Some selected thoughts on the main traits of the characteristics according to some foreign observers and Cambodian scholars of the Cambodian people and society Table of contents - Introduction
- Analysis of Sihanouk‘s character and his role in Cambodian politics
- role and Importance of the United States and France in Present-day Cambodia
- Angkor guide by Maurice Glaize
- khmer empire: Implications from its Oraganizaitonal, and Operational System on Present-Day Events in Cambodia
- Cambodia's History Legacy
- Clinical Pear; naming in Khmer Culture
- Dependence on Foreign Patrons
- The Khmer Mentality
- Today Khmer – The Concept of Time
- Cambodia in Bad Hands
- Who is Khmer?
- An Uncertain Legacy: the Khmer Paradox
- Fatalism, Prophesies, Superstition in Cambodian Thinking
_______________________________________________________________________ Introduction: Most Cambodians do not even know who they are, that is their identity. This major flaw in the Cambodian people character is the result of the heavy and negative impact of history and especially of the role of the monarchy on the Cambodian people and society. For instance, if one would ask a Cambodian to tell who a Cambodian is? He would mostly likely mention among the main characters; the language (Khmer), the religion (Buddhism - Therevada), and of course, being the builders of Angkor Wat. But, if one were to ask further who built Angkor Wat. The answer from most common Cambodians would most likely be that it was the gods Preah Puh Nokar) or giants who built Angkor. So, if gods who built it, how could it be that the Cambodians who also built it. Secondly, the Cambodian monarchy absolutely crushed the identity of a common Cambodian. Although, the monarchy always built these enormous monuments like Angkor Wat to honor their ancestor, the common Cambodians hardly know the name of their own great grand parents. This is, in turn, makes the Cambodian society very weak and insecure. By contrast, the Chinese and the Vietnamese know who their ancestors are and could go as far back as 12 generations ago. The habit of honoring their ancestors gave the Chinese and the Vietnamese society a more stable and stronger base for their daily life, as a person and as a group. Here, you will be able to read some key articles in understanding the basic Cambodian behavioral flaws and their impact on the current tragic situation of Cambodia. Some comments will also be provided where they are needed. Washington DC. 2005 Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D.
Analysis of Sihanouk‘s character and his role in Cambodian politics during the 1950s and 1960s Source: CIA Secret Report, released in May 2007 under the Freedom of Information Act
(Comment: this is perhaps, to my knowledge, one of the best description and analysis of Sihanouk as a person and as a leader. One important aspect of this analysis that clearly portrayed Sihanouk as, both a person and a politician is his enormously big ego, which led him to see himself as the indispensable person to be able to “save” Cambodia from sure death at the hands of Vietnam and Thailand. His enormous ego also has led him to be paying so much attention to the protocol aspects of his relationship with the major powers. His conviction that the Communism will prevail in the ideological struggle between East and West powers, also led him to align himself with China and against the West, especially the United States.
Because of his firm belief that he is the real and only person who could save Cambodia, he allowed no room for other Cambodians to challenge his authorities, and leadership. In turn, this lack of room for other Cambodians to come to be leaders, led Cambodia to be narrowly based in terms of who can lead that Cambodia has become as vulnerable as ever to fight against outside threats. Sihanouk has convinced himself that he is so indispensable for the survival of the Cambodian people and society that he will anything to keep himself alive, even at the cost of losing ground to the outside threat, as in the case in present-day Cambodia when he allied himself to the Khmer Rouge and now to Hun Sen and the Vietnamese. Ultimately, he also knows that the majority of the Cambodian people are still with him regardless of his frequent capricious behavior and gyration, that is why he is known as the “Mercurial Prince” or the “Flip Flop King.”
Last but not least, Sihanouk was the one who had brought the suffix “Varman” or “shield” to blazon his name as Norodom Sihanouk Varman.
In so doing , Sihanouk had linked his name to the names of all the most famous king of Cambodia who reigned during the height of the Angkor period, such as Jayavarman II or Jayavarman VII, who were then the god-kings of Khmer empire. The most unfortunate aspect of this Cambodian tragedy is the fact that most Cambodians are closely identified with Angkor as the national identity, witout borthering to look more deeply into the meaning of Angkor, both the bad and the good sides. They can only see the good side,as even Pol Pot had said that if Cambodians can build Angkor, then Cambodians can do anything! this warp view of the role of Angkor in the cambodian psichy has been very costly to Cambodia and the Cambodian people.
This, in turn, in the eyes of the majority of the Cambodian people in present-day Cambodia, Sihanouk is a god-king, and the descendant of the builders of the Angkorian Empire, and can never be blamed for anything he does regarding Cambodia’s destiny. In the eyes of the majority of the Cambodian people, Sihanouk is the only person who can save Cambodia. That is the real tragedy for Cambodia. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. December 15, 2009) To read the whole Report, please, click on the link posted below: CIA report on Sihanouk and Son Ngoc Thanh.pdf
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VII. CONCLUSION
It would be difficult for anyone writing about Sihanouk, whatever his bias, to conclude other than that he is his own His best, worst enemy, with recriminations, and frequently undignified behavior have all but succeeded in obscuring the tenacity with which he has pursued certain fundamental goals since coming to power. In other words, while his tactics have fluctuated wildly, his main objectives are little changed since 1952.
In that Sihanouk faced the tasks gaining full independence from France, of subduing the Khmer Issarak, of consolidating his own political power, and of administering the government and economy. Today he is preoccupied with essentially the same problem, to an extent which raises questions concerning his ability to recognize changed situations as they arise, Although Cambodian independence is a fact, Sihanouk behaves as though his country is in imminent danger of SEATO enslavement. The Khmer Serei (Issarak) are on the verge of extinction, yet Sihanouk regards the movement as a dagger pointed at the heart of Cambodia. His personal popularity continues at a level difficult for Westerners to comprehend, yet the Prince courts his followers like a dark-horse candidate for county clerk.
To Sihanouk's credit, he remains a dedicated nationalist. Today as in 1952, his overriding concern is for the independence and territorial integrity of his country, He has improved the standard of living of his people, and for all his erratic behavior, he has brought a degree of political stability to Cambodia which certainly compares favorably to anything to be found in Laos, Vietnam or even Thailand. He has reinforced the Cambodian sense of nationality, an insurance against the Communist triumph in Southeast Asia which he regards as inevitable.
The path which Sihanouk chose f or Cambodia in international affairs was what he called neutralism, but which, on examination, barely qualified as non-alignment, has rarely been other than critical of the West on issues in the Cold War, and his professions neutralism appear based solely on Cambodia's failure to date to align itself by treaty with the Communist bloc.
Although there has always been a leftist tinge to it, Sihanouk's "Neutralism" can be said to have had three recognizable stages, The first stage spanned most of the three years up to the spring of 1955, during which Sihanouk was occupied mainly with domestic affairs, including the launching of the Sangkum, During this period Sihanouk was concerned with the problem of Communist subversion, and could not afford to antagonize unnecessarily either the East or West. He sought non-involvement as well as non-alignment in foreign affairs, and it is hardly coincidental that this was the period of Sihanouk's lasting achievements. He secured independence, subdued the Issarak, built up a political organization, and launched Cambodia on the road to becoming a recipient of aid from both East and West.
At approximately the time the Bandung conference in 1953, Sihanouk began to demonstrate a greater interest in international affairs. He professed to be a neutralist of the Nehru school, and periodically lectured the West--particularly the United States--concerning its inability to understand the Asian mind. Although Sihanouk enthusiastically endorsed the "five principles" of coexistence developed by Nehru and Chou En-Lai, Cambodia's was always a small-nation neutralism. There was none of Sukarno's irredentist bluster, or Nehru's third-force ambitions. Probably because the Afro-Asians looked elsewhere for leadership, Sihanouk was never an energetic participant in the neutralist bloc. He could never see far beyond Cambodia's borders and the nonalignment which Sihanouk called neutralism had a nationalistic and pragmatic aspect. He probably had a longing to play a greater role on the international stage; certainly he demonstrated a first-class inferiority complex concerning protocol matters. In practice, however, his interest was largely confined to Southeast Asia.
The period during which, Sihanouk made some effort to practice "true” neutralism, covered the period from early 1955 until sometime during 1959. In that year Sihanouk was shaken in quick succession by the Dap Chhuon’s revolt, the palace bomb plot, and the inauguration of propaganda broadcasts by the Khmer Serei. Even during his middle period, however, Sihanouk's neutralism was one of convenience. His ego suffered rather than conviction repeated bruises at the hands of the United States, particularly on the occasion of his visits to the UN. By contrast, his junkets to the bloc, beginning in 1956--were personal triumphs as well as economic windfalls. Sihanouk's vanity was such that the red carpet treatment he received in Peiping and elsewhere in the bloc generated gratitude out of all proportion to the amount of aid received.
There is no doubt that during this period he felt very strongly under the spell of Chou En-Lai. The ensuing honeymoon with Communist China did not prevent Sihanouk from taking action when necessary against Communists at home, but stiffened his resolution to take a hard line in his always delicate relations with Thailand and South Vietnam. Cambodia's relations with the United States cooled as he came increasingly to link the United States to the policies of his SEATO neighbors, and to view U,S. aid mainly in terms of the larger amounts being supplied to his enemies.
The Prince's dark suspicions concerning the United States were confirmed to his satisfaction by the events of 1959. From that time to the present, he has never tired of reciting the story of "CIA's" attempt to overthrow him, and of its alleged sponsorship of clandestine broadcasts designed to overthrow his regime. Nor has he forgotten that China and France, but not the United States, warned him of Dap Chhuon's plotting. Under the circumstances, it is not entirely surprising that Sihanouk concluded that only China could be counted upon t0 in preserving Cambodia's independence. It was in this context that he sent three sons to study in china in 1964. At the end of the year, in return for 'bloc economic assistance, he swallowed the bloc propaganda line whole, recognizing Outer Mongolia supporting Khrushchev on disarmament, attacking U.S intervention in Laos and even endorsing the Soviet troika 's proposal for the UN.
Over a period of years Sihanouk had come to the conclusion--unenthusiastically a Communist triumph in Southeast Asia was a foregone conclusion. His thinking on this matter is unclear; although he was doubtless impressed by his visits to China he is just as likely to have arrived at his belief on the basis of astrological predictions. The fact remains that from 1960 to the present two dominant influences have shaped Cambodia’s policies: hostility towards the United States and the assumption of a Communist triumph In Asia. On several occasions Sihanouk has indicated that there are worse fates than that of a Communist satellite, and he has cited Poland as an example of a nation which has preserved its identity even though absorbed in the bloc. Sihanouk's very real fear that Cambodia may once again be partitioned between Vietnam and Thailand helps explain his fetish concerning territorial guarantees. for his country, and also his willingness t0 accept satellite status if the Cambodian nation cm be preserved by no other means.
Because of Sihanouk's penchant for airing his hopes and fears on the national radio, in speeches which have often degenerated into anti-Western diatribes, he has become sensitive on the subject of Cambodia's "neutralism.' He finds no inconsistency in professing neutralism while serving as Peiping's sounding board, so long as there is no formal alliance, and is prone to point to Cambodia's cordial relations with Wance as evidence of its desire for ties with the West. Only in unguarded moments has Sihanouk hinted that Cambodia has in fact abandoned neutralism. Cambodia was obliged to give up U.S, aid, he observed on 5 November 1963, because he was unable to remain neutral, It was in a spirit of kicking over the traces that Sihanouk terminated U.S. aid, disparaged President Kennedy, and threw himself at Peiping with shrill threats to become a Communist satellite. But the trend away from a more-or-less true neutralism can be traced back at least to the Dap Chhuon affair.
Although Sihanouk's more dramatic tantrums have involved his relations with the United States and its allies, Cambodian foreign policy has been marked since 1960 by disorganized but persistent efforts to convene an international conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity, Although there is good reason to believe that Sihanouk desires that a conference be held, he has made no effort to make such a meeting palatable to the Thais and Vietnamese, and the conference may end up a casualty of Sihanouk's declining effectiveness as an international politician. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the guarantees he seeks would be binding on the Communists as well as Cambodia's SEATO neighbors, and Sihanouk-with his childlike faith in treaties and guarantees--is most anxious to obtain recognition by the DRV of Cambodia's present borders.
Apart from the question of the neutrality conference, there is other evidence that Sihanouk has lost his sure touch in international affairs. In the early 1960s Sihanouk was at his best in obtaining full independence from France, and in uniting his countrymen behind the monarchy. He was then capable of forgiving enemies, made skillful use of communications media, and was able to keep in perspective the relative threats posed to his country by the Thais and the Viet Minh. It is hard to recognize in this early Sihanouk the prince who cut off $30 million in annual aid on a whim, and who has so isolated his country from the West that it is now dependent on the goodwill of Communist China.
No great insight is required to conclude that Sihanouk's recent failings are closely related to his mental health. Certain of his prejudices, including his dislike of the United States, can be explained in terms of some of his experiences. Others, such as his disproportionate fear of the Khmer Serei, his sensitivity to any kind of criticism, the frequent morbid references in his speeches, and the excessive vituperation of his critics, appears rooted n Sihanouk’s personality, mere is a tendency among Western observers to attempt to "pigeonhole" 'Sihanouk: t0 the favorably disposed, he is a temperamental but essentially shrewd ruler, who has gained and preserved his country's independence in the face of tremendous obstacles. To his detractors, he is a petty leftist tyrant, mad as a March hare, whose limited achievements are a byproduct of Communist preoccupation elsewhere in Asia.
To come up with the "true" Sihanouk it is not necessary to reject either of these views but it is necessary to combine them. For all his popularity at home, there is ample evidence that his judgment, in certain areas, is badly impaired. He does not appear out of touch with reality so much as a victim of his emotions. The mystique surrounding Sihanouk, which contributes so greatly to his popularity in the countryside, appears to have bred a sycophancy among his advisors which precludes any effective check on his actions.
Barring deterioration in relations between Cambodia and Communist China, prospects for a significant improvement in Cambodian-American relations are not bright. Sihanouk's hatred for the United States is deep-rooted and seemingly implaccable. If his commitment to Peiping is today less than total, and. presumably undefined by a formal treaty, it still represents a firm belief that Cambodia requires a champion and that China is the only one available.
In view of the recent changes in government in Thailand and South Vietnam, some improvement in Cambodia's relations with these countries cannot be ruled out,' Thai-Cambodian relations in particular would appear to be susceptible of improvement, inasmuch as there is no longer a territorial matter in dispute, and Sarit is no longer premier. Any significant rapprochement however, appears unlikely in the absence of a change in the balance of power in Southeast Asia favorable to the Vest. Sihanouk has alluded frequently to the inevitability of a Communist triumph, and he is understandably reluctant to offend his "great friend," Communist China, in the interest of any transitory improvement of relations with Thailand or Vietnam. By the same token, he can be counted upon to be among the last to recognize any trend against the Communists, should one develop.
Sihanouk does not look for a long life for the Cambodian monarchy, and in his pessimistic moods ruminates on the problems inherent in conversion to a People's Republic. Basically, however, he is far less interested in what form of government may evolve in Cambodia than in preserving it as a political entity. If in the land of the blind the one-eyed man is King, Sihanouk may in fact deserve mention with the Khmer rulers of old.
It is likely that a successor regime to that of Sihanouk--presumably representing some amalgam of palace and Sangkum elements--would be more easy for the United States to deal with than is the current regime. The faces of geopolitics, however, are unlikely to bring about any dramatic reversal of Sihanouk's policies -by a successor. Although a successor regime would presumably take a more tolerant view of U.S. aid. It would be no more desirous of antagonizing China than is Sihanouk, and not necessarily any more accommodating concerning Thailand and South Vietnam. The most reasonable hope is for a return by Cambodia to more of a "true" neutrality.
Role and importance of the United States and France in Present-day Cambodia Selective principles, confusing signals: French and US policy on Cambodia
by François Danchaud and Dylan Hendrickson http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/cambodia/institutions-personalities.php Although France and the US no longer have significant strategic interests in Cambodia, their long involvement in Vietnam has conditioned their roles in Cambodia in contrasting ways, at times exacerbating, if not directly contributing to internal political tensions.
Courting Vietnam
France was seen to have 'saved' Cambodia from the hegemonic tendencies of its neighbours with the establishment of its protectorate in 1887, though its strategic interest in Southeast Asia has always revolved around Vietnam and continues to do so. The strong attraction Vietnam holds economically for France means that its efforts to promote good relations with Vietnam as well as to restore French influence over its Indochinese colonial empire have strongly influenced its policy on Cambodia.
Following Cambodia's international isolation during the 1980s, France was the first major Western power to restore relations with the Hun Sen regime by re-opening its Phnom Penh embassy in 1991. France led the rally to declare Hun Sen's victory in the 1993 elections and, in spite of Prince Ranariddh's surprise victory, the perceived threat he posed to French relations with Vietnam means that Hun Sen remains in favour. This relationship was clearly illustrated by France's muted response to both the July coup and Hun Sen's 1998 electoral victory under widespread allegations of fraud.
Punishing Vietnam
The US response to the July coup was also heavily influenced by its historical role in Vietnam, one which still casts a long and painful shadow. Though the initial response by the US Embassy in Phnom Penh was also muted and likely interpreted by Hun Sen as an indication that the US would not take sides, the US State Department soon came under domestic pressure to condemn the 'communist dictator' Hun Sen. Although the US has sought stronger ties with Vietnam in recent years as part of its policy of normalizing relations, allowing Vietnam the moral victory of seeing its 'man' Hun Sen retain power was a step too far for right-wing elements within the American Congress still intent on punishing Vietnam for the war.
Congress' action forced the State Department to take a strong line, to cut all but essential humanitarian assistance to Cambodia, and to pressure Hun Sen to allow Prince Ranariddh's participation in the July elections. Although unhappy with Ranariddh for his failings as Prime Minister, strong US political backing was provided for him in exile which, along with the support of other countries, was a crucial lifeline for FUNCINPEC. While the first serious attempt to use political conditionalities, there was a danger that it was based on a simplistic assumption about how democracy should be supported in Cambodia. At the same time, it also raised the spectre of partisan involvement by the US in Cambodia's affairs, reminiscent of the Cold War.
Hollow principles
The US position contrasted sharply with France's unwillingness to condemn the July events and their pragmatic argument that 'stability' should take precedence given the 'new political reality' in Cambodia. The lack of consensus between the two camps was not lost on Hun Sen, and was also evident before the coup. Furthermore, persisting tensions between Prince Ranariddh's Cabinet and the French Embassy, tensions which were often publicly, though not officially, expressed by both sides, also reassured Hun Sen that the response to his violent ouster of Prince Ranariddh would not be universally condemnatory. This proved to be true.
While the US role was key in bringing about Prince Ranariddh's participation in the elections, the limits of its principled approach soon became evident. With the refusal of the EU and Japan to place conditions on their electoral assistance, the capacity of the US to take a strong stand in influencing how the elections were conducted was diminished. While the US also publicly distanced itself from the Joint International Observation Group's premature decision to certify the elections as 'free and fair', the overwhelming response of other countries in support of it again undermined its position.
The ambiguity of the US position after the elections highlights the limits of a principled approach in dealing with Cambodia's problems when it is not adhered to consistently or when other countries do not adopt it. Without a search for greater international consensus, there is the very real risk that the policies of countries like France and the US - no matter how 'pragmatic' or 'principled' - will be seen to mask the pursuit of national interests.
Francois Danchaud has a background in law and political science and, as a journalist, has been writing on Cambodia since the mid-1980s. He worked with the French NGO Children of the Mekong in Cambodia from 1991-92 and returns regularly to the country to cover the political situation.
recognizing harsh realities In the absence of greater efforts to enable Cambodia's political institutions in line with the spirit of the Constitution, international policies unwittingly support political personalities, whether so-called 'democrats' or 'strongmen'. Moreover, with the international spotlight on the differences between Cambodia's political camps, the difficulties of governing are easily downplayed resulting in simplistic prescriptions for bringing about political change. The reality is that behind the formal trappings of democracy in present-day Cambodia, such as the National Assembly, is a political system based on factional politics, hierarchy and personalized rule. The hostility between the so-called 'democrats' and 'communists' disguises a high degree of war-weariness and general agreement on running the state along free-market and democratic lines. The question is: who should control the process of liberalisation? The 'winner-take all' attitude underlying Cambodia's political culture is reinforced by the attitude that 'if you are not with us, you are with them'. This attitude is ingrained in the psyche of Cambodia's politicians, including many of those - particularly of the older generations - who have spent time in exile. This undermines cooperation and dialogue and also makes it difficult for more far-sighted Cambodians or external diplomats to play the role of a neutral mediator. In a climate of heightened competition and acute distrust, there is little incentive for transparency in decision-making, much less consensus-building. Underlying these patterns of political interaction in Cambodia is the crucial role played by resources. Maintaining power is dependent on the ability of politicians to deliver patronage to their supporters in exchange for loyalty. All political leaders - of all political persuasions - are forced to play this card to stay in power. The past five years show that beneath the surface many of the so-called 'democrats' in the opposition differ little from their CPP counterparts, in the way they play the political game even if their stated intentions are better. The failure of the opposition parties to work together during 1993-97 is a sad indictment of their lack of success - if not commitment - in promoting the new, more inclusive way of politics in which they profess to believe. Moreover, the massive corruption involving some within FUNCINPEC during their time in power cannot be overlooked. Yet when these problems are seen by outsiders simply as causes of Cambodia's problems rather than as symptoms of its dysfunctional institutions, this masks the real challenge of strengthening political institutions. In the absence of easy explanations for problems, outsiders often have a tendency to blame current Cambodian politicians for a 'lack of political will' as an explanation for what is going wrong. To the extent that the accusations frequently levelled at Prince Ranariddh for being 'an incompetent ruler' or at Hun Sen for being 'drunk with power' are accurate, this emphasises the need to see the creation of political will as an important peace-building goal in itself, rather than falling into the trap of assuming that it already exists and can simply be called upon. The common tendency within the international community to search for a new 'personality' to lead Cambodia out of its troubles therefore seems like an excuse to overlook the dilemmas they will face once in power. A good example of this is the case of Sam Rainsy, considered by some to be the future hope of Cambodian politics. Young and energetic, he has the image of a reformer, and is adept at wielding the language of democracy. While he enjoys a certain popularity and demonstrated real strengths as Finance Minister from 1993-95, the extreme political positions he at times adopts have been interpreted by some as an indication that he is just another politician with a winner-take-all mentality. Whether Sam Rainsy is better or worse than other Cambodian politicians is perhaps not the key issue; the question is rather what can be done to ensure that he, or other people who hold power, are able to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities effectively. Without greater efforts to look beyond personalities and seek to influence the institutions which both shape and constrain the actions of Cambodia's leaders, international peace-building efforts will fall far short of laying the groundwork for a more stable, institution-based peace. Engaging more constructively
Pro-democracy demonstrators, Phnom Penh, September 1998. Source: Source: Jean-Paul Jaslet. While there is a genuine long-term need in Cambodia to restore some sort of balance between opposition parties such as FUNCINPEC which seem to enjoy more popular legitimacy, though lack power, and the CPP which currently enjoys more power than popular legitimacy, this must be done by supporting the political institutions upon which democracy resides. Without consensus within the international community on when, whether or how aid should be linked to progress on issues such as democracy and human rights, and a willingness to act, the democratic changes being promoted will not be sustainable. There is nothing inherently undemocratic about Cambodian culture, though many Cambodians have lost faith in their country's ability to surmount the huge obstacles which lay ahead. While this has contributed to an apparent reluctance among some to challenge the system, it belies the fact that there are many individuals who are actively breaking the mould. Often from a younger generation, these are people who have lived in exile and returned to join either the CPP or opposition parties like FUNCINPEC. Their exposure to more mature democracies has equipped them to exert a positive political influence over leaders who have for too long expected and received the unquestioning loyalty of their followers. These progressive Cambodians need to be identified and supported. This nonetheless presents unique challenges for countries wary of further 'interfering' in Cambodia's political problems. Insofar as constructive engagement implies a more interventionist approach, this will only be acceptable - and consent will only be forthcoming from Cambodians themselves - if the international community is seen to adopt a more united and consistent approach. This not only means matching their rhetoric of democracy with concrete actions to promote it, but also making better use of the wide range of political tools at their disposal.
Angkor guide by Maurice Glaize A highly recommended Guide Book to Angkor Monuments and the Khmer Civilization http://www.theangkorguide.com/ Preface to the 4th French edition Published in 1944 in Saigon, republished in 1948 and again in Paris in 1963, "The Monuments of the Angkor Group" by Maurice Glaize remains the most comprehensive of the guidebooks and the most easily accessible to a wide public, dedicated to one of the most fabled architectural ensembles in the world. In his preface to the first edition, Georges Cœdes (1886-1969), the unchallenged master of Khmer studies and the then director of the École Française d'Extrême-Orient, wrote: "Maurice Glaize's guide, more than a quarter of which is devoted to fundamental ideas concerning the history of the country, its religions, the meaning and evolution of the monuments, their architecture and their decoration, the sculpture, and finally to the work of the Conservation d'Angkor, gives an initiation to Angkor that until now has been lacking. The guide recommends itself on these qualities alone. By means of taking apart and rebuilding the monuments during the process of anastylosis Mr. Glaize has learnt to know their secrets and, like a professor of anatomy, reveals to his readers all the details of their structure. But further, in daily contact with the ruins since 1936, he has learnt to love them, and one can easily perceive the emotion of the artist as he faces the corner of a gallery lit by the morning sun, or views the light playing on the waters of an ancient pool at sunset... In brief, this volume is a book that is of service not only as a guide for touring the monuments, but also as a presentation of the results of the most recent research to a wider public. With these diverse titles, it deserves the success which I hope for it with all my heart... " Founded on an exceptional understanding of the monuments and an ability to popularise to a high level, this rightful success was soon gained - the work of Mr. Glaize being no less valuable for students of research than for tourists, or for the most demanding connoisseurs of art. With the exception of Georges Trouvé, whose involvement was sadly too brief, nobody had a better understanding or 'feeling' for the monuments of the Angkor region than Henri Marchal or Maurice Glaize. But if H. Marchal was the first to make use of anastylosis towards the end of 1931 for the exemplary reconstruction of Banteay Srei, it was M. Glaize who generalised its use for the "Angkor Group" - notably in the "rebirth" of Banteay Samre, for the sanctuary of Neak Pean, and the "resurrection" of the sanctuary of the Bakong. It would, however, be unsatisfactory to simply republish a work written now some fifty years ago without some form of amendment. All manner of events have in the mean time intervened that impose necessary revision - although, in terms of the Author's thoughts, those responsible have made the request that any alteration should be as discrete as possible. These factors derive as much from the unhappy events resulting from ongoing political changes as from events directly affecting the monuments themselves. On the one hand, there has been the abrupt and rapid decline, since 1945, in the state of some of the better known temples, such as the Baphuon and Angkor Wat - symbolic of the highest achievement of Khmer classicism. On the other, towards 1955, the availability of modern techniques and materials enabled the improved efficiency of the Angkor Conservation Office, which then expanded from a simple workshop to a research office with engineers and technicians. Under the direction of Bernard Phillippe Groslier more ambitious programs were devised, and large, urgent site-works, previously unthinkable, were able to be undertaken. The brutal deterioration of the political situation in 1975 and the resulting insecurity came to ruin these hopes and put an end to the activity that had previously run uninterrupted since the founding of the Conservation Office in 1908. The resumption of work, even with limited objectives, was to take a long time in coming. These facts cannot be omitted from a Guide whose primary aim is the reader's instruction. Likewise, progress in research has considerably reduced the importance for a long time placed on the notion of the "god-king" and the "royal linga", with more qualified interpretations being proposed by Jean Filliozat and Georges Cœdes himself during the 'sixties. There has been a similar evolution in terms of the symbolism of the monuments (in particular with respect to Phnom Bakheng and the temples from the period of the Bayon) for which a recourse to texts has allowed the release from mere hypothetical speculation. All of these amendments have been handled unobtrusively, usually with simple notes. It is with the same concern for "revision" that the original, but old, photographs have been substituted with a choice of more recent and more evocative illustrations. Jean BOISSELIER 1993
INTRODUCTION There is only one way to best view Angkor - without unnecessary stress and with some benefit - and that is to allow at least a week, and to visit within reason two or three temples per day maximum. If this period of time is insufficient to penetrate to all the secrets of the very particular architecture and the dense ornamentation - which require a certain adaptation in order to fully appreciate their value - it is instead permitted to at least taste their charms, to assimilate the rudiments of Khmer Art, and to leave with a desire to study them in more depth. A stay of short duration will, however, give a good idea of the ensemble - on condition that one paces one's programme according to the small amount of time at one's disposal, and has no pretension to 'see everything'. For this reason, we propose several itinerary types to aid the task of the hurried tourist. A minimum of three days would seem to us essential to make contact with the principal monuments of the group. Angkor may be visited in all seasons. However the most favourable period extends from November to March, during the first months of the dry season, when the temperature is particularly clement. In contrast, April and May are hot and humid, and then come the rains - through to September - which put one at risk of immobilisation for several hours - though without always lasting an entire day. They are extremely rare in the morning, and the sandy soil quickly dries. This is the time when the forest becomes alive and verdant, when the reservoirs and moats refill, when the stones become covered in creepers and lichens - and it is only important to no longer climb, except with extreme caution, amongst the boulders and on the sandstone blocks, which the moss renders slippery. It is preferable, particularly in the hot season, to leave early in the morning and to return before eleven o'clock, and not to revisit in the afternoon until three or four o'clock - the light at the end of the day being generally more favourable. The majority of the monuments - and in particular Angkor Wat - lose much in being viewed against the light. We would especially recommend the setting of the sun at Angkor Wat, where sometimes the spectacle will include the flight of the bats in the fading light, or from the top of Phnom Bakheng or Phnom Krom, or the terrace of the Srah Srang - or else from the beach of the baray, where the bathing is delightful. Finally, if you have the opportunity, do not miss, by the light of the full moon, the second level courtyard of Angkor Wat at the foot of the central tower, or the upper terrace of the Bayon. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Khmer, from origins to contemporary times From: Maurice Glaize; The Angkor Guide; Introduction If one is to believe the legend, the ancient dynasties of the Khmer empire were derived from the union of a Hindu prince, Preah Thong - who had been banished from Delhi by his father - with a "female serpent-woman", the daughter of the Nagaraja who was sovereign of the land. She appeared to him in radiant in beauty, frolicking on a sand bank where he had come to make camp for the night. He took her as his wife, and the Nagaraja, draining the land by drinking the water that covered it, gave him the new country, called it Kambuja and built him a capital. A variation, revealed on an inscription at Mison in Champa (mid Vietnam) and reproduced in various descriptions of Cambodia, substitutes for the prince the Brahman Kaundinya, who "married the nagi Soma to accomplish the rites" and, throwing the magic lance with which he was armed, founded at the point of its landing the royal city where Somavamsa, the race of the moon, would rule. Another popular tradition, though less widespread, gives as the origin the coupling of the maharashi Kambu and the apsara Mera, whose union is symbolic of that between the two great races, solar (Suryavamsa) and lunar (Somavamsa). This survives particularly in the word Kambuja - son of Kambu - from where derives the name "Cambodian" by which we now call the present descendants of the ancient Khmer. Whichever version one takes, the mythical implication is undeniable and the truth remains - that the Khmer people are born of a joining of two distinct elements; Indian and native. They are not, as some would believe, simply a people of purely Indian or Hindu origin who had come, following migration, to settle in a region devoid of any inhabitants, or where the indigenous race had been eliminated by mass deportation. Established since prehistoric times in the lower Mekong valley of the southern Indo-Chinese peninsula, that included not only present day Cambodia but also Cochinchina and parts of Siam and Laos, they were in fact a mixture - from an ethnological rather than a linguistic point of view - of people from lower Burma and various barbarous people from the annamitic chain, themselves in turn quite probably deriving from Negroid and Indonesian roots. The Indian contribution apparently resulted from a natural expansion towards the east for commercial, civil and religious reasons rather than for any brutal political motivation. Moreover, with the fall of the Khmer empire - that so captures the imagination in the extent and apparently abrupt timing of its destruction - came perhaps a total decline and abandonment of the capital, but, mysteriously, not the entire extinction of the race. With a little help from France and a clear understanding of the glory of their past, these people soon regained an awareness of their value and began to rise again, having never ceased to exist. Having retained their fundamental characteristics - their traditions, their religion and their language - their artistic talents need only the opportunity to revive. Some physical catastrophe, earthquake, flood, or a drying up of the country's economy has been suggested, and though it is difficult to accept that an earthquake could leave so many stone structures standing, there are however indications, such as the filling of the enormous basins and low areas of Angkor Thom and its suburbs, that render the suggestion of an overflow of the Great Lake or the rupture of some dike plausible - and it is common that such disasters usually result in epidemic and devastation. Likewise, the collapse of a perfected hydraulic system that gave life and fertility to the region could have quickly transformed to inhospitable areas of land that had until then been populated and plentiful. But human causes suffice. Although only five centuries separate us from the date of Angkor's abandonment as capital, it should not be forgotten that a hard and far less glorious time followed the four century period - from the 9th to the 13th - of her splendour. Already exhausted by builder kings seeking to ensure their posthumous glory, the Khmer people could no longer offer resistance to a series of bloody wars followed no doubt by the systematic transfer of the population to slavery. Ruin came, but not total extinction. CAMBODIA AND THE CAMBODIANS The geographical framework of the ancient Khmer empire is reflected in that of its monuments. Although these are found grouped in a particularly dense manner in the Angkorian region to the north of the Great Lake, one can however include in totality more than a thousand remains scattered over the whole of the area between the gulf of Siam and Vientiane on the one side and between the Mekong delta and the valley of Menam on the other - that is to say in Cambodia itself, the major part of Cochinchina, lower and middle Laos, eastern Siam and a part of the Menam valley. The changes that occurred over the centuries came not from any lack of unity in the population, but rather from a contrast of a physical nature between the dry regions to the north of the chain of the Dangrek mountains and the fertile plains to the south. Present day Cambodia is found bordered by the Gulf of Siam to the south-west, Laos to the north and Vietnam to the east and south-east. Its main artery is the Mekong valley, which crosses from north to south. This is joined at Phnom Penh by the Tonle Sap, spreading to the north-west in a large plain of water that extends for some 140 kilometres by 30 and irrigates the surrounding plains. The Tonle Sap - once a maritime gulf that now forms a lake - has the peculiarity that each rainy season, from May to October, its waters are no longer able to flow into the flooding Mekong and become choked, rising by ten metres and so forming a huge regulatory basin, whose surface area triples that of the dry season. Large water festivals with canoe races during November's full moon mark the end of this period, and the King, in a symbolic ritual, presides over the reversing of the current. Each annual deluge sees the Tonle Sap rise still further, completely flooding the forested zones that border its banks and ensuring a particularly abundant source of nourishment to its fish - so making it the richest fish pond in the world. Cambodia lies between 10 and 14 degrees latitude north, and the climate nears the equatorial with an almost constant temperature. The contrast between the dry season and the season of the heavy rains is, however, quite marked, and although the average temperature of the year is 28 degrees, the nights of December and January - that are particularly fresh - see the temperature fall to around 20 degrees, while the months of April and May are distinguished by a torrid heat reaching 35 degrees in an atmosphere charged with storms which never break. Although under the influence of the monsoons, the country is protected from the coast by chains of mountains ranging from 1000 to 1500 metres in height - notably the Elephant mountains, where the Bokor altitude station is located - giving it a less humid and unhealthy climate than Cochinchina. Here the skies are often quite fresh and clear - and extremely favourable to moonlit nights. With its eight million inhabitants for an area of 180,000 square kilometres, Cambodia is an under-developed country with little cultivation. Thin agricultural resources are complemented with fishing, a little rearing of cattle and some forestry, while a large part of its area is mostly covered with unbroken forest and bush, and remains deserted. Rice and fish are the staple diet, and the harvest is regulated by the rhythm of the rains and floods. The fish are plentiful - even in the paddy fields where they hibernate in the underground mud during the dry months to re-emerge with the first rains. On the Tonle Sap, during the dry season, entire villages are established on the open lake - their belongings suspended from poles with the racks of drying fish. The rural Cambodian lives a rudimentary existence, by the water if possible, in straw huts or in wooden houses raised from the ground on posts of two metres in height. He is sheltered from the animals and the floods and keeps his meagre livestock under his home. With just enough work to be able to pay his taxes and support his family he lives preferably in the middle of his small-holding, and, without much of a taste for business, is content to let the Chinese or Vietnamese deal with the surplus produce from his paddy or sugar palm, pigs, chickens or the fruits of his garden. The extensive crossbreeding over the centuries - the happiest of which has resulted, particularly in the towns, from a mixing with the Chinese - does not appear to have fundamentally changed the nature of the people. Cambodians are broad and muscular (standing on average 1m.65), are brachycephalic and generally dark in colour. The nose is broad, the lips are thick and the eyes straight and fairly narrow. The hair is worn short, even on the women. When they feel that one shows them some interest, they are hospitable and sweet natured. Sensitive and religious, the family centres its life on the pagoda, where the male youth is obliged to spend some of his time. Generous towards their priests - the innumerable monks whose bright orange robes animate the landscape and to whom subsistence is readily assured - they take every opportunity to venerate the Buddha and gain merit, marking the year with numerous festivals to satisfy a distinct taste for leisure. The national religion is Buddhism of the Small Vehicle, or Theravada, of the Pali language - which is also practised in Ceylon, Burma, Thailand and Laos. The monastic life here plays the principal role and the popular faith, while rudimentary and sometimes tinted with remains of ancient superstition, is based on the transmigration of the soul and the search for personal salvation through work during the course of an existence in which each action is accounted for in the regulation of the future. After death the body is carried to the pyre, and the cremation ends with either the deposit of the ashes in a small funerary monument (Cedei) or their scattering on sacred ground. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
How to use this guide book To start, please, click on the title "Introduction" from the 'list of chapters' posted blow, to view the details in this guide.
Part TWO contains the details (Style, building materials, architechture, and other technical information) on the monuments at Angkor
Click on "Google map" to see a view of all the Angkor area from space
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- List of chapters
The Khmer Empire: Implications from its Institutional and Organizational System on Present -Day Events in Cambodia The traumatization of the Cambodian people did not start with the Khmer Rouge genocidal regime. It began when the "land and the Water Chenla" were unified by Jayavarman II in 802 and became known as Khmer Empire. The unification of these two principalities, also coincided with a major shilt in the 7th century, in the international trading route from maritime to land-based, known as the "Silk Road." As a consequence of this major shift in international trading route, the main economic activities of the Khmer empire under Jayavarman II, had also shifted from international trade to land-based activities, and the center of the newly founded empire had moved from the Mekong Delta region into a region close to the Tonle Sap (Great Lakes), where labor, water and land were plentiful. Consequently, the organization of the economy of the Khmer Empire had become more regimented, as the kings had become owners of all land in the Khmer Empire suppported by a retenue of civilian and military officials to serve them to control the labor force and cultivable Land for the production of agricultural products, namely rice. Those who are senior members of the Khmer Empire administration, civil or military, loyal and subservient to the kings, were given the rights to exploit these lands and to be the masters of the workers who were living on these lands. In turn, these workers have become endentured laborers, and must provide, for free, their time and labor, to produce goods (mostly rice) and services (to build roads, bridges, reservoirs, canals, and temples, and military service), most of which was taken away as taxes to be transfered to the kings and members of their loyal retenue. Only a small portion of the production was left to these laborers to feed themselves and members of their family. So all laborers had become - to use a Cambodian word for slaves - "Knhom" of the kings and their retenue. For more information of this total exploitation and abuse of the royal power and its impact on the behavior and mentality of the majority of present-day Cambodian people, please, click the link pasted below , titled "The Khmer Empire; Implications from its institutional and organizational System on Present-Day Events in Cambodia." Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. December 12, 2009 SAIS 2009 Presentation on Angkorian Empire.ppt rationale for institutional org.ppt
Cambodia’s historical legacy David Chandler (November 1998) http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/cambodia/contents.php More recent links to Cambodia’s history and other subjects; highly recommended http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Cambodia.html http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/90520/Cambodia/52487/Independence http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/Cambodia
Cambodia’s past, with its mixture of grandeur, obscurity and horror, weighs on its people and on those who study it with peculiar force. Two stretches of Cambodia’s history in particular have tended to hold fascination and have shaped the country’s present-day politics. These are the medieval era known in the West as ‘Angkor’ and the late l970s when Cambodia was ruled by the murderous Khmer Rouge. Contrasting images Angkor Between the ninth and the 15th centuries AD, a Hindu-Buddhist, Khmer-speaking kingdom centred in Cambodia’s northwest was a powerful presence in Southeast Asia, extending its influence over much of present-day Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Hundreds of elegant stone and brick temples, over 1,000 inscriptions in Sanskrit and Khmer and a wealth of mesmerisingly beautiful sculpture testify to the magnificence and complexity of the kingdom, the richness of its art and the sometimes awesome power of its rulers. After Angkor was abandoned in the 15th century following a series of attacks from the west, Cambodia’s centre of gravity shifted southwards to the vicinity of Phnom Penh. But Angkor lingered on in popular mythology. Several of the temples came to be associated with ancestral spirits and a few became Buddhist pilgrimage sites. Inscriptions could no longer be read, however, and the names of Angkorean kings, their demands on ordinary people and the cruelty of the Angkorean wars were forgotten. Over the next four centuries, the power of the Angkorean era was gradually watered down. When Cambodia, like Vietnam and Laos, became part of French Indochina in the late 19th century, French scholars ‘discovered’ Angkor. Deciphering its inscriptions, they named its Angkorean kings, supervised the restoration of its major temples and established the sequence of Cambodian art. To their protégés, the Khmer, the French presented evidence of grandiose autonomy that contrasted sharply with the country’s diminished size and dependent status. The Angkorean heritage has been used ever since by Cambodian nationalists to differentiate Cambodia from its neighbours and to enhance its own identity. An image of Angkor has appeared on every Cambodian flag — of which there have been five — since the l940s. The Khmer Rouge The second period of Cambodian history that springs to mind is uglier and more recent. In April l975, following 90 years of French ‘protection’ and 22 years of independence, an indigenous communist movement known in the West as the ‘Khmer Rouge’ seized power in Cambodia. Inspired by Mao’s China, it stamped its utopian brand of socialism onto a population devastated by five years of foreign invasions, aerial bombardment and civil war. Until January l979, when the regime was swept from power by a Vietnamese invasion, Cambodia called itself Democratic Kampuchea. It was ruled by a shadowy Communist Party led by a deceptively soft-spoken former teacher named Saloth Sar who hid behind the pseudonym ‘Pol Pot’. The so-called Party Centre which ruled Democratic Kampuchea consisted of Pol Pot and a handful of colleagues who believed that they had ‘grasped the wheel of history’, as they put it. Filled with revolutionary zeal they decided to cut off Cambodia from the rest of the world. They tried to revive its past grandeur and forestall what they saw as the corrupting influences of modernity by drawing on the perceived limitless revolutionary empowerment of its people. Their goal was to achieve socialism faster and more thoroughly than it had been achieved anywhere else. The human costs of this experiment were enormous, and are still being paid by survivors of the regime. Within a week of the Khmer Rouge ‘liberation’ of Phnom Penh in April 1975, its population was driven into the countryside en masse to begin establishing a collectivised agricultural system. Thousands of people died on the way. Within a month, towns, private property, markets and money were abandoned; law-courts, government offices and schools were closed and religious practices were forbidden. As everyone set to work under the supervision of revolutionary soldiers, Democratic Kampuchea became a prison farm. Pol Pot and his colleagues, who believed that secrecy had played an important role in their victory, only revealed their identity to the world in October l977 when forced to do so by their Chinese patrons. Conditions in Democratic Kampuchea varied from time to time and from place to place, but were generally harsher than most Cambodians had ever known. The Khmer Rouge had systematically set out to obliterate Cambodia’s Buddhist culture, its family-based system of social organization and its educated classes. Between April l975 and January l979 perhaps as many as l.5 million Cambodians died from malnutrition, overwork and disease. At least 200,000 others were executed without trial as ‘class enemies’. It was only during the 1980s that the full horrors of the Khmer Rouge period became known to the outside world. The Khmer Rouge had presided over the deaths of roughly one in five of Cambodia’s inhabitants, pursuing what the French writer Jean Lacouture has called a policy of ‘auto-genocide’, which left deep scars on its survivors. What had happened in Democratic Kampuchea also altered people’s views of Cambodian history. This era provided a striking contrast to the prevailing, sentimental view of Cambodians as peace-loving, non-violent people, more sinned against than sinning, whose culture reflected the beauty of Angkorean art without the passion and destructiveness of Angkorean politics. The Khmer Rouge period, in other words, exposed an inherent ferocity in Cambodian politics that had been either neutralised by foreign ‘protection’ or played down in the historical record written to favour those in power. For many people, therefore, the word ‘Cambodia’ conjures up images of the medieval temples of Angkor — which seem so peaceful — or the killing fields of the l970s, or both. At first glance, it is difficult to establish any continuity between these two epochs or to see beyond these two clichés. The intervening centuries are poorly documented and lack comparable emotional force. Nonetheless, to understand the background to present-day Cambodian politics, it is helpful to examine the more obscure years between l400 and l975 when times of prosperity and national self-confidence alternated with periods of subservience to outside powers. Was Cambodia a great nation treated unjustly by larger, inferior powers, or was it a weak state unable or unwilling to resist the inevitable dominance of its more advanced and more ambitious neighbours? The roots of vulnerability Expansionist neighbours One key to understanding Cambodian history and the policies of its leaders lies in the country’s physical geography and its relations with Thailand and Vietnam. In the Angkorean period, Cambodia owed much of its greatness to its ability to subjugate peoples immediately to the west. The Mekong Delta to the southeast, which was populated by Khmer-speaking people, had not yet come under the influence of the Vietnamese empire. Like Angkor itself, these areas were easily accessible to armies, immigrants and traders, with no natural barriers to protect them. As its neighbours became more populous and ambitious after 1400, the territory and population under the control of Cambodia’s kings shrank markedly. Cambodia was often invaded by Thai or Vietnamese armies which, in turn, would be expelled by forces assembled by the other neighbour. This destructive process reached a climax in the mid-19th century when the kingdom was on the brink of disappearing. It was at this point, with its western half falling under the patronage of Thailand and the land east of the Mekong coming under Vietnamese control, that the French offered the Cambodian King their protection. During the French colonial era, Thai influence over Cambodia declined, but hundreds of Vietnamese civil servants worked in Cambodia and thousands of Vietnamese settlers came to live there. Many Cambodians and, in particular, nationalist members of the minuscule élite, were wary of the Vietnamese and fearful of their long-term intentions. This animosity persisted after independence and most markedly among the Khmer Rouge. Anti-Vietnamese feeling continues to smoulder today among many Cambodians both inside the country and abroad. Despite repeated Thai depredations throughout Cambodian history, however, anti-Thai feelings among the population have been rare. Social volatility Another key to recent Cambodian politics is the nature of power and social relations in post-Angkorean, pre-revolutionary times. Chronicle histories, law codes, travellers’ accounts and normative poetry from the period suggest that the King’s power was in theory absolute. The word for ‘govern’, or ‘reign’ also meant ‘to consume’. There was almost no corresponding notion, which is familiar in the West, China and Vietnam, of the King acting as the ‘servant’ of the people. Absolute power flowed downwards onto a powerless population. In practice, however, the King presided over a fractious family, rivalrous factions at court, ambitious officials with regional power-bases and a cowed but scattered rural population that was hard to reach. Society, also, was rigidly structured in theory, but highly volatile in practice. The word ‘society’ was, in fact, not introduced into the Cambodian vocabulary until the 20th century. Instead, the population was seen as a collection of subjects subservient to the King, who in theory owned all of the land. The population was traditionally divided into those who gave orders (neak prao) and those who received them (neak bomrao), between those who exploited others and those who paid homage; as the Cambodians graphically put it, between the few who ‘possessed’ goods and power (neak mean) and the much larger component of the population who were deprived (neak kro). Loyalty was not a two-way street. The volatility of post-Angkorean patterns of social relations was in some ways reinforced by Cambodia's dominant belief system, Theravada Buddhism. While it preached the avoidance of violence, it also awarded merit to those in high positions. There were, however, neither legal restraints on people holding power nor peaceful methods to replace them. Concepts of primogeniture or a loyal opposition did not exist. When a King died struggles for succession were often fierce and losers were routinely killed. Because Cambodia was regularly prey to foreign invasions, often encouraged by factions at the court seeking foreign help, supposedly absolute rulers were often fearful and forced to negotiate their positions with their rivals or foreign powers. During the French colonial period the King's powers were curtailed, though the institution of royalty remained powerful and deferential attitudes in the population at large remained in place. While political activity was forbidden by the French, little was done to diminish the hierarchical nature of Cambodian society or to introduce such concepts as accountability or a respect for human rights. Dependency was the order of the day. French rule, like monarchic rule in earlier times, was unquestioned. At the same time, the French brought much needed peace and security to Cambodia. The rural population flourished and expanded and a small, educated elite was trained to help the French govern their protectorate. With hindsight it could be argued that the French did less harm to Cambodian society than most post-colonial administrations. personalized rule Because Cambodia's kings — like those in Laos but unlike those in Vietnam — accepted French protection, resistance to the French in Cambodia was rare. Cambodian nationalism, which was slow to develop, was not particularly anti-French. When Cambodia gained independence in l953, its young King, Norodom Sihanouk, who had been crowned by the French in l941, embarked on a political career that took advantage of the ingrained habits of deference among the people (whom he called his ‘children’) and reflected his own considerable skills at subduing his political opponents. Sihanouk claimed to have won independence almost single-handedly, ignoring the role played by the Vietnamese-led communist resistance. In l955, in the face of the growing threat to his grip on power posed by Cambodia’s nascent democratic parties, he abdicated, started a national political movement, and swept to power as an ‘ordinary citizen’. Under various titles, he ruled the country almost single-handedly. Like previous Cambodian rulers Sihanouk interpreted opposition to his rule as treason. Fawning associates compared him favourably to the monarchs of Angkor. In the Sihanouk era, no countervailing institutions, such as an independent judiciary or an analytical press, were allowed to develop. His official ideology, a ramshackle confection called ‘Buddhist socialism’, effectively institutionalized the status quo. In foreign affairs, Sihanouk wisely opted for a neutralist position. His greatest contribution was to keep Cambodia out of the Vietnam War which engulfed the country after his overthrow in 1970 in a pro-American coup. This contribution, however, needs to be balanced against his failure to allow political debate or suppress corruption, and his tendency to monopolise political life. Sihanouk allowed himself to be compared to Angkorean kings and repeatedly stressed Cambodia’s past grandeur. In so doing he also encouraged some Cambodians, including the Khmer Rouge, to assume that they could — by virtue of their glorious Angkorean past — overwhelm the vast forces arrayed against them. The makings of revolution
Cambodia’s fledgling post-World War II political movements comprised both right- and left-wing tendencies, and covered the gamut of pro- and anti-monarchist sentiments. Despite the fact that King Sihanouk allowed elections to be held, he remained intolerant of dissent. This radicalised many young Khmers and, as the strength of the leading Democratic Party waned in the early 1950s, a more virulent left-wing opposition began to emerge.
The Cambodian communist party, formed in 1951, linked its opposition to Sihanouk with the anti-French nationalist movement. The Communists saw independence as but one stage in their revolution to completely transform Cambodian society. They had both a clandestine and a legitimate face and initially remained heavily dependent on the Vietnamese communists for support. When Sihanouk cracked down on the left-wing in 1963, three Phnom Penh teachers — Pol Pot, Son Sen and Ieng Sary — the core of the future Khmer Rouge leadership, fled to the jungle.
Even as the expanding Vietnam War undermined Sihanouk’s power and the Cambodian economy, the Khmer communists were forced to delay the official launch of their armed struggle. The North Vietnamese refused to provide adequate support to their Khmer counterparts until the Americans had been driven out of Indochina. Moreover, the Vietnamese communists were eager to maintain good relations with Sihanouk who had secretly allied himself with Vietnam in 1966 in a desperate bid to avoid being drawn into the war.
Following Sihanouk’s overthrow in 1970, the pro-American regime which replaced him steadily crumbled and Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer communists on 17 April 1975. This came two weeks before the communist victory in Saigon and ushered in a new phase of the Cambodian revolution without any connection to the one in Vietnam.
Prisoners of the past Descent into chaos Delusions of grandeur also plagued the American-backed regime that took office in 1970 under General Lon Nol. Encouraged by a United States increasingly involved in Indochina, the new regime quickly launched a holy war against the Vietnamese ‘unbelievers’ (communists) then sheltering in eastern Cambodia. But Lon Nol’s holy war was unwinnable from the start. Despite continuing US military assistance and massive bombing of the Cambodian countryside, the Vietnamese armies, much better-equipped and trained, soon neutralised his forces. The indigenous Khmer Rouge, until then a marginal group, flourished and expanded until they were strong enough to seize power in April 1975. The same fondness for absolute power that had characterized every Cambodian regime in the past reached grandiose proportions under the Khmer Rouge. Pol Pot and his colleagues believed that they could lead the swiftest and most thorough socialist revolution in history. Like many previous rulers, they paid little attention to the human costs involved and equated debate with treason. Like Lon Nol, they also embarked on a holy war against Vietnam, counting as he had done on open-ended foreign patronage — from the United States in Lon Nol’s case, from China in the case of Democratic Kampuchea. Like Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge leaders were also inspired by Angkor. ‘If our people can build Angkor,’ Pol Pot declared on one occasion, ‘they can do anything’. Resenting the patronage of the Vietnamese communists and their policy of subordinating the Cambodian revolution to their own, the Khmer Rouge stepped up attacks on its former ally in 1977. In December l978, Vietnamese forces launched a devastating attack on Cambodia. Within a month, the Khmer Rouge had been driven into exile in Thailand and a pro-Vietnamese regime took its place, protected by over 200,000 Vietnamese troops. Isolation and destabilization
Throughout the 1980s, the Cambodian government was deprived of all humanitarian and development assistance by the United Nations. Moreover, Pol Pot's delegation was allowed to hold the country’s seat at the UN, the only government in exile to do so. Because of the Khmer Rouge’s horrendous record, however, the delegation officially represented the so-called Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). This comprised the two non-communist factions — the royalist FUNCINPEC founded by King Sihanouk and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPLNF) — and the Khmer Rouge, the most powerful of the three.
The tripartite ‘resistance’ shared a hatred for Vietnam and a dependence on foreign support. This was provided through their sanctuaries in the huge refugee camps along the Thai border, home to some 350,000 Cambodians and the source of the factions’ fighters. With relations between the superpowers warming in the early 1980s, China was actively encouraged by the US to arm the Khmer Rouge. The CIA itself, with the support of the Thai army, Singapore and various European countries, ensured food relief and military assistance reached all three armed factions. When the US Congress clamped down on the CIA’s activities in 1986, they continued to provide assistance covertly and the British were also prevailed upon to provide the factions with military training.
With the tripartite resistance benefiting from the credibility of an international relief operation, the dividing line between humanitarian activity and war in Cambodia became very confused. Despite this massive assistance, the resistance factions never succeeded in gaining more than a small foothold on Cambodian territory. However, the US campaign to destabilize Cambodia and, by extension, Vietnam — the ultimate target of its aggression — was largely successful. With this broader objective in mind, the terrible price being paid by Cambodia’s people, together with the fact that the West was actively supporting the perpetrators of the Khmer Rouge genocide, could be conveniently overlooked. Recovery impeded The government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) that took power in January l979 differed from its predecessors. Headed by former Khmer Rouge officials, who had defected to Vietnam some years earlier, it understandably declined to stress Cambodian grandeur at the expense of Vietnamese intentions and took a more realistic view of power relations between the two countries. Under close Vietnamese supervision, Cambodia struggled to its feet in the 1980s though it remained isolated from global capitalism. Opportunities for corruption (or economic development for that matter) were few. Because of the welcome contrast the regime presented to the Khmer Rouge, few observers paid much attention to its systematic suppression of dissent and its monopoly of information. Cambodia suffered inordinately in the closing stages of the Cold War because of the backing it enjoyed from Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The United States and its allies isolated Cambodia by cutting all economic and political ties. Using the armed forces mustered by the three resistance factions (Khmer Rouge, KPLNF and FUNCINPEC) on the Cambodia-Thai border, the United States and its allies conducted a proxy war against Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The war dragged on through the 1980s, raising hopes among exiled Cambodians that the Vietnamese-sponsored government in Phnom Penh would at some stage collapse or be overthrown. These hopes proved illusory, and the main victims of the anti-Vietnamese strategy were Cambodia’s own people. In effect they were punished for having been invaded by Vietnam (the US’s enemy) and, at another level, for having been saved from Pol Pot (Vietnam’s enemy). The end of the Cold War sharply diminished the interest of foreign powers in the conflict and led to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989 as support from their Soviet patrons was reduced. Negotiations to solve the Cambodian problem nonetheless languished because of the severe intransigence among the Khmer factions and the difficulties of achieving a settlement acceptable to the major powers. Inklings of peace The Paris peace accords of l991 represented an honourable, if belated, effort by Cambodia’s patrons to distance themselves from their unruly clients and lay the groundwork for a lasting peace. Hun Sen, the young Prime Minister of the ‘State of Cambodia’ regime (SoC — successor to the PRK), seemed to offer a pleasing contrast to his predecessors in the meetings and conferences that preceded the 1991 settlement. Unlike Sihanouk, Lon Nol and Pol Pot, Hun Sen seemed to be open to new ideas and eager to bring Cambodia into the wider world. United Nations-sponsored elections resulted in the formation of a government of ‘national reconciliaton’ in 1993 between Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen. It seemed as if Cambodian politics — while still far from open - were emerging from the shadows and practices of the past. Although the Paris agreements were sweetened with promises of extensive foreign assistance, the powers drafting the accords also looked forward to a time when Cambodians would rejoin a wider world and deal with their own affairs. However cynical or well-intentioned these efforts may have been, what happened over the next few years, as David Ashley's article makes clear, was disillusioning to everyone. The hope that the authoritarian style of Cambodian politics might be altered faded rapidly as the animosity between old enemies returned to earlier levels. With Prince Ranariddh’s overthrow in July 1997, Hun Sen has again come to resemble a more traditional and intolerant leader. Indifferent to constitutional constraints and concerned with stifling dissent, this brings him into line with every recent Cambodian ruler. Cambodian politics have remained in many ways a prisoner of a past in which effective or ineffective despots have seen themselves as born to rule. The Cambodian people, who deserve a better fate, are still being treated as commodities to be commanded, outmanœuvred and ‘consumed’. The struggle for a settlement
From the beginning, the Paris agreements were worked out by foreign powers who exercised tight control over the factions and the form the final settlement would take. This was because, on the one hand, the factions refused to cooperate among themselves, and on the other the superpowers sought a solution which would officialise their withdrawal from the conflict on terms they found acceptable. For the Americans this required a solution which would not give any kind of victory to Vietnam even if this meant inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in a final settlement.
A ‘comprehensive’ solution
At a December 1987 meeting in France between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen, which marked the beginning of the peace process, the possibility of a power-sharing arrangement between the two non-communist factions — FUNCINPEC and the KPLNF — and the SoC regime was discussed. This would have ended the war, but was rejected by the US and China on the grounds that it excluded the Khmer Rouge and legitimized the Vietnamese-backed regime already in power. The inclusion of all four factions henceforth became the pre-requisite for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict acceptable to the superpowers; it would ironically often be argued that the Khmer Rouge were too ‘militarily powerful’ to be left out.
Future negotiations would therefore focus on an overall timeframe for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia; demobilisation of the factions’ armies; measures to prevent further gross abuses of human rights such as had occurred under the Khmer Rouge; and the organization of elections, which were key to bringing about an ‘internationally-recognized’ government. Negotiations would nonetheless constantly founder on the SoC’s insistence that a Vietnamese withdrawal be linked to guarantees of a non-return to power of the Khmer Rouge. Though this was simply interpreted as political manœuvering on the part of SoC to stall the peace process, it raised a delicate issue — rarely broached by the international community — concerning the fact that the peace process would legitimize the Khmer Rouge.
The factions made few concessions at their first face-to-face talks in Jakarta, Indonesia in July 1988 and February 1989, though the role of an international control mechanism for supervising implementation of a future agreement was discussed. In August 1989, 18 countries and the four factions attended the ‘Paris Conference on Cambodia’ where the US, China and ASEAN pressed for a ‘quadripartite’ government to be formed as a solution to the conflict. This would not only require Hun Sen to dissolve his goverment, but give 25% of power to the Khmer Rouge, a condition he found unacceptable.
International guarantees
Internationally-supervised elections were seen as the way forward, requiring that viable administrative arrangements be made for the transition period leading up to them. Drawing upon an Australian proposal to enhance the role of the UN in the process, a framework for a future settlement was proposed by the permanent five members of the Security Council in August 1990. The UN welcomed this initiative, though stressed it would need a well-defined and practicable mandate, backed by adequate resources, if it were to implement an eventual peace agreement.
In September, the Cambodian parties accepted the framework and in April 1991 announced their first ceasefire in 12 years. In mid-June 1991, the factions made this ceasefire ‘permanent’ and announced a halt to receiving outside military assistance. Most of the outstanding difficulties were ironed out at an August meeting in Pattaya, Thailand, which opened the way to the signing of the final agreement on October 23 at the second Paris Conference on Cambodia. This act marked the beginning of the transitional period in Cambodia, which would lead to the formation of a new Cambodian government following elections, to be overseen by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
Compromises all round
There were reasons for optimism at this time. With the end of the Cold War, all four factions had been deprived of external military backing, were weary of war and in need of international legitimacy. At the same time, however, the Paris agreements were the product of numerous compromises focusing on the interests of each of the Cambodian factions as well as the superpowers, which did not bode well for its implementation.
The bottom-line for each of the Khmer factions, as the next article underlines, was that the peace would not be considered a ‘just’ peace unless they each won a share of the power. Hence, each stood to potentially gain from signing the agreements, though not necessarily from respecting its provisions. But the positions of the Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen’s government, in particular, were irreconcilable.
Clinical Pearl: Naming in Cambodian Culture Author(s): Paularita Seng Date Authored: November 01, 1999 Date Last Reviewed: December 28, 2000
(Comments: This article is about a way of finding out the way a Cambodian identity can be defined by his or her name, which is quite different from the Western or other Asian ways. For instance, both the Chinese and the Vietnamese have a well determined and dating back to many generations. The same is the way the westerners do, except that the Chinese or Vietnamese always have their family name, first, and the Westerners have the family name, last; and that is they also why call family name, last name.
It is interesting to note the important role of superstition and fatalism in naming a newly-born child, and naming the child after the day they were born, Monday (Chan), or Saturday (Sao). Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. December 4, 2009) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- View Documentation
One feature of Cambodian names that often confuse westerners is the origin of family names and the order they are used. This can present confusion in schools and in clinics as filing systems and roll calls are developed. The Cambodian name is always spoken and written in the order of last name then first name. For example: if my last name were Soth, and my first name were Sopheap. My full name would be written as Soth Sopheap. Notice, there is no comma used to separate the last name from the first name. My family and friends will call me Sopheap, or by a nick name. In Cambodia my records would be categorized with Soth as my last name. This can cause substantial confusion in the American record keeping system because someone may think my last name is Sopheap because it is called last and use this as the filing name. I could easily end up with two files, one Soth, Sopheap, and another Sopheap, Soth. Identifying households or family groups can be equally confusing. The Cambodian children usually carry the last name of the father with some exceptions. Siblings may have different last names due to the favoritism of the parents. For example, the father of a Cambodian family name Sok, Narvaratt, has two daughters. The first daughter's name is Sok, Sophany; and the second daughter's name is Narvaratt, Keokalyan. The second daughter carries the father's first name as her last name because she is her father's favorite. Giving his first name to his favorite daughter, the father believes and feels he is closer to her. There is another circumstance under which a father may give his first name as the last name of one of the children. Cambodians are superstitious. If something bad happened to a family member (i.e. dad, sister, or brother) during the delivery of the child, that child is perceived to have brought bad luck to the family. For example, the mom is in labor, the sister has to go to get the midwife. Along the way, she got bitten by the snake. That is the fault of the child in uterus. That child will be humiliated, and blamed for any bad things that happen in the family. In this instance, the father may rescue this bad-luck child by giving his first name as the last name of this child as a comfort and a moral support to the child. The father usually gives most of his support, attention, and understanding to this bad-luck child. The first and most general way of naming a child is for the convenience of the parents. They may name the child by the day, the month, or the season of birth to help them remember that their child was born on that day, in that month, and in that season. For example: if a child was born on Monday, the parents may name them Monday. Another convenient way of naming a child is to give a name that rhymes with the Mom's name, Dad's, or both, or the sibling's. Sometimes for married couples without any children yet, the older neighbors prename the child in the belief of helping the couple to have a child. The second way of naming a child for those who are more poetic is to name the child after the flowers, the star, the sun, or the moon. For example, Dara means star which is usually a boy's name. And Chantrea means moon which is usually a girl's name. There are many, many names of flowers that are beautiful and romantic, and many parents name their child after their favorite flower. They wisely choose the name of the flower for its color, characteristics, and meaning so that it matches a particular characteristic of the child. Some parents name their child after a flower that has scent similar to their child's baby scent. By doing so, they think and believe that they are paving the way and hoping to have a child with ethics and beautiful as a person of virtue. The most important criteria in Cambodian culture are ethics, and beauty is not an essence. The last and most respectful way of naming is by older members of the family or the Buddhist monk. An older member of the family is highly respected and is considered to be very wise because of his/her life experiences. The naming usually happens three days or a week after the birth of the baby which is during the baby shower, and only if the baby does not have a name yet. We have a baby shower after the baby is born and not before like Western culture because of superstitious belief. If the monk names a child, he considered the date, time, season, year, lineage, element and characteristics of the child. If the child was born on a bad date, time, and year, then the monk would give the child a name that would give merit and fortune. Sometimes the monk changes the name of a child if he notices that the child is not healthy (sick most of the time). The monk calculates the day of the week that the child was born, the time, the year, and the season. He would then give the child a name that he believes will bring fortune and keep the child healthy. The Cambodian people seek help from the temple for many purposes, one of which is health care. We don't have public hospitals. The only place that we have is the Buddhist temple, a sacred, holy and the center for humanities. Giving life to a child is the first and most important decision made by parents, yet naming a child is also a very important step that the parents can give to their child. Cambodian culture is very rich. Cambodian people are very gentle, generous, and poetic. In any form of communication, tone of voice and choice of words are wisely chosen. Likewise, naming a child among Cambodians reflects tone, form, and character. And there are many different ways of naming a child. After all, the name is a characteristic and a life-long identity. We, as parents do whatever we can, loving and hoping for the best. This does not mean that the child will become what or who their parents wanted them to be. An old Cambodian proverb says, "If it is a bad seed, it does not matter how much you water or fertilize it, it will not grow". Dependence on Foreign Patrons Source: Cambodia and the International Community: The Quest for Peace, Development, and Democracy; Frederick Z. Brown and David G. Timberman (eds.) Asia Society; 1998 http://www.ciaonet.org/book/ass02/ass02_a.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Introduction For a historian writing of Cambodia in early 1998 there is little reason for optimism about the country's future. A pessimistic--even alarmist--stance seems justified by recent political events as well as by the persistence of problems, such as Cambodia's runaway birth rate, declining natural resources, short-sighted environmental policies, and failure to enact and enforce effective civil and criminal codes. In addition the last thirty years have been bleak, and for Cambodians the weight of the recent past in particular has been difficult to bear. Almost twenty years after the end of the Khmer Rouge era (1975–79), Cambodia's society and people continue to suffer from the physical and psychological traumas of that period. In less than four years, over 1.5 million Cambodians died from malnutrition, overwork, misdiagnosed diseases, and executions. The real number will never be known and could easily be higher. The regime's anti-urban, anti-"bourgeois" purges decimated Cambodia's small elite and destroyed the fragile trust that existed among different segments of the population. Its dogmatic, vengeful policies and ham-fisted administration hastened the deaths of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children. Tens of thousands of others were executed as "class enemies" or "spies." When the regime was driven from power, fear of the Vietnamese, weariness, socialism, and the promise of safety drove half a million survivors to seek asylum overseas. Cambodia's institutions, not robust in the best of times, were smashed or abandoned and had to be rebuilt from scratch. Progress in the 1980s was extraordinary, considering the magnitude of what had happened and the scarcity of resources available to the new, Vietnamese-sponsored regime, isolated by the quarantine imposed on it by allied nations hostile to Vietnam. At the same time, the new government treated its opponents harshly, and for several years Cambodia was closely monitored by Vietnamese officials. 1 In the meantime, tens of thousands of Khmer Rouge soldiers, refugees, and dependents were encamped along both sides of the Thai-Cambodian border. They posed a baleful threat to Cambodia, inflicted thousands of casualties on Vietnamese and Cambodian forces sent to oppose them, and were a source of unfocused but severe anxiety for millions of Khmer. The discredited Khmer Rouge and their unrepentant leaders flourished for a decade under the patronage of China, Thailand, and the United States. Calls from smaller nations to bring Pol Pot and his colleagues to justice for their crimes against humanity were repeatedly brushed aside in the interests of realpolitik. Recent calls for a trial of the Khmer Rouge leadership emanating from some of the people who stonewalled the idea for many years may ring a little hollow. Since the 1970s hundreds of thousands of land mines, strewn across the landscape by the Khmer Rouge and their opponents, have been another source of trauma. The mines have maimed and killed thousands of people. They also have made thousands of hectares of land uncultivable, roads hazardous, and marketing goods a perilous undertaking. The mines continue to cripple and kill dozens of Cambodians every month. Twenty years of internecine warfare have left Cambodia with one of the world's highest numbers of widows as heads of families. The psychic damage of these wars and of the Khmer Rouge era on survivors, certainly of mammoth proportions, can never be assessed. Cambodia continues to stagger under the weight of a range of fundamental problems that are rooted in the nation's location and history. These problems--which collectively constitute the heavy burden of Cambodia's past--include its physical vulnerability, the deceptive lure of its history, and its volatile political culture, which suffers from a bizarre blend of tyranny and dependence. This chapter will address the sources and major implications of these problems.
_______________________________________________________________________ THE KHMER MENTALITY (Based on a 1997 translation of the original Khmer text, Proloeng Khmer," published in 1973. Author: Professor Sar Sarun (deceased)) (Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences, University of Phnom Penh Editing Author: Khmer Aphiwath Group. Publisher: Khmer Aphiwath Group, Melbourne, Australia. Translator: Kua Cham. Further Edited 2003 for the Khmer Institute by Vannareth Lamm and William Snyder) - The First Root: MATRIARCHY
A principal component of the Khmer mentality is matriarchy. At all levels of organization within Khmer society, ranging from family life to national government, the accepted leader or decision-maker is a woman. This pattern dates back to the beginnings of our recorded history. During the Funan Period we had as our monarch a queen known variously as "Soma," "Liev Yi," or "Neang Neak." An Indian prince known as "Kaodinhya" (Indian name), "Hun Tien" (Chinese name), or "Preah Thong" (traditional Khmer name) conquered the nation of Funan and eventually married the Khmer queen. During the wedding the prince followed the queen, and held on to the edge of her scarf so as not to be distracted by his surroundings. Our Khmer ancestors carved this story into the walls of Angkor to remind us of the ancient origins of our matriarchy. At present-day royal weddings, custom still requires the groom to hold the edge of the bride's scarf. For ordinary people as well, matriarchy is a basic principle of social organization. This can be seen in the titles of important positions, in educational maxims, and in common social beliefs. A) Within the family, female titles normally precede male ones: • "Mother and father" • "Grandmother and grandfather" • "Aunt and uncle" B) In the armed forces, important titles include: • "Mother of the army" (army chief) • "Mother of the command" (commander) • "Deputy mother of the command" (deputy commander) C) Government titles include: • "Mother of the commune" (Commune leader) • "Mother of the town" (Mayor) • "Mother of the district" (District councilor) • "Mother of the block" (Block representative for a group of ten households) D) An educational maxim: • "It is better to face a shipwreck than to have the house burn down." (Meaning: it is better to lose the father than the mother, because the father is less important.) E) Some common social beliefs can be expressed as follows: • Clean husband + Corrupt wife = Corrupt • Bribe-free husband + Bribed wife = Bribed • Husband's disapproval + Wife's approval = Approval The wife is the chief of the family, while the husband seeks work outside the home in order to bring money back to her. If the sum is less than expected, his wife may chastise him. Khmer wives have the personality of "master-wife." In contrast, in Chinese society the husband controls the family's finances, and Chinese wives have the personality of "slave-wife." - The Second Root: HIDDEN STRENGTH
According to current research into our national history, a second element of the Khmer mentality is a "hidden strength," which has kept the nation from perishing despite repeated attacks from the outside world. We are now asking ourselves, "What is this hidden strength?" Many academics, as well as other citizens who are concerned with the nation's future integrity, are now searching for the source of this defensive power. Historical research tells us that the Khmer nation has repeatedly been invaded. In some of these periods the Khmers were enslaved by the Thais. The successive Khmer capitals of Angkor and Longvek were subjected to terrible devastation. The great sages and scholars were taken prisoner and sent to serve in the invaders' country. How have the Khmer land and the Khmer people survived to the present day? These case studies show that the Khmer have a hidden quality of persistence, which gives them defensive strength and keeps the Khmer nation from falling. For this reason our ancestors created the popular proverb, "The Khmer territories will never perish." The very fact that they had the confidence to say this clearly indicates the strength contained in the Khmer mentality. Yet, we no longer know the exact nature of this essential, hidden strength, nor exactly where it resides in the Khmer identity. Only when we find this hidden part of the Khmer spirit can we continue to protect our land and our nation from danger. Until then, we will have no reason to believe the optimistic proverb mentioned above. The Khmer spirit and identity are tightly intertwined with our culture and civilization. - The Third Root: SELF-PRAISE
The third element of the Khmer mentality, based ultimately on considerations of geography, lies in the fact that the Khmer have considerable pride, and have a strong inclination to praise themselves. This is because the Khmer people originally belonged to an ethnic family known as the Mon-Khmer, which inhabited the entire peninsula of Indochina. At that time the region was called Sovanna Phum ('Golden Country'), and shared a border with China. The name comes from the Pali words sovann, meaning 'gold', and phum, meaning 'land' or 'country'. People living in the Golden Country of Sovanna Phum led joyful lives, blessed with natural riches, and in their unconscious mind there slowly developed a high level of pride, as well as a tendency to boast. The inhabitants of Sovanna Phum belonged to three different ethnic groups: the Mon, the Cham, and the Khmer. They lived in tribal communities, without clear land boundaries, and mainly traded gold with the Portuguese, who traveled by sail in the China Sea. The people of the Golden Country had no concerns other than the gold trade. This is what gave rise to their boastful attitude, and to the development of a high level of pride. In this respect the Mon ranked first, followed by the Cham and then the Khmer, who were the humblest of the three. Nonetheless, the Khmer were firmly trapped in the same up-bringing, and our Khmer ancestors made this explicit in the following parable: • The Mon takes the heavens for their seat. • The Cham raises a single palm to the sky. • The Khmer ascends to the clouds, but then pass through the earthworm's shit. According to this saying, the self-praise of the Khmer went as high as the clouds, but not so high as the sky or the heavens. Moreover, the Khmer usually came back down to earth quickly: They boasted, but then returned to reality. When the Khmer spoke among themselves, they did not realize that they were boasting, because they shared a common level of pride. But when they spoke with the Cham, who were even prouder, they could see that the Cham liked to boast. Likewise, the Cham did not see themselves as a boastful people, but when they spoke with the Mon, they did notice that the Mon were remarkably fond of boasting. • The Mon boasted more than anyone else, until they lost all their land. • The Cham, second only to the Mon in boasting, lost their land, too. • The Khmer boasted only moderately, and thus retained some of their land. Yet, by no means should we expect the Khmer to retain their remaining land forever. At present the Khmer nation is headed for catastrophe. How did boasting cause these three ethnic groups to lose so much of their land? The answer goes something like this. As they continued boasting and enjoying their natural resources, they forgot that the surrounding ethnic groups coveted their land. The Thai, who originated in China's southern province of Yunnan, became known in the Eighth Century when they started to migrate southward. When the Mongolians invaded China in the Thirteenth Century, the Thai took advantage of the resulting chaos and attacked the city of Sukhotey. They took over all the Mon areas, and also conquered a number of northern Khmer provinces beyond the Danrek Mountains, along the Semourn River. These included Nokoreach, Surin, Sangkeas, Kouk-khan, Sisaket, and Burirum. Moreover, they extended their control into southwestern areas, as far as Malaysia. All of this territory had belonged to the Sovanna Phum Peninsula. Later, in 1794 and 1795, three Khmer aristocrats were competing for state power. Each considered himself superior to the others, because all three belonged to an unconditionally proud people. One of the aristocrats, Ben, tricked another, Sous, into assassinating the third, Mou. Afterwards Ben tried to kill Sous, but failed, because the latter had strong allies. Ben then requested the help of the Thai army, whom he allowed to enter Cambodia. In exchange for their help, Ben let Thailand annex several Khmer provinces, including Battambang, Mongkolburi, and Serisophan. What led these Khmer aristocrats to fight one another for power? In that day there was an active race for power based on self-proclaimed superiority, with assistance from foreign armies. The aristocrats had placed on the throne a six-year-old prince named Ang Eng, the son of Prince Otey II, who was too young to rule. Their goal was to seize power for themselves. Thus, we can see from history that foreign invasions of the Khmer territory were possible only because Khmer leaders were stubbornly convinced of their own superiority, and failed to realize that the country was headed for disaster. The Khmer fondness for boasting is also well-documented, for instance, in such ethical poems as "Father's Testament," "Rules for Children and Grandchildren," "Fable for Children and Grandchildren," and "Conduct Rules for Men." All these writings seek to awaken the Khmer people from their dreams of self-praise and irrational pride. The following are some examples. "Father's Testament": DO NOT BOAST ABOUT YOUR STRENGTH... "Fable for Children and Grandchildren": A FROG BOASTS THAT IT CAN FIGHT WITH THE ELEPHANT... A TOAD BOASTS THAT IT IS AS BEAUTIFUL AS GOLD... "Rules for Children and Grandchildren": DO NOT BOAST ABOUT YOUR RANK... Another example comes from an academic conference held at Chakdhumuk Hall on 9 November 1970, where a Buddhist monk argued that the Khmer language "has excellent linguistic rules that are superior to those of any human language in the world [sic]." Further discussion of our people's taste for boasting can be found in a recently published book by Mr. Bun Chan Mol, The Character of the Khmer. - The Fourth Root: AGRICULTURE
The fourth element of the Khmer mentality is a link to agriculture. From the beginning, Khmer society relied almost exclusively on agriculture, and eventually it took agriculture as an important source of cultural identity. All aspects of Khmer education have their "roots" in agriculture, because the Khmer have a strong tendency to use agricultural metaphors in explanations. A) In the family domain: • "WHEN YOU FARM, LOOK AT THE GRASS." (Meaning, when you marry off your children, look at their partners' roots.) • "START FARMING NOW, WHILE THE SOIL IS STILL WARM." (Meaning, start courting the girl now, while your heart is still aflame.) • "TRANSPLANTED RICE-PLANTS BRING ALONG THEIR ORIGINAL SOIL." (Meaning, a wife can elevate her husband.) B) In the military domain: • "YOU FARM A FIELD WITH WATER." (meaning, you fight a war with food.) C) In the domain of national development: • "AGRICULTURE IS THE BREATH OF THE COUNTRY." D) In education, more generally: • "DROP BY DROP, THE PALM TREE FILLS THE TUBE." • "VERTICAL RICE PLANTS BEAR NOTHING, LEANING ONES BEAR GRAIN." • "HAPPY FARMING AND PLANTING WILL BRING TRADE, RESPECT, AND A GOOD MEAL. REAL WEALTH ISN'T HARD TO GET. THE JOY IS TRUE, BECAUSE IT LASTS." (From "Father's Testament"; original verse in crow's-walk rhyme) • "THINK ABOUT, AND WORK ON, GROWING RICE DURING ALL THE SEASONS. A RICE FIELD SHOULD HAVE A SIGN, WHILE A FRUIT FARM SHOULD HAVE A FENCE." (From "Inherited Conduct Rules"; original verse in Bhramngit rhyme) - The Fifth Root: INDIFFERENCE TO RULES
The fifth element of the Khmer mentality, due once again to considerations of geography, is a relative indifference to laws and regulations. Why should this be so? The Khmer region is seldom threatened by the natural disasters found in Japan and Europe: • Freezing winters • Earthquakes • Volcanic eruptions • Savage storms • Typhoons • Large-scale floods The Khmer territory seldom faces such disasters. Indeed, natural disasters are almost unheard of, aside from minor floods that occur every few decades, and even they are not especially brutal. The climate is so warm that Khmer people can survive without clothing. The only significant "earthquakes" are caused by bombs dropped by B-52's, which come day and night, destroying both the farmland and the occupants of many villages. Because the Khmer countryside is rarely subjected to natural catastrophes, the Khmer people are less aware of nature, and have little need to adjust themselves to natural constraints. This exemption from constraints has shaped the Khmer mentality, making it insensitive to social and legal rules except where there is coercion. This stands in contrast to countries in colder regions, where people cannot even survive without appropriate clothing. Yet, people from those regions who migrate to the Khmer territory eventually adopt a mindset similar to the Khmer people. Likewise, Khmer people who go to live in colder regions eventually adopt the mindset of the people there. Thus, the fifth element of the Khmer soul is explained by geographical conditions. - The Sixth Root: BEING INACTIVE
The sixth element of the Khmer mentality is inactivity. Because the Khmer people live in the tropics, they tend to avoid physical exertion. The Khmer artistic spirit dwells in a soft, fanciful, and romantic state, one that is low in energy. Khmer music tends to be sentimental, and to make people sleepy. Khmer people move slowly. They set off for the workplace at a relaxed pace, as if they were on vacation. These factors have shaped the Khmer mentality to prefer people who are inactive rather than active, conservative rather than progressive. Examples: The Khmer admire people who work less and earn more, rather than people who work hard and earn little. Likewise, the Khmer admire a government official who simply signs a document and earns millions of riels, rather than one who works from morning till evening and hardly earns enough to survive. In fact they should appreciate the latter, who makes a personal sacrifice and saves money for the national budget. Yet, if an educator and a customs official simultaneously ask to marry a family's daughter, the former will end in despair. Where does this come from? Indeed, this is the unfairness of society in a tropical country. Shall we continue with this lifestyle, spoiled by nature? Or shall we try to win out over nature? Shall we destroy this root of the Khmer mentality, or leave it undisturbed? The solution lies mainly in the awareness of Khmer youngsters, but the right awareness will be possible only after education – that is, after enlightenment. If we lack enlightenment, our minds may unconsciously drift in the wrong direction. Being blind or ignorant is a great evil, and allows other people to manipulate us easily. The authors of Khmer folktales exhibit this aspect of the Khmer mentality in the following ways: • An ignorant man finds two jars of gold hidden in the ground; • A senseless man usually has a wife of excellent quality; • A stupid man is the one likeliest to get sacred powers; • An uneducated man gets promoted to the rank of lord; • Kong Hean is made a Khmer hero by his own shit. Another example is an old Khmer saying that tells us, "A sage falls into a hole, while a fool rises up to paradise." Shall we retain this root of the Khmer mentality, or cut it off? - The Seventh Root: FUZZINESS ON COMMITMENT
The seventh root of the Khmer mentality is a tendency to be confused about commitments. This is because the Khmer people live in a country in which the various seasons are not clear-cut: the rainy season and the dry season, as well as the cold season, start and end at fuzzy dates, known to no one. In contrast, countries in colder regions have clear-cut seasons. For example, on the European continent: • Spring is from 21st March to 21st June; • Summer is from 21st June to 22nd September; • Autumn is from 22nd September to 21st December; • Winter is from 21st December to 21st March. Clear-cut seasons have trained the people of that region to have clear plans: • When they work, they concentrate on working; • When they play, they concentrate on playing; • When they study, they concentrate on studying; • When they eat, they concentrate on eating; • When they rest, they stop all work. In France it is almost impossible to find a restaurant that serves anything more than drinks before 9AM, or after 10PM. The Khmer region's fuzzy seasons have spoiled the minds of the people living there, with fuzziness in all aspects of commitment: • Work and play are mixed together; • Conflict at work is similar to conflict at home; • Study time and break time are intermingled; • Eating time lasts from morning through the middle of the night, until the sun rises again; • Office tasks and home tasks are mixed together; • A government-owned car is also taken as a personally-owned car, and used to carry the wife, transport the children to school, and even carry the mistress; • Experts at organizing theatrical plays, or at teaching in school, assume ministerial positions in the government (although different people have talents in different areas). In order to correct this root of the Khmer mentality, it is necessary to impose truly strict laws, and also to have good examples from the top down. - The Eighth Root: EXTREMISM
The eighth element of the Khmer mentality is an ambivalent extremism. Khmer extremist thinking is not always oriented in one particular direction. When we come to like something, we go out of our way to stick to it. But when we start to dislike it, we go far in the opposite direction. This is reflected in the following popular expressions: • The more loving, the more hating. For example, in the story of "Tum and Teav," Teav's mother initially loved Tum so much that she asked him to become her adopted son. But when she started to dislike him, she sought to have him killed in an extremely violent way. • Teav's mother: "OR-CHOUN, YOU HAVE POWER. WHY NOT USE IT RIGHT NOW? ARREST THAT STUBBORN SHIT TUM. HAVE NO MERCY. ORDER YOUR MEN TO BEAT HIM, STAB HIM, KILL HIM. HIS GUILT IS TOO HEAVY TO BE PARDONED ON EARTH" (original verse in seven-word rhyme) • When we believe people, we believe them a hundred and twenty percent. But if we stop believing, we stop forever. • If you drink, then drink so much that others have to carry you. If you can still walk by yourself, then what was the point in drinking? • If you kill someone, go ahead and taste the flesh. • If you put your hand into the fish paste, go ahead and stick your whole arm in. • If you want to cut someone, go ahead – don't just pretend! - The Ninth Root: HONORING OATHS
The ninth element of the Khmer mentality is the sanctity of one's "truth-word," or oath. Faithfulness to one's word is among the principal Khmer virtues. Examination of Khmer literature indicates that this has been true for a very long time. Some believe that it resulted from contact with Hinduism, for Hindu Brahmans were considered the agents of God, with a mission to spread their religion, and were said to honor their word strictly. Truth to one's word was seen as a major virtue of Hinduism, and indeed as the essence of its theology. • The essence of the body is chastity. • The essence of speaking is one's oath. The essence of the mind is courage. We can see this philosophy in the Khmer version of an Indian legend called "Ramayana," where a king named Preah Bat Tusarath does not dare violate his oath. The King has promised a woman named Neang Kaikesi that he will leave his throne to a particular prince, Preah Phirut, if he wins a war with the Sun. In Part One of "Ramayana," the city of Aiyutya is at the center of a conflict over the throne, and the solution is for the King's oath to take priority over tradition. As a consequence, Preah Ream, Preah Laksma, and Neang Sita have to leave the kingdom and live in the forest. In the story of "A Young Weaver of Palm-leaf Baskets," a personal oath is once again taken as a binding contract. The weaver is stuck at the top of a palm tree, and promises to become a slave to anyone who will save him from falling to his death. A person passing by, riding on an elephant, takes him at his word and initiates a rescue, without asking for any real guarantee of the promise. The elephant rider himself becomes trapped with the weaver. The two make the same promise to four bald men, who again come to their rescue without requiring any real guarantee, because they take the two men's promise as an oath. In two other folk tales, "A Man and a Tiger" and "A Man and a Crocodile," the main character promises a wild animal that he will come back and be eaten, as soon as he has written his will. In each story, the man keeps his word. Likewise, in "Golden Arrow," a king states that he will kill anyone who interferes with his war plan. When he discovers that his own consort, the Queen, has made this mistake, he bitterly forces himself to keep his word, and executes her with the golden arrow. To capture the sanctity of one's oath, the Khmer people have formulated the following proverb: "ONE'S WORD IS AS PRECIOUS TO A HUMAN BEING AS IVORY IS PRECIOUS TO AN ELEPHANT." Yet, the sanctity of one's personal oath decreased somewhat after an event known as "the lord's tea-spilling," which first occurred around 1845 under an occupying Vietnamese general, Troeung Minh Yang. One night the general ordered his troops to behead four or five Khmer citizens, in response to an order from the Vietnamese emperor, Ming Mang. The victims' heads were then used to support the boiler for his tea. This practice, which continued up until the French entered our country, shook the Khmers' spirit to its very core. In response, the Khmer people began to consider "tricky" approaches to problem-solving, as indicated in the following saying: "CONSIDER THE CURVED ROAD; AVOID THE STRAIGHT PATH." Yet, the value placed on one's oath persists to this day, and has been inherited in something close to its original form by people in rural and mountainous areas, whose strict adherence to their personal word resembles the practice of an ascetic monk. In mountainous regions, people teach their children that a person who fails to honor an oath cannot live on the mountain. - The Tenth Root: CHASTITY AND PURITY
The tenth element of the Khmer mentality is to place a high value on chastity and purity. Indeed, the Khmer essence is a devotion to chastity, especially in women. Khmer women work incredibly hard to preserve their chastity, including, of course, their physical purity, or virginity. Correspondingly, Khmer men are inclined to accept as "queen" of their heart only a woman of fairly complete chastity, for which bodily purity is a necessary condition. When a single woman loses her purity, she generally believes that her body has no more worth, having lost its essence. Her life becomes meaningless, and she sometime tries to end it through suicide. This stands in stark contrast to European women, who generally accept the loss of bodily purity as a natural event in their life, and who are more inclined to value the reality of their heart, which they consider the essence of their life. Khmer people place greater value on the quality of the body, than on the quality of the heart. There are those who believe that this emphasis on bodily essence has its roots in Brahmanism, for the Brahman likewise values bodily essence as a principal quality of Brahmanhood. Yet, we believe that such a transfer of values is possible only when the recipient was, at some level, already thinking along similar lines. The existence of this value in the Khmer mentality is noted in many works of Khmer literature: • In the story of "Ramayana," when Preah Ream takes refuge in a forest, his wife Neang Sita accompanies him. • In the story of "Preah Vesantar," when Preah Vesantar is exiled to a forest, his wife Neang Metri goes with him. Some people think that these stories are influenced by Indian thought. Yet, acceptance by one country of another country's influence, whether in beliefs, customs, religion, or ideology, is possible only when the influence is compatible with the accepting country's pre-existing ideas. Hence, we conclude that Khmer women's devotion to chastity existed even before the Indian influence, which simply added new momentum to our own way of thinking, and led to a greater fondness for stories that praise this value. For example: • In the story of "Tum and Teav," which is a purely Khmer love story, we see the Khmer woman's devotion to chastity clearly in the deeds of Neang Teav. When she learns that her lover Tum has been executed with a knife, she follows him by cutting her own throat with a knife. • In the story of "Sophat," Neang Manyan believes that Sophat has drowned, and follows her sweetheart by drowning herself in a river. Now, what evidence do we have that this characteristic is invariably present? One piece of evidence comes from the present-day rotation of Khmer soldiers through different locations, which is required by different missions of the armed forces. As the husbands respond to various dangers, the wives follow them and devote themselves to providing support. Despite the challenges to family finances, and the difficulty of constantly changing their habits and lifestyle, Khmer women take this devotion as their highest priority, and thereby preserve their chastity. ******************** "Knowing others is Intelligent; Knowing yourself is true wisdom. Mastering others is power; Mastering yourself is true strength." ********************* © 2003 The Khmer Institute. A Web-Based Organization. All rights Reserved. _______________________________________________________________________ TODAY- KHMER - THE CONCEPT of TIME By Sok San Should we consider the " unthinkable " as we use to think : it is not really important, before we go to the big stuff like Patriotism, Revolution etc... ... etc., ? For me... I used to observe in many occasions how the Khmer majority uses their time. In order to really understand their real identity I try to see their reaction towards time and their time-consuming by working with the REAL Khmer. The reason I take this problem to the forum is to find out why TIME is a problem for the Khmer(s) ? and how we can help and correct it ? According to my observation (not all Khmers but the majority) TIME is not really "clear " and its application has no precision if we compare it to others, especially the Europeans. The Khmer-time is "ELASTIC". This means that not all the Khmers are careless about time but if we try to see " how the Khmers in majority use the time in their own way " we will notice many... This writing is divided into two parts.The first one is to show about the reality of time-using, time spending or time- consuming of the today-Khmer and at the second part, we are intended to take a close look to the Khmer concept of time(s) and their meanings. A. PART ONE Before we go further..... try first to find the answer : "why the Khmer doesn't like to obey time ? In many occasions.... the meeting, the ceremony, the wedding reception etc... when we put the starting time on our invitation card by 6:00 PM, the real time we can start will be at 7:00 PM or 7:30 PM. In our schedule.... we plan for 2 hour- or- 3 hour- discussion, but we go further more to 3 or 4 hours. Our organizer(s) try very hard to obey time, but we fail and fail... One time... we started at the EXACT schedule, but just for the two or three of us (the organizers), the rest and the majority were really late. We have changed our strategy by putting one hour before the real time we plan to start ... but still the same. One time... we asked one Buddhist monk in his preaching (Teas-Na:) to give some ideas about TIME to the Khmer Buddhists. But later on, seemed NOTHING.... at the next ceremony... the same old game ! To really understand the problem... we tried to find out what's wrong with the Khmer(s) and time?- First, we started to do many surveys, kept all ingredients in the making of this carelessness. We, then discussed and discussed tirelessly in finding way to reduce or, to improve it... Until today, nothing is satisfied yet !- Second, we finally came up to some conclusions that : 1. This happened mostly in the real Khmer's (meeting, ceremony etc..) but rare Khmer(s) went late to other meetings especially with American's 2. Late or Tardy became a real disease in the Khmer community 3. Time-problem became a Khmer sluggish image when they ONLY dealt with their own people....their own community.( When they worked, they could adjust to American way. They survived with the American system, if not, they would be " Kicked Out " from their working place !) 4. Time-problem was not only for the illiterate... even the so-called intellectuals, they still DID THE SAME... I remembered when I was young our teacher had ordered us to wake up from the early morning, 3:00 AM to welcome Sihanouk for our school inauguration... and other time when Li Chao Chhi, China Premier, did a state visit. The real time we saw their faces was in the afternoon! When I was young I didn't mind much about this problem. In the contrary I was happy because I would meet my classmates and we together enjoyed our playing time.) I read the news at somewhere else that our Khmer eminent representatives for the Geneva signing the Khmer Independence in the 50s were so late at the " signing ceremony "because they were lost and they couldn't find the place (sic!). The signing ceremony was already done and for the Khmer delegation it was represented by the Vietnamese. Reason for that lateness was the night before they enjoyed so much and were so busy with their new "cake" in their hotel. When that Delegation came back home, we welcomed them at Pochentong airport as our Khmer Heroes ! ! ! ) Late and Tardy people were in most the time, the same people... their thick faces showed their CARELESSNESS and their SHAMELESSNESS. Time-problem was not for any specific Khmer group but for all, including: men, women, young, old etc... Time-problem became a BAD HABIT in the Khmer community. So there were plenty of EXCUSES..... when these tardy people came to the meeting. It seemed so hard... in dealing with this kind of problem. Sometimes it made us NOT really PROUD to be ONE of them... because the whole universe was already near to the new Millennium. - Who did pollute our Khmer identity? - What went wrong with Khmer(s) and Time? - What was its impact on the young Khmer generations? - Any other way around or alternatives for its change and improvement? ______________________________________________________________________ Cambodia in bad hands* (* Non official translation by Khmer Diffusion from the below original version in French.) L’Express July 26, 2004 from special correspondents Sylvaine Pasquier, Christine Chaumeau (http://www.lexpress.fr/info/monde/dossier/cambodge/dossier.asp?ida=428697) The country of the former Khmer Rouges is a gangrened State by corruption. Whereas half of the population lives below the poverty line, everything can be bought there. Even ministry portfolio. At night, in Pailin, Khmer Rouge’s previous foothold near to the Thai border, the hotel Heng Meas is illuminated like a Christmas tree in the heart of an obscure village, deserted by the invaluable precious stone hunters. Exploited with excess, the treasure which was used to finance Pol Pot’s guerrilla is practically exhausted. This evening, a group of Khmer rock'n'roll band, the White Lotus, came from Battambang, is giving its Show in Heng Meas, revealing its best tubes to the diners. A tearing song of melancholy diverts them for awhile from their foods. "Separated from her husband, she give birth to a child in a poor hut and its tears, without end, run on the child." These unforgettable words are the work of the Prime Minister Hun SEN, former head of Khmer Rouge military unit, in homage to his wife Bun Rany, who was left behind him, alone and pregnant when he fled towards Vietnam in 1977 in order to escape from the purge. He will be back in 1979 when Hanoi will send its troops to invade Cambodia which will be occupied for ten years. "Hun Sen, you were ours, how could you sell the country to the Vietnamese?" a polpotist ex-combatant exclaimed, at the time of an organized forum, July 11, by the Cambodian Center for the humans rights in a pagoda of Oudong. Thunder of applause. The history in Cambodia is as omnipresent as the spirits, but these are not the ritual which is able to alleviate it. Then there is the justice, but which Justice? " only 1/10 of graduates will find an employment " In Pailin, where he lives since 1999, Khieu Samphan, 73 years old, prepares himself for the Trial. Head of the State of Kampuchea Democratic, in other words Khmer Rouge Administration which caused the loss of about two million Cambodian lives, he affirms to have discovered the genocid only in the afterwards, in the "ignorance" of what was the massacres. "From my own nature, I am not able to kill. My compatriots can be sure for it." Initially, he says to his visitors that he does not want to receive them, that he had often to deal with insincere interlocutors, that he already wrote a book (1) to explain himself, lastly that he is in a "delicate position. I will be freer as an defendant, I will be able to express myself ". In front of him, there is the strange feeling to be the general audience on which he tests its argumentation and audience. He unceasingly insists on the fact that it is necessary " to place the events in their historical context". This morning, it will reconsider for a long moment the years 1950 and his enthusiasm for the Movement of Non-aligned and these leaders of the Third World, among of them was Prince Sihanouk, who dared to wake up "against the imperialism". Khieu Samphan, to hear from him, was neither communist nor socialist, but patriotic. When he speaks about the Khmer Rouges, he says "they", so that it is quite clear that he was not at the same edge. A fellow traveler, not more. If he had agreed to represent them, it is that he was convinced, in all humility, that Pol Pot in particular "was able to work out a strategy adapted to the challenges of the will of independence of the country. My duty was to take part in the fight for national sovereignty. In my heart and conscience, I believed in making the good choice ". Very often, he has this obvious gesture, of impotence, hands opened, palms tended towards the sky. "How to reconcile the human rights and the respect of the fatherland? And there is this problem which was never solved - the tendency of human being to abuse its power." At outside, children are playing, their cries of joy resound, covered intermittently by the din of the trucks furrowing the ground track. "I was in a communist regime, underlines Khieu Samphan, where the rule is to concentrate oneself on one’s own tasks, and anything to see, nothing to hear, nothing to know apart from that. I did not imagine all these massacres. Until now, the question continues to arise with my conscience." He was asked who is responsible? "I will not pronounce myself about this, it is too delicate. Moreover, I do not believe to be in possession of all information." Still in Pailin, Nuon Chea, brother n¡ 2 of the hierarchy Khmer Rouge and ideologist of the Regime - directly implied in the chain of command of the executions and the purgings - lives in a house hidden under the trees, a few hundred meters from the Thai border. "He left for Bangkok yesterday, in order to be medically cared, affirms his wife, without giving any information about the date of his return. "The foreigners, usually, she suggests, give him 600 dollars for his medical expenses". Under the Cambodian sky, everythnig can be bought and everything can be sold. Back to Phnom Penh, on the 13th of July. At the hour of the morning soup bowl, the Cambodian capital is in effervescence. Under the cover of protection against a hypothetical attack, the military police forces, the special forces block the access of the Senate and the residence of its president, Chea Sim, which hold a function of head of State in the absence of Norodom Sihanouk, 81 years old, king of Cambodia - in voluntary exile since last April in Pyongyang (North Korea). Chea Sim is also the n¡ 1 of the Cambodian Prachheachuon Party (CPP), ex-Communist, who dominates the political life. He has refused to sign, in the monarch's stead, the text of a constitutional law allowing the Prime Minister Hun SEN, in power for almost twenty years, to be renewed in his functions in an almost automatic way. Divisions within the CPP burst wide-open. The sovereign did not give any instruction to Chea Sim. He has only called upon his conscience. But, in order to express his disapproval, Norodom Sihanouk announces his "irrevocable" will theatrically to abdicateÉ when he is back to Cambodia. These manoeuvres extremely irritate the Prime Minister. Exit Chea Sim. Escorted to the airport by Hok Lundy, Hun SEN’s faithful man, head of the national police force, one learns that he flew away towards Thailand, in order to have a "medical treatment there". At the end of the day, the capital finds out its usual rythm, its "Land Cruiser" and its glowing "Pajero" convoying the powerful people in the frantic crowd of the motor cycles. "At least, there was no violent confrontation", sighs Sat, a young musician who keeps in memory the vision of the tanks - the first which he saw - in the streets of the capital, at the time of the coup d'etat orchestrated by Hun SEN against the Royalists in 1997. Sat earns 5 dollars, on Saturdays, when he plays violin in an orchestra. With his wife, a flautist, he lives in an unhealthy room of hardly 10 square meters, at the bottom of a labyrinth of quarters invaded by mud in the rainy season. According to UNDP’s data, unemployment would include more than 50% of the population, and particularly the young people. Every year, they are more than 300 000 to enter on the labour market. Including 35 000 graduates. "1/10 only, says Saroeun, a consultant in Phnom Penh, will have an employment." And others? "They are so desperate, notes Chea Vannath, president of the Center of social development, that they are ready to pay of enormous bribes for a work." Failing of having obtained the necessary majority of two thirds at legislative elections of 2003 to govern alone, the CPP is constrained to find a partner of coalition. But the Alliance of the Democrats, founded in the autumn 2003, will have given it (CPP) wire to wring out during eleven months. Combining the forces of Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), head of the opposition, with those of the royalists (Funcinpec), it (AD) works out a political platform and negotiates step by step with the CPP, driven back to undertake to democratic reforms, legal, electoralÉ It claims mechanisms of fight against corruption, of the wage increases for the civil servant, that of teachers’, or the abolition of the unequal frontier treaties imposed by Vietnam at the time of the occupation. It requires that the ministers answer the questions of the elected officials at least once per month, once per quarter to those of the citizens. That has never been seen. Alliance gave birth to a dash for hope. "The private radios gave a broad echo to its program, underlines Lao Mong Hay, adviser in Phnom Penh of the Center of social development, because it touched very sensitive cords for the population. The listeners, and not only the educated ones, did not hesitate to express their opinion at the broadcast time. At present, many feel betrayed by the alliance of the royalists with the CPP." "The concept of State has disappeared. All is only for personal interests "At the end of June, whereas he seemed to have back against the wall, Hun Sen managed to conclude an agreement with Norodom Ranariddh, son of the monarch, for the formation of a government. It is the third alliance of this kind during the last ten years. The assessment of the two first coalitions is not brilliant for Funcinpec: 58 seats in the Parliament in 1993, but only 26 today. The image of Ranariddh, splashed by rumours with corruption, was strongly degraded. Not so long thereafter, all the country learned that he had bought in France for himself a new bright helicopter. His royal ancestry is worth still prostrations in the campaigns to him, but, among urban youth, that does not take any more. "People call him " the sweet pepper "", ironically speaks a Cambodian journalist, outlining hands to shape of the princely face. "Ranariddh is distressing, notes an intellectual who prefers to keep anonymity. He will take the responsibility for the destruction of the royalist party, created by his father in 1981, with the fall of monarchy the ultimate consequence." At age 52 years old, the Prime Minister, of his own consent, would see himself in power for twenty or thirty years more. He and the prince have agreed to preserve their respective positions - Ranariddh at the head of the National Assembly, Hun SEN with at the top of command of the country. But, to reach that point, one and the other, not very confident of their troops, sought to circumvent the Constitution. This latter requires that the Assembly elect initially its president and his vice presidents. In agreement with them, the king indicates then a personality charged to form the government - who will have to collect a majority of two thirds among the MPs to obtain the nomination. A former teacher of Ranariddh at the Faculty of Law of Aix-en-Provence, Claude Gour, now in the service of Hun SEN, undertook to soften the constraints. The solution? A single poll baptized "packaged vote ": renewing Ranariddh, is to renew Hun SEN. The trick is accomplished. Moreover the duos imposed the vote by hand raising. None of the elected officials of the SRP, that denounces a constitutional coup d'etat, has attended the meeting. Already, Hun SEN has accused the head of the opposition - in displacement abroad - of seditious activities, affirms that he recruits an armed militia, threat to arrest him. Cambodia, one of the poorest countries in the world, with an average annual income lower than 300 dollars per capita, comes to beat a world record! Its new government counts more than 330 ministers, Secretaries of State and under-secretarys of State. One will note that this portfolio of ministries are tariffed. Confidence of a personality forseen by the royalists for a secretariat of State: "My interlocutor entrusted to me that this poste had cost 100 000 dollars to him. Undoubtedly should he understand that once in function I should give back to him." Here is what will weigh heavy on the public finance, maintained under perfusion by the international assistance and the donating countries. "The concept of State has disappeared, deplores Chea Vannath. All is only for personal interests, competition for power and the sources of enrichment ". The prince himself obtained, which is theoretically incompatible with its functions at the head of the Assembly, the presidency of Cambodia’s Council of Development, entering point of foreign direct investment. "And source of extremely lucrative commissions ", specifies an opponent. The whole of the system functions with corrupted envelops. Not so long ago, an informal report from the World Bank, quoted in Phnom Penh, estimated bribes twice more significant in Cambodia than in Bangladesh, country considered as one of the more corrupted in the world. One wonders why the price of the fuel is 70% higher in Cambodia than in Thailand, whereas the purchasing power is dramatically lower there. Based on IMF’s recommendations, that barely takes into consideration the local conditions - the porosity of the borders, for example - the government increased the taxes. However the companies close to the ruling party are practicing smuggling. "Out of seven liters of gasoline which are sold in Cambodia, only one was taxed", explains Sam Rainsy. On the other hand, the prices at the pump are the same everywhere to the detriment of the population. "When one asks for a wage increase for the civil servants, the persons in charge answer that they do not have money, he continues. It should just fight against the illegal trafficsÉ " Since more than one decade, the donor countries make up every year the deficit of the finance public, without being worried about the utilization and the embezzlement of funds they granted - 550 million dollars in 2003 - provided that a part is maintained to pay for tens of consultants remunerated at the Western rate. The reports of the international agencies attest it, in spite of a relatively steady growth of approximately 5% these last years, one does not notice any reduction in poverty, quite to the contrary. "Explain me why the people work so hard, and why they live so badly?" shout a woman, already aged, at the time of the Forum on the democracy organized with Oudong. According to a study of the World Bank (April 2004), approximately 43% of the population - against 38% in 1992 - live today under the poverty line, with a maximum equivalent of 1 dollar per day. Due to the lack of response, the score should pass to 45% in 2005. At the beginning of this year, the Asian Development Bank had produced more optimistic statistics, but "by surreptitiously lowering the poverty line to 50 cents", Sam Rainsy underlines. The infant mortality increases, notes the United Nations for the Development Program (UNDP): it passed from 115 per 1 000 in 1990 to 138 in 2001. But the government devotes barely more than 3 dollars per annum and per capita to the budget for health. In the past, "the biggest properties did not exceed 132 hectares, points out Lao Mong Hay. Today, some of them cover thousands of hectares to the detriment of dispossessed peasants by soldiers or businessmen protected by the ruling party. If there were no traumatism inherited from Khmer Rouge genocide, there would have been riots ". In Phnom Penh, on the edges of the river, not so far from the National Assembly and the Bouddhist Institute, tens of men work on a giant building site, that of Nexus Naga, hotel, casino, night club, built by the Malaysian company Ariston. An investment amounting to some 100 million dollars. Cambodia has already about 20 casinos - ideal washing machine for the laundering of the dirty money - the majority located in the border areas. "Each time that one builds one of them, Saroeun notes, the Prime Minister pockets 2 million dollars." The rapacity of the elite appears without limits. In 2007, the country will go to the ballot boxes for the communal elections, in 2008 for the legislative ones. "If nothing changes, the sanction will be terrible". The final touch on the canvass, a report of the United Nations reveals that the seizure of narcotic increased in a considerable way in 2003 to nearly 47 kilograms of heroin, for 19 the previous year. As for the methamphetamins, these synthetic drug baptized yama in the region, the quantities fallen into the hands of the police force are 50% higher than what they were in 2002. Since a few years, Cambodia was only country of transit. The manufacturing sites for yama and ecstasy are now located there. In June 1999, one of them has beendiscovered in a luxurious rented villa in Phnom Penh by EM Sam An, then vice general secretary of the National Authority of fight against drug. According to wellinformed sources', Hun SEN, informed, nipped the affairs. Promoted meanwhile, the same EM Sam An was dismissed in 2001 after his nearer collaborator, colonel Sok Sopheak, had been arrested in possession of 14,000 pills of methamphetamin. But EM Sam An, a protege of Hun SEN, remains Secretary of State to the Interior ministry. He still holds the position. The traffickers are protected by the ruling party and also by the bankers. "Some, within the CPP, would like to start the reforms, advances Kem Sokha, president of the Cambodian Center for the humans rights. Supposing that even Hun SEN accepts to do so, he does not have any more room to maneuver, because he is deeply implicated with these affairs. If he undertakes to reform the justice system, he himself will be one of the accused. If he goes after the military, they will have opened the Pandora's box similar to that of the coup in 1997. He bound his own hands himself." A clear warning to the donorcountries. (1) recent History of Cambodia and my standpoint (Harmattan) |