-term application, permitting provinces of Cambodia to discuss with Vietnamese border provinces the facilities to be given for dossiers for changes of abode for civilians of the two countries who desire to move to the border communes to earn their living there in an honest fashion. This will take place within an atmosphere of equality, friendship, and mutual interest and with reciprocal respect in order to ensure social order and political security under the supervision of the public powers of the districts and communes of the two sides.

6. Considering the nature and the duties of the present Cambodian revolution, it is necessary to create the conditions that will enable the entire Vietnamese population to receive an appropriate status quickly in order to facilitate work in all fields: education, sustenance, and the Vietnamese popular movements united to serve the two strategic goals of the revolution in our country.

7. Increase supervisory measures of all kinds at each point of crossing; strictly forbid people to come and go illegally.

a. The application of this memorandum must tend to increase the spirit of special friendship and Khmer-Vietnamese fighting solidarity, ceaselessly to create conditions favorable to the relations between the Cambodian people and Vietnamese civilians living in Cambodia, between the rallying movements of the Vietnamese of Cambodia so that they actively participate in the two revolutionary tasks, that is, the defense and construction of our country.

b. This memorandum resolves only a part of the problems concerning the future, viz., the durability of the installation of Vietnamese civilians living honestly in Cambodia, and the elimination of bad elements who hide themselves among the Vietnamese population of Cambodia; and it constitutes a step toward the settlement of the problem of border crossings between the two countries. This memorandum does not resolve basic, long­ term problems such as measures concerning nationals with Vietnamese citizenship in Cambodia or that of the crossing of the Khmer-Vietnamese border. However, for all these problems, the central committee and the presidency of the council will issue various memoranda to resolve them later.  

c. The solution to the problem of Vietnamese civilians living in Cambodia is very timely and appropriate, but it is very complex. And it is easy for the enemy to foment discord and fear through psychological warfare dividing the two peoples. The central, provincial, and municipal administrations will proceed with care and make all necessary arrangements.

To begin with, action must be taken so that the cadres understand this work and get it thoroughly into their minds, so that they clearly grasp the spirit of staunch Khmer-Vietnamese national solidarity. Next, in the places where there are Vietnamese civilians, they must conscientiously conduct educational work among the Cambodian population as well as among Vietnamese civilians; they must attempt to vanquish manifestations emanating from a narrow nationalism among the Cambodian population as well as among Vietnamese civilians. Through this educational work, they must clearly grasp the nature of the division of the Vietnamese people into categories and try to develop the appropriate measures and forms of organization for administering and educating Vietnamese civilians.

d. This constitutes a part of the work of the popular masses and of the central, provincial, and municipal administrations that must supervise the application of the rules. During this process, clear discussions must be held with the Vietnamese experts, and Vietnamese civilians belonging to the cell [of the Vietnamese Communist party] must be sought out so that they may be used for support in mobilizing popular Vietnamese movements. We can count on the Vietnamese experts for helping us to guide, educate, and explain matters to the Vietnamese civilians wherever they have settled.

e. This memorandum is in force from the day of its signing.

During its period of application, if the central administration, the state institutions, and the provincial and municipal administrations encounter difficulties or any points whatsoever of disagreement or imperfection or any obstacle of any kind, they should quickly report them to the Council of Ministers so that the latter can draw conclusions and issue new instructions for the future. The central departments and the provincial and municipal administrations should regularly prepare a report to the Council of Ministers in order to inform that body of the development of the application of this memorandum.

For the Council of Ministers,

The President,

Seal

Signature of Chan Si

Source: Marie alexandrine Martin “Cambodia; A Shattered Society” Appendix 10

                A Petition To:  George W. Bush, President of the United States of America

TO SAVE THE KHMER ROUGE TRIAL BY MOVING IT OUT OF HUN SEN’S CORRUPT SYSTEM TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) OF JUSTICE, THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS AND TO INVESTIGATE THE VIETNAMIZATION OF CAMBODIA

Signatures: _______ November 14, 2005

Category: Justice and Human Rights

Region: United States of America

Perspective: Global

The Honorable George W. Bush

President of the United States

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We, the under-signed, Cambodian-Americans and friends in the United States and abroad, call your immediate attention to Hun Sen’s systematic manipulation and obstruction of the Khmer Rouge Trial process under international scrutiny. This blatantly contradicts the United States’ longstanding governing principal of democracy, open society, transparency and the protection of inalienable human rights. These current practices of sabotaging the rule of laws and the proper working of the judicial system according to the international standard of justice, pose imminent danger to the Cambodian people’s ability to survive and to their return to normalcy, after having been victims of one of the most heinous crimes against humanity in recent memories, under the demented regime of the Khmer Rouge. Ultimately, these deliberate acts of sabotage by Hun Sen and his CPP threaten the very existence of the Cambodian people.

Attached herewith are supporting a set of recent articles on how Hun Sen has been creating political obstacles to allow the Khmer Rouge Trial to be concluded at an early date. Hun Sen sabotage’s acts center mainly on his claim to defend Cambodia’s sovereignty.

Cambodia’s territory has continually shrunk while the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s land continues to grow since its January 1979 military invasion and capture of Phnom Penh from Pol Pot’s regime. Vietnam installed leadership that consisted of former members of the Khmers Rouge who fled to Vietnam to seek refuge from Pol Pot’s regime and joined forces with Vietnam’s communist organization. Among them is the current dictator Hun Sen. Cambodia’s current government is a colonial regime of Vietnam. Vietnam has imposed its communist system on Cambodia through the back door, as His Excellency Bindra states in his writing. Vietnam was forced by the international community and by the collapse of the former Soviet Union to abandon its direct occupation of Cambodia in 1989; however, it still retains power through its client communist party led by Hun Sen.

Less obvious but more deadly, Vietnam’s colonial policy is evident by the alarming and continuous influx of illegal Vietnamese immigrants into Cambodia from 1979 onward, where substantially none remained during the Khmer Rouge regime. With its protégé Hun Sen in power, Vietnam was able to create land growth and secure full legal status for the Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia through the 1982, 1983, and 1985 agreements. These treaties revoked the agreements that the same Vietnamese leadership made in1967 in its recognition of Cambodia’s borders in the name of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and South Vietnam National Liberation Front (NLF). By 1987, there were approximately two million Vietnamese inhabitants in Cambodia. Today, about 17\% of approximately 14 million Cambodians are Vietnamese. Full voting rights from these illegal Vietnamese settlers and a deadly grip on the governing system are allowing Vietnam and Hun Sen to breach the territorial integrity of Cambodia through colonial practices.

It should be noted that many independent NGOs have reported human rights violations by the Vietnamese government on the Khmer Krom, the Cambodian indigenous people of South Vietnam, who are now reduced to ethnic minority status.

Vietnam’s foreign policy of expansionism has already obliterated an entire civilization of Champa residing in what is now the Red River delta of Vietnam during the second half of the fifteenth century. The remaining group of Champs sought refuge in Cambodia, where they remain today. These practices of isolating and of forcing Khmer Krom to take Vietnamese names could be regarded as a form of genocide according to the content of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Furthermore, in his recent speech Prime Minister Hun Sen threatened to “legally” deal with Cambodian citizens who dare criticize his stance on the border issue with Vietnam. For instance, he arrested and detained journalist Mam Sonando and President of the Cambodian Independent Teacher’s Association, Rong Chhun. He also brought government charges against four members of Cambodia’s Border Watchdog Council for voicing their concerns. Many NGOs have been reporting that Hun and his government are responsible for numerous gross violations of human rights and repression of democracy.

For all the above mentioned reasons, we urge the United States government, international organizations, the United Nations, the European Union and members of ASEAN and Donor-Nations, to investigate Vietnam for continuously violating breaching Cambodia’s territorial integrity and encouraging the uninhibited flow of illegal Vietnamese settlers into Cambodia. We strongly request all those international leaders who were participants and signatories of the Paris Accords in 1991 on the peace settlement in Cambodia to compile an unbiased report and submit this document to their Member-States for further debate in order to stop current illegal actions in Cambodia.

Cambodia has had a turbulent and tragic history and if it is to have another chance at normal social, political, and economic development, the world needs to firmly monitor this extremely dangerous situation and encourage a democratic and transparent governing system in Cambodia. In the January 1979 invasion by Vietnam of Cambodia, the United States, Western and Third World nations refused to cooperate with Vietnam. We again need that type of moral integrity and resolve to protect the rights and liberty of Cambodia, a Member-State of the United Nations. We sincerely fear that if Vietnam continues to violate Cambodian sovereignty, the Cambodian people cannot be expected to remain peaceful and silent. A human tragedy of major proportion may be repeated in Cambodia. The Cambodian people have the legitimate right and duty to defend themselves against this naked Vietnamese aggression.

                Khmer Rouge Leaders: the Role of the Vietnamese in the Khmer Rouge

                                                                         Introduction:         

This page presents a number of selected articles showing how Vietnam is at the roots of the creation of Communism, and therefore, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The Vietnamese are not at all what they claim to be that is the 'savior' of the Cambodian people from Pol Pot murderous regime. Only, The Vietnamese have always consider Cambodia as part of Ho Chi Minh' s dream of the greater Vietnam. The Vietnamese know more about Cambodia and the Cambodian people than the Cambodians know themselves.

Thus, in this context, one can assume that the Vietnamese knew all along that the Khmer Rouge had committed regonocide against its own people. Only when the Vietnamese realized that they could no longer control the Khmer Rouge, did they start to systematically destroying them, as they did later on with Pen Sovann, and replaced him by a more subservient one, like Hun Sen and Chea Sim. Two articles are highly recommended for a better grasp of this deadly problem for Cambodia, one by Steve Morris, and the other by Phillip short, posted below in this page.

The late military historian, Bernard Fall had most vividly captured this hidden but deadly Vietnamese colonialism when he wrote that:

"“It is interesting to compare the Vietnamese colonization process with the corresponding process of state-building going on in Europe at that time; for too many well-intentioned writers (particularly those in the United States who feel that Europe must continually make amends for her colonial performance) tend to gloss over the non-European colonial processes that were going on simultaneously. In Europe, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed what could be called a national "regroupment" process: Spain left the Low Countries; non-German states lost their influence in Germany; and the Turks, after a high tide that had brought them to the gates of Vienna in 1529 and 1683, returned to the lower reaches of the Balkans. In Europe outside Russia, only Austria-Hungary was to survive as a major multinational state until 1918, and no new state rose to power by ethnic assimilation of alien areas. Viet-Nam was obviously doing exactly the opposite: It carved out its territory through military conquest over states whose level of indigenous culture was at least equal, if not superior, to its own. In other words, it did not invoke the moralistic rationale of "Manifest Destiny," "la Mission Civilisatrice," or "the White Man's Burden"; its action, like the German Drang nach Osten, was simply a manifestation of the vitality of its people. It was simply and purely a process of colonial conquest for material gains, no more, no less. The fact that it took place on contiguous territory does not make it any more respectable than, say, the Russian conquest of Hungary.  

But, what makes the Vietnamese colonial process unique in Asia is that it took place in competition with that of several European powers—and the Vietnamese beat them to the punch on several occasions! By 1750, nearly all the later European colonial powers had appeared on the scene: the Dutch and Spaniards in the Spice Islands, the French and British in India, and the Portuguese through-out Southeast Asia, even as far inland as Laos. All of them, at one time or another or simultaneously, had trading stations in Viet-Nam. Whether through superciliousness or plain ignorance, none of the "traditional" colonial powers consciously reacted to the Vietnamese colonial process. But it was not without reason that the French consolidated their position in South Viet-Nam first when they set out to conquer the country one century later; after all, it had been Vietnamese for so short a time that its conquest proved easiest, for its inhabitants were the least secure in their social structure and institutions. This assertion appears to be borne out by the fact that the South appeared more “pro-French” (or simply “French”) than central and North Viet-Nam and that the French colonial penetration became more difficult as it advanced farther North.

Thus, much of what today is the Republic of Viet-Nam south of the 17^th parallel has been "Vietnamese" for a shorter span of time than the Eastern seaboard of the United States has been American." This is a reality that cannot be simply talked away, for it affects the very fabric of the nation in times of stress and crisis, as in the 1960’s.”

(Vietnam Deadly but Hidden Colonialist and imperialist design and policy; From Bernard Fall 'The Two Viet Nams; A Political and Military Analysis, Chapter 2,': 'A glimpse of the Past' Praeger, New York, 1971)

You will also find the detailed biographies of those Cambodian leaders, Communist and non-Communists who participated, in one capacity or another, in the destruction of Cambodia and the Cambodian society, since World War II.

        1     The heavy Legacy of the Past on the Present and the future of Cambodia; a Reflection

 Please, click here to read a web page on an Expatriate's reflection on Cambodia's Past, Present, Future. the Burden of history on present day Cambodia and its future is being discussed and presented based on serious documentations. Cambodia's past is unique, and does not portend well for its future, namely, because of the lack of identity for most Cambodian people, resulting from the overpowering of the monarchy on the common Cambodians.

This will have to be changed, if Cambodia is to have a better chance for survival. The culture of internal political patronage and dependence on foreign patrons are two of the deadly sins of the Cambodian society.